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ABSTRACT

Does Democracy Promotion
Promote Democracy?
The Zimbabwean Case

by

MAVHIKI Ruvimbo Natalie

Master of Philosophy

Why has the increase in election funding by both Western
international organizations and governmental donor agencies not
resulted in the deepening and consolidation of democracy in most
African countries? This study assesses this question with reference to
Zimbabwe. Significant financial and technical commitments have
been invested for the establishment and consolidation of democracy
in Zimbabwe, but instead of democratic consolidation, Zimbabwe has
oscillated from a de facto one party state to a competitive electoral
democracy and then to an electoral authoritarian regime. What
explains this puzzling phenomenon? Can democracy promotion
promote democracy, and if not, what are the pre-requisites for
successful elections and peaceful transfer of power? This project
focuses on electoral democracy resulting in power transfer, where a
successful election is followed by intra (within one party) or inter
(between parties) transfer of power. In countries where elections are
constantly held without an alternation of parties in power, can we say
democracy promotion is ineffective or are there other factors that
inhibit its effectiveness? In addressing these questions, this study
argues that increases in election funding does not necessarily
guarantee the advancement of democratization and good governance,
although it finds that democracy promotion even where it does not
result in power transfer does deepens democratic values. It does so by
investigating the literature on the following variables presumed to
affect democratization processes: democracy as a concept; democratic
trends and its recession; democracy promotion’s motives, actors and
strategies; democratization by elections in Africa; recipient practices;
the role of opposition parties and their strength; the will of the
recipient population; and the evolving problem of hybrid democracies
given the rise of China and it's strengthening partnership and

influence in Africa, all guided by electoral cycle processes. The
study’s methodological contribution is a qualitative study of
comprehensive empirical data of elections and democratic processes
in Zimbabwe compared to those in Tanzania and Ethiopia. The study
tests empirical generalizations on the development of democracy and
African politics on Zimbabwe and evaluates various methodological
approaches to the study of elections as they relate to Zimbabwe.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the first African country, Ghana attained independence in 1953; African countries
have gone through significant political reforms toward multiparty democracy. These
political reforms were the result of domestic, but mostly significant international pressure
— leading some authors to argue that democracy was exported by the West to Africa.
Partly, as a result, there is a proliferation of hybrid political regimes in Africa. These
hybrid regimes are increasingly ‘accepted’ as attaining a level of democracy, although they
still exhibit authoritarian tendencies. In these hybrid political regimes, institutional
arrangements that facilitate democratic progress such as regular elections are present,
albeit they lack legitimacy as political and civil rights, human rights and the rule of law
tends to be overlooked despite international efforts and pressure toward Western style
liberal democratization.
Since the reforms were largely externally influenced, depending on the level of external
pressure, at least thirty African countries have vacillated between electoral democracy and
authoritarianism (Appiah, 2015). Accordingly, forms of “political renewal” have taken
place through democracy promotion initiatives by international institutions. Principally,
Western governments and donor organizations have re-emphasized the importance of
democracy promotion even when the results are disappointing; mostly because they
consider persistent ‘re-introduction’ of pluralist procedures as important for the
consolidation of democracy. As theorized by Lindberg (2009) and Bratton (2013)
“repetitive elections even when flawed can eventually lead toward competitive democratic
rule.” There is often a strong correlation between efforts spent promoting democracy and
its advancement in the process of democratization (Hyde, 2014). Therefore, a country like
Zimbabwe is an outlying case then as the amounts of funds poured in by Western or
generally international donor agencies towards the creation of a democratic system do not
match its democratic progress. This makes the question of whether democracy promotion
promotes democracy problematic.
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Democracy promotion initiatives have often had two purposes: democracy consolidation,
and its deepening. Vertically, donors intend to strengthen political accountability ensuring
that candidates fulfil their responsibilities in representing their voters or citizens at large.
This is often through electoral processes — where elections are mechanisms to keep
elected officials accountable, aided by pressure from opposition parties, media and Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs). Horizontally, they intend to strengthen relationships of
accountability across government institutions and other stakeholders working with them.
Hence the focus is mostly on the role of parliaments, judiciaries, anti-corruption
commissions and their ability to keep a check on each other. Democracy deepening aims
to avoid a transition back to authoritarian regimes; a cessation of elections; or worse still
their erosion (where for instance, elections are still held but they are not necessarily free
and fair, minority rights are infringed upon, potentially the government has tried to change
the constitution or has imposed restrictions on other important institutions). Regardless,
increasingly, countries in Africa (not just Sub-Saharan Africa but North Africa too) are
sliding back to authoritarianism as democracy recedes (Diamond, 2015). The ‘transition
back to authoritarianism’ argument is supported by the fact that despite billions of dollars
being spent on democracy promotion, increased technical support from experts, the
advancement of technological innovation to aid electoral processes and vast information
on democratic processes, 65% of African countries are classified according to the 2014
Freedom House rankings; as ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’ (Freedom House, 2015).
So, does democracy promotion promote democracy? This question has not been
adequately addressed, although it carries significant implications for public policy — both
foreign and domestic. This study is an attempt to fill a scholarly gap on the study of
democratization in Africa with a specific focus on Zimbabwe, but also informed by events
in Tanzania and Ethiopia. Specifically, this study investigates whether the international
practice of democracy promotion actually promotes democracy. The answer is not straight
forward as the field of democracy promotion and democratization demands consideration
of an array of issues including historical factors, local contexts, donors, recipients,
legislature and processes of political awareness and participation.
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The increase in the number of ‘free’ countries has been closely correlated with efforts
spent promoting democracy (Hyde, 2014). Over the last decade, the United States’
invasion of Iraq has been used as an example of democracy promotion efforts. Often
discussions on the subject lead to arguments around why powerful states promote
democracy abroad. International relations scholars point to the issue of interests in
geopolitical and economic gain, while many more examples of democracy promotion
challenge this assumption. In 2003, the ‘need for the democratization of Iraq’ rhetoric was
used to justify its invasion, but the issue of democracy promotion came up after ‘weapons
of mass destruction’ were not found t (Hyde 2014). “Democracy promotion was used to
sell the invasion after regional justifications had failed to materialise” (Hyde 2014). These
developments kicked off debates and studies on democracy promotion. It is not to say the
practice was non-existent before this time nor is it a representative case.
Democracy promotion existed for decades as a key component of Western foreign
policies. More than 40% of its recipients are in Africa (Freedom House, 2014). Democratic
rule has become the most popular, legitimate and acceptable form of governance today.
Hence, the burgeoning of hybrid political regimes where democratic rules are
continuously synthesized with authoritarian, dictatorial or non-democratic governments
to gain international legitimacy. States often hold elections for legitimacy, although
denying their citizens real choice (Goldman and Douglas, 1988). Not doing so has often
had negative consequences such as sanctions, side-lining, a reduction in investor
confidence or even war -- although rarely.

Definition of terms
Democracy is defined as a system of arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote
(Schumpeter, 1947). Or rather the rule of the people, where governments are chosen
through free and fair electoral competition at regular intervals (Diamond, 1999) but
resulting in the transfer of power from one party to another. Citizens periodically choose
or even nominate in some cases a leader or government and authorize them to decide and
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act on their behalf. This classification excludes any bureaucratic or military domains of
power not accountable to elected officials.
The study of electoral democracy includes analysis of or an acknowledgement of the need
for minimum levels of liberties and the rule of law. These facilitate successful participation
when enforced. Even across democracies (those with competitive elections amongst
different parties), basic rights vary considerably. This puts the definition of electoral
democracy as a “civilian, constitutional system in which legislative and chief executive
offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage
(Diamond, 1999, p. 10).”
Democratic theory alludes to democracy as “a theory unassociated with any ideals nor
ends… a political method, that is to say a certain type of institutional arrangement for
arriving at political — legislative and administrative decisions” (Schumpter, 1976).
Schumpter argues against the basic theory that democracy focuses on competition by
potential decision makers for the people’s vote as the future and offers this modern
realistic definition: democracy is an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpter, 1976). In this case, the competition for
leadership is the distinctive feature of democracy and the one which allows us to
distinguish between the democratic from the other political systems (Pateman, 1970).
Everyone is in principle free to compete for leadership in free elections so that the usual
civil liberties are necessary and Schumpter compares the political competition for votes
to the operation of the (economic) market: voters like consumers choose between the
policies (products) offered by competing political entrepreneurs and the parties regulate
the competition like trade associations in the economic sphere (Pateman, 1970). Of the
various forms of democracy, this project focuses mainly on the electoral form where
donors support the conduct of a free and fair vote resulting in either an inter or intra party
transfer of power.
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Research background
This research is guided by three main bodies of literature on democracy. Democracy
promotion,

democratization

and

democratization

in Africa,

and

competitive

authoritarianism which will be expanded in the following chapter.
The historical origins of aid to promote democracy are difficult to pinpoint. However,
Napoleon, Jefferson’s and Woodrow Wilson’s initiatives after World War 1 are considered
the periods of its birth. Imbalances in economic inequality and under-development in the
19th century resulting from wars, colonialism and failed systems of governance motivated
rich countries to give money to poor and underdeveloped countries. Led by Britain and
France, Western countries provided regular aid to their colonies in Africa, Latin America
and Asia by the 1920s. They developed infrastructure such as roads, railways and ports
and even after the colonies gained independence, foreign support continued to focus on
economic development (Eyben, 2014). The intention was to assist lagging economies to
catch up with the advanced economies.
Eyben (2014) argues that the world had split into three, namely — the ‘first’ (Western
democratic countries) the ‘second’ (Soviet Union and its Communist satellites) and the
‘third’ (former colonies, which were now independent and organized themselves into the
non-aligned movement in the early 1950s). The United States became the world’s biggest
aid donor, starting with the Marshall Plan to help Europe rebuild after the World War. The
assumption was that the old colonial powers would gradually phase out their direct
financial aid as colonies became financially independent; and multilateral organizations
like the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund would take over
development work (Phillips, 2013). Later around the 1960s, aid programs began to
crystallize with states assuring their commitment starting with the “0.7 per cent target”
resolution, in which states set aside 0.7 per cent of their national income for development
assistance. The commitment was easier to fulfil for states with former colonies like Britain
and France but not for countries like Sweden which did not have similar obligations
(Phillips, 2013). There was a general consensus though on the need for humanitarian aid
(addressing basic needs like water, education and health). After the 1960s with efforts by
5

the World Bank, support extended to economic development, human rights, disaster relief
and democracy support. The United States Agency for International Development became
the first major bilateral donor to include democracy as part of its portfolio when it
launched its Democracy Initiative in 1990 (USAID, 1991).
In pursuit of a peaceful and prosperous international system, state and non-state actors led
efforts to export democracy abroad. Commitments to advance an international
“community of democracies” (Schraeder, 2002) under the Warsaw Declaration in year
2000 by more than half of the globe reiterated the need for democracy assistance. With
respect for sovereignty, mature democracies led by the US and Western Europe felt a need
to export democracy abroad. Promoters believe that, ‘good intents are sufficient to have
good intents’ as a justification for interventions. International organizations such as the
European Union, the United Nations Development Programme, and United States Agency
for International Development, Humanist Institute for Cooperation, Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency, Canadian International Development Agency, the
British Department for International Development, Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the National Democratic Institute share the
same belief. They carried out countless democracy promotion activities each year in the
newly emerging countries, including the young democracies.
The ‘global community’ idea has altered political arrangements that would have otherwise
been internal, into global causes. The internal affairs of states have increasingly been
elevated to global causes as democracies find other democracies more reliable partners
with whom common understanding, including trade and other exchanges are easier
(Goldman and Douglas, 1988). “Most countries in the world have agreed to democratic
principles and in many cases become actively involved in democracy promotion beyond
their borders” (Hyde, 2014). This subject will be further investigated using the works of
Michael Bratton and Richard Joseph on elections and democratization in postindependence Africa, including how incumbent rulers secure more terms in office, the
inadequacy of foreign donors pressing for greater democratization and the ‘uneven
progress in developing democratic institutions’ (Diamond, 2014).
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To effectively evaluate democracy promotion initiatives in Zimbabwe it is important to
explore theories and literature regarding its background, motives, actors (donors and
recipients), strategies and evaluations (success and failures) because over the past 25 years
it has found its place on most Western foreign policies (Carothers, 2007). What were
initially considered anti-Communist security policies before the 1980s developed into
democratic principles entered not on ‘geopolitical strategic competition’ (Carothers, 2007)
but on self-governance. In the 1990s developed nations began to contribute resources and
expertise for democratization beyond their borders, especially into Africa. Since then
“major established democracies, from Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, to Australia,
Canada, Spain, and others, have become active providers of democracy assistance”
(Carothers, 2007). Other international organizations such as the United Nations, and
European Union also extended their scope to democracy assistance.
However, since democratization widely involves “interference” in a state’s internal affairs,
its promoters received a lot of criticism as some considered it a neo-colonial agenda —
particularly in Africa where the majority of states had been colonized and later taken up
arms to gain their independence. Its ‘promoters’ happened to be the same that had
colonized them. Hence it was a sensitive and controversial issue and it received a lot of
resistance. “Over time, however, democracy aid opened many doors, and by the late
1990s, one could almost expect or take as normal that in a democratizing country, outside
actors would be involved in almost every sector and institution of political life”
(Carothers, 2007).
“While it remains emphatically true that, ‘elections do not equal democracy’ — that there is
much more to having democracy and making it work than free, fair, and truly competitive
elections — it is also the case that institutionalizing free and fair elections, with rigorous and
effective electoral administration, is a crucial aspect of democracy. And over time, it will have a
tonic effect on the governance problem in Africa”.
Diamond (2009)
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Lindberg proposes “Democracy by elections”. This project examines this theory and those
of his critics. On the African case he states, “African states will become more democratic
if they simply keep holding elections” (Lindberg, 2009).
The current democratic impasse or back-sliding goes against Lindberg’s theory on the
consolidation of democracy in Africa which states that the repetition of elections results
in democratization. By 1980 more than 80% of Africa had gained independence from
colonial rule. African states enjoyed democratic rule in the first two or three decades on
average depending on the length of terms leaders could serve. Elections were generally
conducted without much contestation as the same leaders ran for their second or third
terms. Towards the expiration of these terms however, there was widespread reluctance
by leaders to surrender power through democratic elections. In some instances,
constitutions were altered to guarantee and legitimize the extension of presidential terms
by increasing them. In other cases, steps were taken to avoid or control elections. In some
cases, power was transferred to family members or trusted friends of the ruling elite. These
developments dismissed the hopes of Huntington’s “third wave” of democratization.
Evaluations of the on-going processes of democratic renewal in Africa must be considered
against the background of the continent’s’ past experiences (Ihonvbere, 2003). Foreign
domination, structural distortions, underdevelopment, weak state structures, dependence
and the politicization of the national question complicate any democratic governance
attempts. These conditions placed Africa on an uneven path to development. While the
rest of the world focused on the growth of their economies and the development of their
states, much of Africa was struggling with transition, including the change of
administration, adjusting existing systems to fit new ideals, the pressure of fulfilling
independence promises, intra-cultural differences, transitional justice issues and the
ravages of wars — both internal and intrastate. This is to say that countries cannot be
compared on their pace to democracy as the preconditions are not comparable, (a
justification often given by authoritarian regimes to explain their lag in democratization).
Sandbrook (1996) cautions nonetheless that, “Although these are ‘onerous conditions’,
their impact on democratization requires some clarification assuming they do not prevent
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a transition to democracy by means of reasonably ‘free and fair’ electoral contest. Such a
contest can be successfully arranged even in a poor underdeveloped country suffering
from ethnic / regional tensions, rampant clientelism and limited democratic experience"
(Sandbrook, 1996 in Appiah, 2015). This is why Lindberg suggests “repeated democratic
behavior even if the elections are flawed” to strengthen and consolidate democracy in
Africa. These issues will be expanded in the chapter on Literature review.

Rationale and significance
There has not been much disagreement on the need for industrialized states to cooperate
with developing countries on issues like the economy, trade liberalization, (economic)
technical support, poverty reduction or food security. However, still contentious are issues
around governance as Western ideas of development are not independent of good
governance and democracy. The question has been — how to achieve democracy?
Western states emphasize on the need for exercising human rights and free political
competition -- an idea not all leading economic players share. Lately, it has become almost
impossible to talk about African development issues without mentioning China which not
only has become a key global player but one of Africa’s biggest ally. Its record on
governance and democracy remains questionable when compared to the Western model.
More and more China is cooperating with states shunned by the West especially
Zimbabwe. Not only that, increasingly African states are adopting ‘look East’ policies
which this study attributes to the relatively few demands China imposes (if any) for
cooperation. What then does this mean for democracy promotion? Can the Chinese
dimension reduce the pressure of Western democracy ideals and foster illiberal democracy
(though elections take place, public participation and civil liberties are limited)?
This project also investigates work on competitive authoritarianism; a concept developed
after noting an increase in the number of repressive regimes that combine electoral
democratic practices with authoritarian tendencies and are even sometimes mistaken as
democratic regimes. This is necessary to explain the problem when it comes to
investigating democratization in Africa. Often a country’s level of democracy is measured
by the ability to hold transparent or less contested elections under a conducive
9

environment that enables competitors and voters to express themselves freely. The
problem however is dictators or authoritarians have mastered this, as an avenue for
securing aid. In turn, this dilutes or compromises future democratic standards.
Such regimes have been labelled ‘pseudo democracies,' ‘hybrid regimes,' ‘iliberal
democracies,' ‘semi-democracies,' ‘virtual democracies,' ‘electoral democracies,' ‘semiauthoritarian,' ‘soft-authoritarian,' ‘electoral authoritarian’ or ‘partly free’ (Levitsky and
Way, 2002). From studies carried out in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania, it is evident
that most democracy promotion activities in Africa are nurturing such democracies. As
donors increase pressure on authoritarian regimes to conform to democratic norms by
various forms especially ‘conditionality’ (the carrot and stick practice), more and more
competitive regimes are developing. They will experience prolonged periods of
‘controlled’ transition (Diamond, 2014) as they use elections as a legitimizing tool and
make it difficult for any institution to hold them accountable. This will be expanded in the
theoretical framework based on the works of Zakaria (1997), Levitsky and Way (2002).

Hypothesis
The study proposes the following: first, increasing democracy assistance funding and
support does not guarantee democratization. Second, the nature of donor or sponsoring
organization determines the ‘successes’ of its programming (i.e., based on their nature,
whether government supported e.g. USAID or DFID or ‘neutral’ like the UNDP –
authoritarian regimes are more receptive to independent institutions. Based on their aims
e.g. USAID might be more interested in regime change vs. UNDP which might be
interested in building stronger institutions, the success of their programming would not be
the same). Third, the recipient organization’s attitude or operations affects the
effectiveness of democracy funding. Fourth, the strength of the opposition parties affects
the potential transfer of power - if the opposition is too weak to defend its victory, powerturnover is low. Lastly, pressure to democratize and the imposition of political conditions
contribute to the burgeoning of competitive authoritarian regimes or pseudo democracies.
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Main Question
The research question is: Does democracy promotion promote democracy? Why has an
increase in democratic assistance not resulted in faster and deeper democratization
through successful elections and the transfer of power? Countries like Nigeria, Rwanda,
Uganda, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and many others are consistent in conducting elections, yet
have a long way to go to attain genuine democratic status. Beyond Africa, powerful actors
such as Russia and China legally conduct ‘competitive elections’ that are not democratic.
Even when elections are successfully conducted, political developments that follow are
not always positive. Therefore, this project will start by explaining what entails a
successful democracy while addressing what a democratic process could involve
considering substance and quality, while aiming to understand the broader concept of
democracy promotion. It also addresses questions such as: is democratization easier in a
one party state? How does the nature of the donor organization affect successful
democratization? To what extent does the strength and resilience of opposition parties
affect the success of democracy promotion? And, how does the nature, operation or
attitude of recipient organizations affect the success of democracy promotion?

Overview of Methodology
This is a case study of Zimbabwe with references to Tanzania and Ethiopia. It employs
interviews as the main data source. When evaluating the effectiveness of any phenomena
with the use of case studies — interviews are more effective as respondents can provide
context specific data. It was necessary to conduct these interviews within the context in
which the phenomenon occur (Silverman, 2013). So, 32 interviews were conducted in
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania

Chapter outline
The second and third chapters are dedicated to literature and theories on the concepts of
democracy promotion and democratization in Africa introduced above. The second
analyses electoral cycle events and main concepts of democracy assistance. The third
focuses on empirical studies conducted on democracy promotion and democratization in
11

Africa and their findings. The fourth chapter focuses on democratization in Africa while
the fifth outlines the methodological design that guided the study. The sixth chapter
outlines the research findings before concluding the report and offering recommendations
in chapter seven.
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Chapter 2
Electoral Cycle and Democracy Assistance
Donors have contributed much to the development of democracy in Africa over the past
three decades. Their contributions range from civil society support to raise citizen
awareness and hold governments accountable; technical assistance before, during and
after elections to ensure bias free elections; constitution making; training and mentoring
for the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries to check executive power; and
advocacy for the establishment and consolidation of civil liberties including freedom of
speech, association and assembly. For intergovernmental dialogue, foreign governments
have put pressure through conditionality or the imposition of conditions for aid or the
restriction of international liberties like international travel bans, freezing accounts and
sanctions restricting international trade or transfers.

This chapter outlines the various concepts and processes informed by democratization
literature and studies based on the argument that democracy promotion does promote
democracy -- but domestic and foreign challenges limit its effectiveness in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The chapter begins by discussing the concept of democracy; followed by an
analysis of democracy promotion — including its motives, actors and strategies.

Democracy and its trends
Democracy
As the main concept in this study, it is important to briefly analyze the concept of
democracy, its pre-conditions and characteristics. Beetham (1994) suggests a bottom up
approach — analyzing ‘democracies’ for common characteristics to define democracy.
However, this approach is prone to fallacy as characteristics do not remain constant across
democracies, political models differ and characteristics change over time. Although, ‘rule
by the people, ‘popular control’, ‘political equality’ are democracy’s basic principles
centered on popular sovereignty, where “public policy is to be governed by the freely
expressed will of the people, and all individuals are to be treated as equals” (Hadenius,
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1992 in Beetham 1994). Democracy is characterized by principles of majority rule and
participation not excluding equality, freedom, consensus, coercion, competition,
pluralism, constitutional rule and more (Satori, 1987 in Beetham 1994). Individuals are
not equal and differ in tastes, preferences, outlooks and preferences but should be equally
represented and free to select representatives of their choices and desires. Hence the need
for a governance model that ensure their equal representation and participation (Beetham
1994). Representation, guarantees their ability to choose desired representatives through
a ‘free’ and ‘fair’ political process (election) after participating through the free
expression of views (civil liberties or rights). Elections are the common denominator
among modern democracies.
Trends in democratic development
Following the collapse of Communism, democracy rules supreme. Unfortunately, as the
rest of the world has moved on to assessing the quality of their democracy and
investigating ways to improve it, most of Africa remains in transition; or where transition
had ended, democratic recessions have begun. Yet, development over the past three
decades has been increasingly linked to democracy and good governance. The number of
states transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule has increased, so has the
response to the need to exercise political freedoms and get rid of dictatorial forms of
governance. These developments have not come without setbacks however as Freedom
House in their investigation of Freedom in the Word (a country-by-country report on
global political rights and civil liberties) found that as of 2014 “the state of freedom
declined for the eighth consecutive year in 2013” (Freedom House, 2014), particularly
with developments in Arabic African countries like Egypt which experienced democratic
reversals following coups. These reversals certainly do not mean democracy’s
unpopularity nonetheless.
Third wave
An expansion of democratic ideals and practices post 1974 which Huntington (1991)
termed the “third wave,” led by South America in the 70s and reaching South, East and
Southeast Asia around the mid-80s. Transitions from communist and authoritarian rule to
towards democracy in former Soviet states as well as Central America followed in the 80s
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before the trend spread to Africa later that decade (Huntington, 1991). Since then,
democracy has been considered the best form of governance, where “the multitude has the
supreme power, and supersedes the law by their decrees” (Aristotle, 1988). This could
explain why mature democracies see it worth promoting no matter the cost. This study
focuses on the electoral form of democracy (electoral democracy) — a system for arriving
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Schumpeter, 1947). Or rather the rule of the
people, where governments are chosen through free and fair electoral competition at
regular intervals (Diamond, 1999) resulting in an inter (between parties) or intra (within
parties) party transfer of power. Citizens periodically choose or nominate a leader or
government and authorize them to decide and act on their part. This classification excludes
any bureaucratic or military domains of power not accountable to elected officials.

According to Huntington (1991), the study of electoral democracy is normally married
with an analysis of, or an acknowledgement of the need for minimum levels of liberties
and the rule of law. These facilitate successful participation when followed. Even across
democracies (those with competitive elections amongst different parties), basic rights vary
considerably.
The threshold of democratization
Depending on one’s perspective (donor, recipient, government, opposition or civil
society), the effectiveness of democratization efforts varies. Hence the need to highlight
what successful democratization would encompass. Academics, policy makers,
intergovernmental organizations, etc., have increasingly become concerned with the
evaluation of democracy promotion, through the generation of data and the design of
instruments to measure democracy (Munck, 2009). It is not enough to dictate or equate
successful democratization to the ability to hold free and fair elections leading to peaceful
transfer of power.

There are three tasks: first, to select indicators (in this case free and fair elections and a
peaceful transfer of power, with a basic insight into the state of civil liberties and the rule
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of law). Second, to select a measurement level – Munck (2009) suggests a standard of
assessment necessary to “maximize homogeneity within measurement classes with the
minimum number of necessary distinctions”. This project employs Freedom House scales
and rankings (from ‘free,' ‘partly free’ and ‘not free,' these will be explained later) to help
in the categorization of states and help understand the ideal type of government
(democracy) and measure the current state.

In conceptualizing the subject, Munck (2009) adds the need to identify attributes that are
theoretically relevant and creates a ‘logical structure of concepts’ serving as a guide. This
study identifies contestation and participation as the main attributes of successful
democratization or the threshold for democratization. The components of contestation
here are the right to form political parties (multi-partism) and political freedoms such as
freedom of the press. The components of participation are fairness and freeness of the
voting process and other basic freedoms e.g. freedom of speech. I add another component
(or a sub-component of the attributes), the transfer of power.

Democracy

Contestation

Right to form
political
parties

Political
freedoms
e.g. of the

Concept

Attributes

Components
of Attributes

Result

Participation

Basic
freedoms

Fairness of
the voting
process
Freeness

Transfer of
power

Original source before editing Munck (2009)

International IDEA therefore defines a full democracy as one where “basic political
freedoms and civil liberties are respected, and tend to be underpinned by a political culture
conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory;
media are independent and diverse; there is an effective system of checks and balances;
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and the judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced” (IDEA, 2015). It is
the ideal form of governance popular in Western democracies including the United States
(US) and United Kingdom (UK). Only 9 of the 49 Sub-Saharan countries fit this
classification and have remained free for almost a decade with the exception of Senegal.
The majority can be classified either as flawed or hybrid democracies (considered ‘partly
free’ by Freedom House). Flawed democracies are states that hold free and fair elections;
respect basic civil liberties (although with exceptions); however, with significant
weaknesses in other democratic aspects, including problems in governance, an
underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation (IDEA, 2015).
IDEA also defines hybrid democracy as one where “elections have substantial
irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair; government pressure
on opposition parties and candidates may be common; serious weaknesses are more
prevalent than in flawed democracies — in political culture, functioning of government
and political participation; corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak;
civil society is weak; typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the
judiciary is not independent.” These definitions fit a good number of African cases but
cause the researcher to question whether classifying them as ‘democracies’ (although in
hybrid nature) is accurate, as doing so only worsens the ailing state of democracy as will
be expanded in the section on competitive authoritarianism; hence the decision to label
some of them ‘authoritarian’. It is easier to categories 20 of the 49 Sub-Saharan countries
classified as ‘partly free’ in Freedom House’s 2016 ratings fit this classification. However,
there is an overlap as some borrow characteristics from hybrid and authoritarianism.
Authoritarian regimes lack “political pluralism and many are outright dictatorships,
though some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but have little substance;
elections, if they do, but are not free and fair; there is disregard for abuses and
infringements of civil liberties; media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups
connected to the ruling regime; there is repression of criticism of the government and
pervasive censorship; and judiciary is not independent” (IDEA, 2015). Another 20 of 49
states fit this classification. It is important to note, authoritarians in their quest for
17

legitimacy oscillate between these classifications further complicating contemporary
definitions of democracy. This study believes, the classification will continue to widen in
developing countries given the need for international legitimacy and financial support.
Only three countries, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Mali have improved from 'not free' to 'partly
free' — a positive development but unsatisfactory of 49. Yet 7 countries Djibouti, Uganda,
Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Central African Republic and the newest South Sudan have
moved from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’. Diamond (1999), looking at the rate at which
African democracies have lost energy, self-confidence and effectiveness, parallel to US
political polarization concludes the ‘Democratic Zeitgeist’ is over and it is not just a crisis
but a democratic recession. Clearly, new strategies and a renewed sense of purpose are
necessary for democratization in Africa.

History of democracy promotion
Imbalances in economic inequality and under-development in the 19th century resulting
from wars, colonialism and failed systems of governance motivated rich countries to aid
poorer countries. The world had split into three, namely — the ‘first’ (Western democratic
countries) the ‘second’ (Soviet Union and its Communist satellites) and the ‘third’ (former
colonies and countries that had come under imperial influence, which were now all
independent and that formed themselves into the non-aligned movement in the early
1950s) (Eyben, 2014). The US became the world’s biggest aid donor, starting with the
Marshall Plan to help Europe rebuild. US foreign policy and programming began to
include governance aspects — specifically the need for democracy, as leaders like
President Reagan who considered it a way to conscientise the world on values of justice
and freedom. International relations scholars considered it a security rationale, where
“economic and security assistance would bolster friendly governments, whether
dictatorial or democratic against the spread of Soviet influence” (Carothers, 2011). So, aid
became a democracy promotion tool in the 60s. Prior to this, US foreign policy had been
dominated by a ‘pragmatic anti-Communist’ objective as the US competed with Soviet
Union for influence and the loyalty of third world governments (Carothers, 2011). The
US also wanted to combat the spread of leftist movements and regimes. Later President
Kennedy emphasized on the responsibility of the US “to do good in the world” given its
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unique capacity, duty and destiny and his government was convinced that with proper
application of energy and resources America could help the third world nations rise out of
poverty and move from dictatorship to democracy.

African countries burdened with the legacy of colonialism, wars, poverty and internal
power struggles (civil wars) were in desperate need of support for development. Thus,
state building, strengthening of public administration, including administrative
capabilities of these ‘fragile and inexperienced’ states motivated leading economies to
provide aid — both food, medication, infrastructural development and loans. Informed by
“Modernization theory,” developed countries believed in developing preconditions for
democracy first, as economic development by raising middle class citizens with high
literacy rates and other socioeconomic features; potentially leading to democracy
(Carothers, 2011). The belief was economic and political developments are interlinked
and development is a ‘linear process’ which could end up in an American style social,
economic and political system.

In Africa, economic aid was the engine aimed at fighting the growing influence of
communism and reduce poverty as “helping countries grow economically would prevent
empty stomachs from making revolutions and would foster democracy… timely injections
of aid would launch under developed countries into economic take-off” (Carothers, 2011).
Coupled with South Asia’s needs, a Kennedy Cooper revolution (1959) pushed President
Kennedy’s administration to increase foreign aid by 33 percent and strengthened the
institutionalization of foreign aid through the creation of USAID and Peace Corps.
According to Carothers (2011) the ‘aid-democracy’ link was largely ‘indirect’ targeted at
political institutions and processes not ‘democracy assistance’ as it is now. Donor agencies
introduced programs to increase the technical capacities of recipient administrations as
well as reduce former executive dominance mechanisms, by advocating for free market
reform to urge countries to dismantle many of the top heavy administrative structures set
up by these earlier governments.
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Still, realizing the administrative quandaries of the African populace in the 1960s —
among others, poverty, inequality, poor education, erratic health systems and other
socioeconomic challenges under dictators; US policy community, congressmen, scholars
and aid officials began to question the US’ indirect democracy promotion approach
through economic aid (Carothers, 2011). They feared that the elite would continue to
benefit at the expense of the masses and could potentially use the aid to fortify existing
domestic imbalances for domination. However, a major shift took place in 1961 under
‘Title IX’ of the Foreign Assistance Act, which redirected foreign aid directly towards
democracy promotion through internally driven processes. USAID emphasized aid
programs to ensure the maximum participation of locals in development processes. So,
developed states and their agencies broadened their mandate and increased financial
grants for democracy support through democratization projects, led by the US, EU, its
member states and the UN. In the early 90s, Northern donor governments, led by USAID
began to link development assistance to the promotion of democracy, human rights and
good governance (Diamond, 1999).

International democracy promotion
International democracy promotion (IDP) refers to external relations and development
cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation of
democracy in third world countries, or rather, all measures designed to facilitate
democratic development (Burnell, 2007). According to Levitsky and Way (2005), IDP
originates from the Western state’s desire for international ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’ based
on the idea that “power is a continuum or graduation of relationships and not a short term
process” (Burnell, 2007). Although, there are two main rationales for IDP - first, the idea
of universal value, in which every human being is entitled to freedom (Sen, 1999) and
mature democracies have a ‘moral obligation’ to spread, secure and defend the order of
democracy. Second the instrumental value where democracy should be spread among all
other ‘good things’ through the development of effective policies according to the
European Council of Ministers (2006). Another rationalist explanation arising from the
US-Iraq invasion is based on interests as the US is purported to have invaded Iraq on the
premise of democracy promotion but for economic and power gains. Hence the
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theorization of IDP by international relations scholars in recent history as arising from
states’ material and power interests.
IDP has been considered in political science literature as a ‘soft power’ mechanism
involving a great deal of persuasion and non-coercive influence through political
conditionality, threats or diplomatic pressure on recipient states by donors. ‘Hard power’
on the other hand is an extreme mechanism, often understood through forceful or military
intervention — a less popular strategy of IDP given the sovereignty, independence and
autonomy of recipient states. Democracy promotion’s justification derives from the need
and responsibility to protect individual freedoms, by those in a position of power. This
research focuses on the ‘soft power’ mechanism of IDP to understand its effectiveness in
democracy promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa with a particular focus on Zimbabwe;
specifically focusing on electoral democracy, where transfer of political power to the
‘people’s choice’ through elections is the aim. Aimed at investigating whether Western
democracy promotion promotes democracy, this study explores challenges to
democratization in Zimbabwe.

State development over the past decades has been increasingly linked to democracy and
good governance. Democracy essentially has become the bedrock and only acceptable
standard for most political systems; and political elites continue to put an emphasis on the
importance of a fair, transparent, representative and legitimate form of government for
access and acceptance in the global political and economic arena. Failure to do so, results
in isolation, underdevelopment, vulnerability and lack of support and legitimacy. It is
therefore not surprising that the need to attain the ‘Democratic’ status is greater than ever.
The response to the need to exercise political freedoms and get rid of dictatorial forms of
governance has been positive, therefore more and more states are transitioning from
authoritarian to democratic systems of government. These developments have not come
without setbacks however: Africa remains the only continent lacking in the advancement
of political systems and in attaining the democratic status as well as protecting basic rights
for its people and improving their livelihoods.
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From a ‘normative’ perspective, mature democracies realized that one’s exclusion from
political participation is equivalent to human deprivation in the economic realm; and
political participation became somewhat a right. Everyone had to be able to participate in
the political sphere. Exclusion from participation was considered equivalent to economic
deprivation, according to the Marshal’s view (Aruka, 2015). ‘Instrumentally’, democracy
was considered a means to greater development ends. A large body of political scholarship
believes that democracies are at least more interested in providing goods and services for
their citizens than autocracies: that is in the form of education, health and social welfare
(even if their outcomes are not as good e.g. autocratic regimes in some cases). In an effort
to introduce political reforms, Western governments have supported their foreign
ministries and development agencies to extend their focus to the global south. Millions of
dollars are set aside annually to fund development projects which include democracy
promotion. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) alone spends more
than US$700 million annually on democracy-related programs, i.e., elections,
parliamentary support, judiciaries, political parties and CSO support (Carothers, 1999).

According to the democratic peace theory, fully fledged democracies should have a
normative claim in promoting democracy externally; they should also have a ‘genuine
strategic interest’ in promoting it (Wolff and Wurm, 2011). From a realist perspective both
actors win. As from a ‘utilitarian perspective’, the donor is guaranteed of a peaceful and
secure environment as a result of the lowered risk of war in a ‘democracy’; their trade and
investment is also secure assuming there is rule of law in the recipient state. Lijphart and
Bowman (2008) investigate motives of democracy aid and attribute it to the democratic
peace proposition — “Democracies are more peaceful especially in their relations with
each other than non-democratic systems”. Similar to Kant’s (1975) Perpetual peace theory
that assumes “the rational citizen is generally interested in peace because war endangers
his life and welfare. If the political system allows for the translation of this preference into
foreign policy, the respective state will refrain from any offensive use of force or at least,
will prove less prone to violence and war than other political regimes" (Wolff and Wurm,
2011). Hence, Woodrow Wilson’s aim “to make the world safe for democracy” as it is
more desirable to have the world democratic for peace and security. Democracies are also
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assumed to have markedly better bargaining capabilities and superior institutional
resources than autocratic states, and these strengths make them less likely to be the target
of attack by other states (Herman and Kegley, 1996).

From a policy perspective, democracy aid is an important issue on the donor agenda
(Resnick, 2013). Most agencies insist — along with everything else that promoting human
rights, good governance and democracy are an important part of their efforts; hence the
formation of ‘democracy units’ in a number of agencies. How then have these been
implemented in Zimbabwe and parts of Africa? Are there any contradictions or shortfalls
that exist between their democracy and governance work and other types of development
interventions that have resulted in the slackening of democratization? According to
Crawford (2001), in addition to the promotion of civil and political rights, democratic
government and an accountable and efficient public administration — as a policy,
democracy promotion is aimed at positively supporting projects aimed at strengthening
the respect of human rights and democratic practice through aid. On the other hand, it
withholds or restricts aid where perceived violations of human rights or democratization
reversals exist (conditionality). At the same time should donor governments be engaged
in such activities (Crawford, 2001)?

Donors
Though scholars continuously attribute the success or blame the failure of democratization
efforts on domestic factors, foreign actors have an equal responsibility. The effect of
donor’s actions or interactions with local actors on democratization efforts have been
neglected by democratization scholars, the same is true in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa.
Brown (2005) attributes the muting of democracy promotion success in Sub-Saharan
Africa to local structural impediments that limit the effectiveness of donor conditionality,
and the lack of a necessary understanding and commitment on the part of donors for
successful political reform.

Democracy has been promoted by a variety of actors including governments, political
party foundations, multi-party institutes, international non-governmental organizations,
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political institutions and other international aid agencies. Popular among these are
international donor agencies such as the Department for International Development
(DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Swedish International
Development Cooperation (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the Humanist Institute for Cooperation (HIVOS); international organizations like
the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN); specialized development
institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the National
Democratic Institute (NDI); and political party foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Political finance concerns emanating from restrictions imposed by local governments on
the financing of political activities by foreign agencies have caused donors to try to
empower political institutions technically. Aimed at strengthening key political
institutions necessary for democratization, international governments led by the US in the
90s have channeled significant amounts of money through their democracy promotion
arms such as NED and NDI. Countries like Sweden have created more specialized
political agencies like SIDA and the Electoral Assistance and the American International
Foundation for Electoral Systems. UK’s Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy are examples of other specialized
government-funded organizations. German political party foundations such as Konrad
Adenauer and Friedrich Ebert are also popular democracy promoters. Not forgetting
international institutions like United Nations bodies which have governance programs
through facets like the United Nations Development Program championing democracy.

Civil Society
In African countries, donors primarily work or partner with local Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) directly or
indirectly who sometimes work as intermediaries between them (donors) and the
government depending on the cause. Optimistically premising that democracy can emerge
anywhere with the right knowledge and institutions, support is also provided to
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governments, parliaments, parliamentarians, the judiciary political parties, electoral
commissions (state and independent) and media institutions — a bottom up approach. This
assistance is not meant to be provided over a long period but a relatively short one,
thereafter recipient countries are expected to have acquired necessary tools to
independently govern democratically.

The role of CSOs as that of international donor agencies has become important. Their
activities in shaping political developments have grown compared to their former focus
on socio-economic issues. National and international NGOs have developed into fullfledged institutions and their role commands attention according to Carothers (2000). For
this project, the study of civil society is key as it considers them as the main recipients of
democracy funding and assistance as well as partners of international donor agencies.
CSOs are either viewed as “a unique repository of values, virtue and voluntarism” or as
worrying effects of proliferating nongovernmental organizations as “governments are still
the only legitimate source of order and authority and that too much of a good thing on the
side of citizen empowerment could turn out to be a source of domestic political gridlock
and international impotence” (Carothers, 2000).

Foreign donors support CSOs through assistance programs where they receive training,
advice and financial support. Carothers adds that, looking at the role of CSOs in shaping
America throughout its history makes it hard not to believe that promoting civil society
abroad is a worthwhile endeavor; at the same time, it is natural to ask how much the aid
in this field is actually accomplishing (Carothers, 2000). This study also aims to contribute
to the effectiveness of donor support to civil society and its effect on democratization.
Led by the United States — bilateral aid intended for democracy promotion also focus on
developing local civil society for democratization. With the realization that elections alone
were an initial step to unfeigned democratization, Of the factors affecting the effectiveness
of democracy promotion initiatives, Recipient NGO attitudes and practices are key factors
in determining the effectiveness of democracy promotion. This research believes business
practices in Zimbabwe’s CSOs significantly affect the success of democracy assistance.
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According to Carothers (2000), governments are no longer the only legitimate source of
order and authority, CSOs have risen as median authorities between government and
citizens, advocating for political accountability and freedom.

Democracy assistance literature tresses the civil society strategy from American
Tocquevillian traditions — grassroots activism (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000) as
American strategies are naturally inclined to mobilization from grassroots that often
develop leftist ideas. CSOs act as potential sources of pressure for reform that could reach
entrenched power holders. Donors find them appealing as they are small enough that,
modest amounts of aid are significant to them compared to that needed for judicial reform
for example (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000). Though normally repressed by tyrants, CSOs
are a positive force for democracy and are considered effective for democracy
consolidation (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000).

According to Ottaway and Carothers (2000), democracy requires civically aware citizens
who combine understanding of and confidence in the political system with healthy
skepticism about the performance and good faith of politicians and it is valuable and
important for democracy promoters to work from the bottom-up rather than just top-down
in developing and transitional societies. Democracy promoters consider CSOs an effective
strategy as they are not government affiliated; genuinely reform oriented; and autonomous
to the state (although they may interact regularly). Some scholars disagree with the
effectiveness of CSOs for democratization as they question civil society’s relationship to
political society or its neutrality (particularly with opposition parties) considering their
linkage. However, donors consider civil and political society as separate realms (Ottaway
and Carothers, 2000).

Donors also favor groups that interact with the state through advocacy work and those that
do not explicitly compete for political office as they can actively promote democracy and
follow internal democratic procedures. So, White (1994) defines civil society as, “An
intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations
which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed
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voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend their interests or values”. In
Africa, donors concentrate on a narrow set of professionalized organizations: NGOs
dedicated to advocacy or civic education directly relating to democratization such as
election monitoring, voter education, governmental transparency, and political and civil
rights generally; structured with designated management, full-time staff, an office and a
charter or statement of mission, sometimes called ‘democracy groups’, with very small
membership (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000).

CSO support is based on the classic concept that, active civil society is central to thriving
democracy, there is however a gap in literature examining the effectiveness of these
democracy groups particularly in authoritarian or dominant party states. CSOs while
making sustained efforts to influence government decisions act as “virtuous incarnations
of the people” (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000) and democracy’s watchdogs. CSOs can also
drive political change and can be involved in partisan politics or open political struggle.
They also work with general citizens in active mobilization through social movements for
democratic transition (McAdam et al. 1996) e.g. in South Africa (Landsberg and Ottaway,
2000) found, a social movement brought down apartheid. However, they criticize donors
for confusing NGOs and Civil Society and mention that because of the different nature of
missions, (NGOs - humanist and CSOs - political); also that both actors function
differently according to their locale — this can affect funding decisions and the failure of
missions. Hence “In the future, it is essential that providers of civil society aid abandon
their notion that civil society is mostly about NGOs and instead strive to understand how
civil society is already structured in each recipient country and assist accordingly”
(Ottaway and Carothers, 2000). They also found that, in Peru, Romania, South Africa and
Philippines, donors have successfully promoted democracy resulting in regime change
through CSO support.

Ottaway and Carothers (2000), review the impact of the civil society based approach by
donors on three levels — the micro level (whether CSOs have met their immediate
objectives); meso-level (whether more and stronger advocacy NGOs amount to a stronger
civil society); and macro level (whether a stronger civil society has actually helped
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produce greater political liberalization or democratization). It is important to note that the
sharp distinction in Western literature between NGOs and CSOs is not as clear in reality
in the three African countries investigated for this study (Zimbabwe, Tanzania and
Ethiopia). The two terms are used interchangeably, however based on the distinctions this
study is interested in CSO activity and not NGO. There is significant interaction between
both groups however key is that NGOs although smilingly apolitical sometimes receive
funds from politically aware foreign agencies and in themselves, integrate politics and
democracy activities in their programming. There is a gap however in studies investigating
CSO activities which can significantly affect their effectiveness in democracy promotion
which this study investigates.

Forms of democracy assistance
The extent of democracy promotion by international actors has increased through official
democracy rhetoric by the government, diplomatic actions towards other countries and
democracy funding (Bouchet, 2014). Political aid programs have become progressively
sophisticated as democratic campaigns by Western governments gather force and
effectiveness (Goldman & Douglas, 1988). To evaluate democracy promotion
effectiveness, it is important to understand its mechanisms or basically understand how
democracy is promoted. Donors or democracy promoters generally focus on legal
frameworks, governance issues, election monitoring and observation, technologies,
transparency, campaigning and international pressure when working in non-democracies.
This section explains each procedure and outlines the role of donors in each process
guided by the electoral cycle.

The Election Cycle Components
“While it remains emphatically true that, elections do not equal democracy‟— that there is
much more to having democracy and making it work than free, fair, and truly competitive
elections - it is also the case that institutionalizing free and fair elections, with rigorous and
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effective electoral administration, is a crucial aspect of democracy. And over time, it will have a
tonic effect on the governance problem” in Africa”
(Diamond, 2009)

To objectively evaluate the effectiveness of democracy promotion strategies in Africa, it
is important to understand the relationship between elections and democracy. Why are
elections a key component of democracy promotion, and what effect do elections have on
democracy? Lindberg (2006) presents a positive analysis of African elections and its
prospects of democracy based on an empirical analysis of observable election data
compiled on the democratic quality of elections and the liberal democratic institution. He
examines 16 variables on 232 African elections, to investigate the relationship between
elections and democracy, and shows elections improve the quality of democracy.
Lindberg (2006) states that, elections are neither the end of a transition process towards
democracy nor merely formal procedures. This project sought to understand why foreign
donors continue to fund elections that are almost always contested and what value if any
they had to democratization. Lindberg’s findings address this query.

According to Lindberg, the mere inception of multiparty elections in a country instigates
liberalization. Participatory and contested elections are an institutionalized attempt to
actualize the essence of democracy. Elections are the legitimate procedure for the
translation of the rule by the people into workable executive and legislative power
(Lindberg, 2006). Although, alone they are insufficient to constitute democracy, “Yet no
other institution precedes participatory, competitive and legitimate elections in
instrumental importance for self-government” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).
Below is a summary of Zimbabwe’s main political donors supporting activities facilitating
or contributing to both political participation and contestation as indicated by interviewed
respondents and available literature:
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Donor

Focus
Democracy and Human rights especially

EU

in “difficult states”
Elections, Governance policy, Public-

DFID

sector reforms
Human Rights, Parliamentary

USAID

Strengthening, Civil Society

SIDA

Human rights and Public administration

DANIDA

Human rights and conflict prevention

AFD

Governance and Justice

HIVOS

Human rights, Media, Civil society

Electoral democratic processes follow a specific cycle of events which acted as a guide in
the methodological design of this study as well as the literature review. Contrary to
popular belief, electoral processes do not solely include Election Day or polling day
activities but three periods — pre-election, election and post-election periods. Almost all
major democracy promotion organizations are involved in most of these stages directly or
indirectly. Organizations like NDI pride themselves in successfully promoting democracy
in over 74 countries; being engaged with hundreds of parties promoting electoral integrity;
organizing over 100 international election observation delegations; and playing a leading
role in establishing standards for international election observation by 2003 (NDI, 2003).
This diagram summarizes electoral cycle events guiding the operations of election
stakeholders. It also summarizes how electoral democracy is promoted in Zimbabwe.
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Source: IDEA, 2011

Democracy promotion in Zimbabwe

Legal Framework
The pre-election period is the longest involving five main clusters of activities: the legal
framework, planning and implementation, training and education, voter registration, and
election campaigns. As part of the legal framework, donors support local organizations to
advocate and lobby for an inclusive constitution or the introduction or review or electoral
laws. Often this process begins with a review of the existing constitution in the custody of
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local legal bodies. Political parties, rights groups and various stakeholder often present
petitions to certain clauses they would want included or excluded from the constitution
and essentially the need for a new constitution if any. A Referendum is then organized —
this is an event similar to an election where the electorate directly votes on this proposal
to change the constitution.

Almost all actors including political parties and citizens are active from the grassroots to
lobby for the vote and they vote without government interference however in most cases.
Sometimes the vote is prescribed by the law and considered an expression of direct
democracy. When the Referendum is voted for, in most instances, the constitution goes
through a drafting process to introduce the new legal provisions and a draft constitution is
produced. The draft is often presented before the electorate, then parliament and discussed
again by the various stakeholders. Depending on the outcome, it is reedited or printed for
presentation to the electorate. The changes in the voting system lobbied for by political
parties, CSOs, NGOs, government and others become legislation and are then introduced
and adopted in the new election process. The process can be lengthy requiring significant
financial investments and is widely funded by international donors.

Boundaries guiding the electoral process are then drawn as proscribed the new legislature
and an election commission or electoral body is elected or nominated to oversee the
implementation of the election process. The nomination of commission members is
normally contested by local CSOs in non-democracies as they are usually nominated by
the presidency hence accusations around their bias or lack of objectivity against opposition
groups. At this point, electoral codes of conduct are discussed and agreed to by political
parties and CSOs on regulations as stipulated by the constitution or electoral laws to guide
their actions along the cycle.

Planning and Implementation
Stakeholders then initiate the planning process: this is the entrance point for most political
aid donors. CSOs and political parties (particularly opposition) begin their planning and
budgeting for presentation to donors. Donors assess proposals and announce decisions
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depending on the needs and time. Recipients based on the funding or financing available
begin to plan and implement their projects. Election calendars are generated outlining
activities that also follow this election cycle as normally at this point, all actors are aware
of the election date and plan accordingly. Participatory aspects of the democratic process
normally come first e.g. advocacy and community outreach programs, conducted either
by CSOs or government bodies.

Unfortunately, in most developing countries, democratic activities take place around the
same time before every election. This is a contributing failure to democracy promotion as
will be explained in the findings (Ake, 1996). This is because, local governments do not
devote specific funds for them and funding from foreign donors follows the same suit.
However, looking at the amount of labor required for successful monitoring and
observation before and during an election, it is understandable that, most stakeholders
begin major recruitment processes at this point. It is necessary to map the whole country
and investigate locations of past and future polling constituencies, wards and stations —
based on findings from the previous election. The Commission through local governments
recruits locals to do so. Based on this information, a list of provinces, cities,
constituencies, wards and polling stations is finalized and gazetted for the electorate.

Commissions begin recruiting Election day staff at each level, the majority being Polling
agents responsible for monitoring voter activities on the day, including Voter’s Roll
Inspectors, Biometric inspectors, Polling booth staff and Station leaders (responsible
authority at that polling station). It is important to note that, as is the case in Zimbabwe
and assumably most Sub-Saharan countries, because the Commission is a national or
government linked body, most election staff are recruited from within government
structures especially government school teachers. This has an effect on the objectivity of
the process as will be explained in the findings. The Commission is mostly funded by the
government and ‘neutral’ donors — principally international organizations e.g. the United
Nations; Regional bodies e.g. Southern African Development Community (SADC); or
Regional organizations with a particular focus on elections e.g. the Electoral Institute for
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Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) who also provide Parliamentary support
(Linz,1994).

CSOs and NGOs on the other hand begin their recruitment processes around the same
time. Lists of contacts are shared within their networks or partner organizations with
contact details of potential volunteers — who in most authoritarian states are sympathetic
or aligned to opposition parties. Positions include Long Term Observers (usually one
person per constituency who is almost permanently observing political developments in
his or her area and reporting to the deploying organization); Short Term Observers
(recruited in the run-up to elections providing updates to the deploying organization on
political developments their specific wards); Constituency Observers (normally one
observer per constituency, responsible for responding to polling station observer’s needs
on election day also observing and compiling reports on politically related incidents on
Election day e.g. violence, victimization etc. as stipulated in the Code of Conduct, for the
deploying organization); and Polling Station Observers (normally the biggest number
deployed individually to specific polling stations on Election Day to report on polling
incidents, times and activities). Collectively, about 5000 observers can be deployed by a
single CSO on Election Day. The financial implications are high requiring external
support especially in a country like Zimbabwe with at least 50 key CSOs involved in
democracy and elections; with election budgets averaging at least US$ 1 million per
organization. Due to economic hardships, members do not prioritize the payment of
membership fees, leaving foreign donors to bare the costs.

Political Parties also recruit Party Agents from their structures to carry out the same duties
as Polling station observers, compelling reports and incidences noted during the voting
process. However, depending on the country’s Political party’s financing laws, it is well
known that most opposition parties are financed by foreign donors while the ruling party
uses state funds to finance their election activities. Donors in authoritarian states like
Zimbabwe face challenges of publicly financing opposition parties as they risk being
accused of funding regime change.
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These recruitment processes often parallel procurement and distribution processes of
election materials — often the most expensive part of the electoral process, apart from
recruitment and voter registration. Donors through their local election advising units
advise on essential equipment and budgets, as miscalculations could affect the entire
electoral cycle. With an emphasis on time and quality, CSOs and Election Commissions
are educated on drafting procurement plans as part of donor electoral assistance
programmes. Procurements of materials and expertise are guided by agreed methods
guided by outlined legal and institutional frameworks. Based on the UNDP Electoral
Assistance Implementation Toolkit (2010), election stakeholders should inform and agree
with the Electoral Managing Body and donors on procurement requirements that must be
followed and purchases of IT systems or new voter registration systems, should start as
early as possible to maximize the time for system testing, procedural development,
training, etc. as procuring major systems at the last minute maximizes costs, minimizes
benefits and undermines sustainability.
Based on UNDP’s toolkit the main areas of procurement include Election administration
(hardware and software, vehicles, communication tools, printing services); Voter
registration (hardware and software, means for printing and distributing registration
forms, voter cards and data processing, other materials depending on the type of voter
registration used — generally there are three types: manual and then computerized, use of
an optical mark reader and then a scanner, or digital from the field to the database);
Election day activities (means for printing and distributing ballot papers, ballot boxes,
voting screens, indelible or invisible ink, tamper-proof materials, forms); and Results
tabulation (software, results and media center hardware, other communications
equipment). Logistics and security arrangements are made around the same time. Quoting
Carothers (2009), democracy promotion has become a multi-million-dollar industry.

Training and Education
The operational training for election officials (government and NGOs) then begins along
with civic education and voter information programs. These critical democratic
procedures represent an eminent challenge to Africa’s democratization as they are meant
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to be all year round but they are left to the election season. There is a gap in existing
literature on democratization on this challenge, however the researcher believes to fully
understand challenges of democracy promotion more studies are necessary on the
shortcomings of civic education. According to the Electoral Knowledge Network’s 2013
Civic and Voter Education guide, the electorate is informed of the “respective roles and
responsibilities of citizens, government, political and special interests, the mass media,
and the business and non-profit sectors, as well as the significance of periodic and
competitive elections. It emphasizes not only citizen awareness but citizen participation
in all aspects of democratic society”. Education and information can be shared by
educational institutions, CSOs and national bodies.

Voter Registration
The Election Commission announces voter registration times and locations and based on
the voter’s information, old voters verify registration details while new voters register with
local wards. Voter registration is an essential component of any election and has been
subject to manipulation by incumbents where the Voter’s roll is not updated; deceased
voters’ information exists; or registered voters’ information is false or missing. Since
Voter’s rolls are in the custody of the Election Managing Bodies, institutions have
limitations ensuring its status, however CSOs and Political parties encourage electorate to
check their names and confirm their wards before the election. The researcher believes
Voter registration is just as important as Election Day as it determines the how successful
the process will be. Democratic processes can be conducted to their best but without a
clean Voter’s Roll: Democracy promotion will not promote democracy. As will be
illustrated in the findings, Opposition Parties, Donors, CSOs and Observers have
overlooked this process, hence their failure to unseat Authoritarians, who then they
become increasingly desperate for power, employ sophisticated methods to shortchange
democratic procedures.

Nikuv International Projects, an Israeli firm manipulating voter registration, countering
‘unfavorable’ results and ‘neutralizing’ opposition votes (DailyMail, 2013) is popular for
servicing African incumbents with records manipulation software. The Chinese
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government has also been accused for assisting in limiting access to information by
providing jamming equipment to silence independent radio stations (DailyMail, 2013) for
the transmission of election information. Internally governments use state machinery
especially soldiers and police to register more than once in barracks to ‘double vote’. This
has been a common complaint in a number of African countries, however there seems to
be a gap in existing literature on such challenges.

During or after registration, Election officials particularly Observers and Election
Candidates - requiring access to polling stations and voting centers require Accreditation.
Observers receive accreditation cards indicating an Identification number where
necessary, full names, their capacity e.g. individual or organization and the affiliate
organization name and the validity period. Accreditation is normally conducted by the
Electoral managing body who in authoritarian states can employ government affiliated
security or intelligence officials to vet observer names. Questionable individuals or
organizations can be denied the opportunity to register directly or indirectly. The process
can be clouded with a lot of bureaucracy to frustrate potential observers. Some major
challenges however in developing countries are accreditation costs and the need to be
affiliated. Smaller Opposition parties and CSOs operating with limited funds might field
a limited number of observers as a result. Hence, foreign funds play a major role in
sponsoring accreditation to ensure representative cross-country observation. The need to
be affiliated limits independent observers who might have information on vote
manipulation activities that they intend to verify or interested parties. This all contributes
to the failure of successful democratization.

Electoral Campaign
At this point political parties begin to coordinate their campaigns in terms of time, routes,
contacts, classifying constituencies (swing states or strongholds). Parties share nomination
results with their constituencies and may educate voters about Election Day at this point.
Government institutions including election managing bodies and CSOs educate parties on
party finance and penalties attached if their breach. Opposition parties based on the
national campaign finance laws approach foreign donors for technical and financial
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support (Shugart, 1998). Although laws are stricter in authoritarian states, donors are
accused of illegally financing opposition parties while rolling parties are accused of
diverting government funds to do the same. Electoral codes of conduct and guidelines of
media access are shared. Donors are actively involved in advising and funding opposition
parties here. Depending on the time stipulated by the election commission, campaigns
stop sometime before Election Day.

Voting operations, election day and results verification
The election period then begins on Election Day where voters go to their respective voting
centers and cast their votes within the time stipulated by the electoral managing body.
Normally anyone in line before the end of the voting period is allowed to vote. Depending
on the number of voters, exceptions can be made and voting periods can be extended to
the next day. Votes are then counted at the polling station in the presence of all observers,
and results are written down and depending on the regulations — they may be posted
outside the polling station for the public. Ballot papers are secured and transported. The
verification of results is done normally at the collation center (provincial level), where all
polling stations submit their ballot papers. Results are compiled and tabulated in the
presence of observers and winners are announced by the Electoral Commission.
Complaints and appeals are also launched if any and recounts if necessary are done.

Post election
The shortest and sometimes longest period — the post-election period begins where
political parties and CSOs hold press conferences to update stakeholders (especially
donors) on election day progress and their decisions to accept or dismiss official results.
Afterwards audits and evaluations are done within stakeholders, where parties, CSOs and
even donors report on activities and finances and appraisals are done. In preparation for
the next election, voter lists are updated; institutional strengthening and professional
development take place; legal reforms are made; and archiving of election documentation
and research are done. At all these stages Donors are involved in advising, planning,
strategizing and financing.
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Democracy promoters also use other non-election related strategies to promote democracy
including the establishment of international strategies as well as political conditionality
and international pressure.

International standards
International actors additionally have the ability to enforce and change international
standards. Traditionally the consolidation of global treaties or agreements on electoral
rights in international and regional inter-governmental bodies has helped in keeping
governments in check. These standards might be difficult to maintain given limitations
around state sovereignty and also because developing nations especially African states
have constantly been against the imposition of standard practices by developed or Western
states. However, the Electoral Integrity Project (2014) found that appropriate standards
for regulating aspects like campaign finance and campaign broadcasting are important and
donors use these to foster accountability and transparency.

Conditionality and International pressure
Of the various forms of democracy promotion, political conditionality seems to be the
most contentious democracy promotion strategy although sometimes the most effective
and impactful.
Economic conditionality popularized in the 1980s had dominated aid policy in multilateral
and bilateral lending where recipient states had to adopt Structural Adjustment Programs
introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The
relationship suggested donor superiority and dominance over recipients — mirroring
power inequalities (Nelson and Eglinton, 1992). In the early 90s, most Western donors
announced that future aid allocations would be commensurate with the extent to which
beneficiaries had democratized. “They used a combination of the carrot (increased
development assistance) and the stick (aid sanctions) to promote democratization in
African countries” (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Considered a rational choice mechanism by
political scholars, conditionality maximizes the interests of the dominant state (donor),
but if not packaged and delivered well can potentially reduce its effectiveness and the
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speed of negotiation. Issues of state sovereignty are threatened by negative political
conditionality and authoritarian regimes in particular are not receptive or willing to tradeoff, as they intend to maximize their gains. Colonial history complicates this strategy in
relation to Africa as states might perceive the ‘stick’ an insult from former aggressors who
might have otherwise ‘put them in the situation they are in’.
As will be highlighted later, Hackenesch’s (2015) studies of negative conditionality in
authoritarian Ethiopia and Rwanda by the European Union indicate, reducing or totally
suspending development assistance - pending political or economic liberalization does not
normally have an effect on the authoritarian regime, but on its people. Besides their pride
and perhaps ratings internally, the costs are not too high for the incumbent. Where the
leader has monopolized the state, it is a reason to stay in power and ‘protect’ its gains. We
see this in the case of Zimbabwe where after suspending aid to the government and
instituting ‘smart sanctions’ against its governing elites, by freezing their bank accounts
abroad and denying them and their families visas to travel to Europe or North America;
the government was angered and tightened its grip on the state (Grebe, 2010). In some
cases, withholding of aid has been more effective in advancing democracy. For countries
heavily dependent on aid or for leaders who cannot imagine a future without aid, political
conditionality works. Malawi and Kenya have had such examples of leaders who bow to
international pressure, resulting in democratic transfers of power — these cases will be
explained in detail later (Crook, 1989).

Countries with higher levels of democracy and good governance can be positively
reinforced however with the ‘carrot’. Brown (2010) highlights this kind of ‘preferential
treatment’ through the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which provides extra
assistance to countries that meet a certain number of criteria. Political indicators include
civil liberties and political rights, as well as voice and accountability. The MCA funds
provide incentives for developing countries to reach the eligibility threshold on these and
other indicators (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Present day Kenya and Tanzania are cases of
successful positive conditionality. The effects are obvious — economic development
through increased trade, political alliances allowing for cooperation against forces like
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terrorism and more. Economic conditionalities can provoke economic discontent spilling
into demands for political reforms as was the case in Benin and Zambia in the early 1990s,
where structural adjustment and economic austerity provoked trade unions and civil
society on to the streets. This study contributes by investigating how much international
pressure Zimbabwe and its government has been put under and the effectiveness of these
sanctions on easing repression for political change.
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Chapter 3
Literature review
Scholars until a decade ago had complained that democracy promotion had been largely
neglected in the study of politics and international relations (Carothers, 2000). The field
of democracy promotion had largely been dominated by development policy scholars who
concentrated on the effectiveness of their strategies and the evaluation of development
programs and their implementation. This has changed as what Wolff and Wurm (2010)
refer to as a “democracy promotion industry” advances. “Academic research has begun to
catch up with the growth of foreign and development policies explicitly aiming at the
international promotion and protection of democratic regimes. Yet, what is still a largely
unexplored desideratum is the challenge to theoretically grasp ‘democracy promotion’ as
an aim and strategy of democratic foreign policies — that is, to embed empirical research
on democracy promotion in theoretical perspectives on international relations” (Wolf and
Wurm, 2011). This section explores key contributions by such scholars. It looks at various
studies conducted mostly in Africa, on democracy promotion and the motivations, place
and significance of democracy promotion.

Western democracy promotion
Democracy promoters implement strategies they perceive pro-democratic often based on
their country’s experiences or donor's successes (Youngs, 2010). Nonetheless,
democracy’s possibilities and challenges are relative and differ from one case to another.
Similarities might exist where states have similar histories or are experiencing transition
at the same time -- hence requiring different strategies (Dowding et al. 2001). This is
because the US, for instance, promotes democracy in variegated cases from Zimbabwe to
Peru, Tunisia to Mongolia, with varying political systems. The problem is, promoters tend
to use similar approaches in all cases (Carothers, 1997). Carothers evaluated US
democracy promotion strategies and found that US assistance programming is based on a
set list of institutions and processes the US believe are the constituent elements of
democracy or ‘desired endpoints’ for replication. Programs are designed to address gaps
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between idealized endpoints and the actual socio-political state — “although US
democracy assistance rests on a less clearly established model of democratization, it can
be characterized as one of institutional modelling” (Carothers, 1997).

Democracy promotion is not as successful today as strict modelling of US practices is
risky in Africa where most governance systems were inherited from colonial Britain,
France or Portugal. Copying the US judicial system for instance might not work. An
alternative would have been to use recommendations from academic literature based on a
variety of cases, however Carothers (1997) found, US projects use little if any reference
or borrowing of concepts to academic writing. Academic studies explain internal causes
and dynamics of transition processes but do not examine how external assistance can be
applied to affect a political process according to Carothers. Moreover, “Even if academic
studies do contain useful ideas for the practitioner about democratization, they present
competing theories which the practitioner has little basis for choosing between”, Diamond
notes that democracy is in recession and unpopular but Lindberg states there is a growing
appreciation for democracy just that states are at different levels of transition and it might
take long for one but less for the other. But according to Carothers “practitioners have a
low tolerance for the political science jargon and …. Most US officials simply do not have
the time to delve regularly into academic literature: their hours at work are filled with a
series of pressing, short term bureaucratic tasks that render very difficult the possibility of
trying to find and read the academic literature that might be relevant to their work”.

Carothers (1997) found three positive strengths of US strategies: first, its undeniable
common sense appeal as the strategies can be easily explained to a wide variety of persons
e.g. “An accountable, competent legislature is a foundation stone of democracy: country
Y’s parliament is weak, there we will help strengthen it”. The challenge is, the ‘blanketsolution’ strategy cannot be guaranteed of success in all constituencies. Second, its broad
based — inclusive nature, where they “need to do a bit everything on a fairly long menu
of potential programme areas”. However, the ‘jack of all trades but master of none’
problem could potentially affect their effectiveness. Third, their strategies have the ‘useful
quality of implicit certainty’ as promoters can go anywhere and quickly settle on a set of
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democracy programmes (Carothers, 1997). But what about cases where they fail to adapt
to local circumstances?

Contrary, Carothers (1997) identifies four important weaknesses. First, that US strategies
over-specify democracy ideas, applied everywhere but not universal. Carothers says this
narrow minded or ‘hubristic belief’ — “America is the most democratic country in the
world” in itself limits democracy assistance’s effectiveness. This challenge is endemic in
other Western democracy promotion strategies though, like the German belief that the
social-market approach is best for the third world or the British Westminster approach.
Existing literature nonetheless does not explain whether a combination of all strategies in
the same country at the same time is realistic.

The second challenge is the missing link to power, as current democratization strategies,
Carothers (1997) found “ignore the power relations that underlie and determine a
country’s political life”. The basic functioning of political institutions depends on who
shapes these sectors. Particularly in Africa, as will be expanded later; change can be
extremely difficult. If the government or citizens have no will to change, despite donor
efforts, transition maybe difficult. Verweij and Thompson (2006) highlight external
actor’s tendency to prescribe plural and ‘clumsy’ solutions for complex problems in
developing countries and end up ‘treating the symptoms rather than the causes’; yet the
deeper causes of the failings are not considered.
Third, Carothers (1997) found that with democracy in recession, promoter’s basic
systemic strategy of ‘democratization as a naturalistic process’ in which “a political
opening leads to elections and elections are followed by a period of consolidation in which
governmental institutions are rationalized and democratized while civil society is
strengthened and diversified” does not often occur today. Democratic transitions have
stagnated or slid back and a ‘basic’ strategy of elections will not work. Carothers adds,
without the will to reform and real space for CSOs to operate successful democracy
promotion will not promote democracy. While this is true, successful democratic openings
are being witnessed today -- are they not a reason to continue trying?
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Carothers’ forth criticism is similar to that of the ‘democracy promotion — political versus
development’ debate like Knack (2014) a Senior Research Economist for the World Bank
conducted a multivariate analysis in a large sample of recipient nations over the 19752000 period on the effectiveness of foreign political aid for democratization. Knack found
that successful democratic reform must be linked to development cooperation and long
term measures e.g. education and increased per capita incomes are necessary to improve
socio-economic standards believed to adversely affect democratization. Carothers (1997)
underscores the political-economic divide in Africa confirming Knack’s findings that
social and economic development contributes to democratization, namely that promoter’s
strategies should not be disconnected from economic concerns. He suggests agricultural
programmes to give peasants a stronger stake in their land and if privatization programs
that create new classes of small business owners could possibly empower citizens to freely
participate in democratic processes.
Cost to donors
Wolff and Wurm (2011) caution democracy promotion might not be as effective in
promoting democracy as donors have to look closer into the costs and benefits of
democracy promotion as it also offers “important reasons to refrain from engaging in
democracy promotion” (Mesquita and Downs 2006). They found that, because
democratization is a complex and conflict ridden process, six challenges must be
recognized. These are important to this study as they might explain some of the challenges
to democratization problems in Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole. First, there is a time
consistency problem: as democracy promotion is a “middle to long run endeavor and
(potential) rewards do not come quickly, but costs are immediate” (Wolff and Wurm,
2011). Most Western democratic leaders serve two terms at most and rationally want to
leave a legacy. Promoting long term agendas might not serve that goal. This could explain
why most democratization initiatives focus on electoral democracy as the results are short
term than the process of deepening democratization.
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Second, the results of democracy promotion are ‘not only delayed but highly insecure’.
Actual costs to donors often exceed the intended as the introduction of new forms of
governance requires time. After electoral victory, old systems have to be replaced by new
ones and they are not guaranteed to succeed. Carothers (2002) and Schmitter (1995) in
their research on democratization found that, “Democratization processes can have
diverse outcomes and a stable liberal democracy is only one and perhaps rather unlikely
result”. Third, potential rewards have to be weighed against potential costs that evolve
from the risks inherent to the democratization process. Wolff and Wurm, (2011) argue
that, external democratization has to come to greater benefits than those of international
peace, trade and cooperation as the “value of democracy is heavily disputed for countries
undergoing a process of regime change or remaining ‘stuck’ in a grey zone between
autocratic and democratic rule” (Wolff and Wurm, 2011). This study hopes to find — if
regime change in a foreign country offers direct and significant rewards to its sponsors.
This shall be addressed later.
Fourth, following this argument Schmitter et al. (1999) state “the net impact of external
Democracy Promotion and Protection (DPP) upon democratization is likely to be only
marginal in determining the outcome, and hence singularly difficult to measure and
predict”. Since democratization is largely an internally driven process (depending on the
willingness of domestic actors), the utilitarian approach might be wrong to assume
external actors have the capacity to achieve with tangible results external regime change.
So despite IDP efforts, if the recipient population is not willing or desperate enough to
change, democratization will be challenging. Following this argument, Monten (2005)
raises the fifth challenge of relative power where the success of foreign efforts “depends
on drastic asymmetries in relative power capabilities between ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’
countries”. If the donor is significantly more powerful over the recipient, the likelihood of
a successful transition is higher. Lastly, the free-rider problem in international cooperation
for democracy support can be a challenge. Normally several donor agencies contribute to
the democratization of one country at once; the successful democratization of one country
becomes a global public good any country can benefit from (democratic peace argument
— by cooperating politically and economically, by not being threatened anymore). Hence
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smaller donor agencies for example, wait for bigger ones to fund the programs first but
claim credit for its success. So, Wolff and Wurm, (2011) suggest donors make selective
incentives (side payments) or emphasize on close international coordination (burdensharing) that largely inhibits free riding.

Democratic recession
However, democratization scholars attribute the failures of democracy promotion to
democracy’s recession. This means that, in spite of efforts and commitments made by
donors and government agencies to democracy promotion globally, if democratization and
democracy is not thriving, it is difficult to persuade the rest to accept it. Though
acknowledging the moral obligation that advanced democracies have to spread democracy
abroad, governance issues in recipient countries further complicate efforts. Democracy is
at a “fragile and dangerous juncture” according to Diamond (1999) who conducted studies
in Africa on challenges to democratization efforts. He suggests that, although Freedom
House ratings do not indicate an improvement in freedom ratings, electoral democracy
remains popularly preferred and people are demanding political accountability as never
before, and there is much to celebrate. According to Diamond facilitating the
extraordinary transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes and values requires
serious commitments to support democrats and civil society to make a concrete impact
through democratic and transparent elections and a stronger, more vigilant civil society.

"Without international assistance of the kind that the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) and other donors provide, many democratic nongovernmental organizations, think tanks,
and independent media could not survive”.
(Diamond, 2007)

Sub-Saharan African countries that had democratized after independence are either in a
period of stagnation as democratic systems are overthrown or quietly suffocated while the
surviving ones function badly or are suppressed. Basic democratic values are respected in
principle e.g. elections are held according to periods stipulated by constitutions; citizens
can participate in referendum processes; they are allowed to demonstrate, assemble,
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discuss; and courts are open to independent adjudication processes. However, the level of
objectivity, freedom of bias, honesty and efficiency in all these processes has been highly
questionable. Most political processes have become a formality and are under the control
of a few powerful individuals mostly aligned to the ruling party; hence the label
‘competitive-authoritarian regimes’ in recent political science literature. Diamond’s
(2007) findings also indicate a lack or decline of trust in political and governmental
institutions as citizens are disillusioned by corruption, mismanagement, and the abuse of
power. Strands of hope from elections are loosened when former opposition parties turn
out to be the same once in power.
“There is a specter haunting democracy in the world today. It is bad governance — governance
that serves only the interests of a narrow ruling elite. Governance that is drenched in
corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power. Governance that is not responding to the
massive and long-deferred social agenda of reducing inequality and unemployment and fighting
against dehumanizing poverty. Governance that is not delivering broad improvement in people's
lives because it is stealing, squandering, or skewing the available resources”
(Diamond, 2007).

According to Diamond, developing countries (in Africa, Asia and South America)
experience different levels of democratic decay yet reflect a common problem — “where
power confers virtually unchecked opportunities for personal, factional, and party
enrichment, hence it is difficult if not impossible to sustain democratic rules of the game.
The democratic spirit of elections drowns in vote-buying, rigging, violence, or all three”.
These pathologies cannot be simply ‘cured with more medicine’ (democracy assistance),
like corruption which is an endemic problem (deeply embedded in the norms and
expectations of political and social life there) a “technical fix or political push” will not
solve (Diamond, 2007). He suggests that donors directly aid local civic and political
organizations to counter corruption and rule of law for revolutionary change. Diamond
warns that, this strategy nonetheless can only work where there is political will to govern
with a different logic: that values the provision of public goods. Furthermore, democracy
promoters can only support but not drive the revolution; meaning bold diplomatic changes
in methods and global institutions are imperative. Diamond likens the ‘titanic struggle’ of
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International Democracy Promotion (IDP) to the battle between communism and freedom
which can be won with a significant reduction in corruption to resuscitate democracy.

Freedom house scales have been criticized by democracy scholars like Carothers and
Diamond (2015) for lacking a workable, valuable methodology for evaluating the annual
status of freedom and democracy. Diamond notes a methodological and substantive case
for reworking their data suggesting the addition of transparency and the rule of law to the
existing political rights and civil liberties based on his findings in Africa. He found,
government integrity and accountability have been slipping since around 1999 due to bad
governance — assaults on civil society; growing constraints on civil liberties; shrinking
space for internet freedom and political pluralism. However, measuring transparency and
the rule of law would be a difficult task given difficulties in agreement for standards of
measurement. Constitutional progress had been made to formally limit presidential terms
— mostly to two. However, 10 out of 49 Sub-Saharan countries today still have no
presidential term limits, on average at least two decades after independence.

Where term limits exist as ascribed by the constitution e.g. Equatorial Guinea, Angola,
Cameroon, Uganda, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Chad, Eritrea and Gambia, these countries are
all led by long serving leaders who constantly defy presidential term limits (GyimahBoadi, 1991). President Museveni of Uganda just won the highly contested presidential
elections and has been in office since 1986 on 5-year term limits after contesting the 7th
time on a constitution that clearly stipulates a 2 term maximum. When asked during an
interview why he is running yet his time is up responded “there are no term limits in
Uganda…this is why the people keep voting for me” (Museveni, 2016). The issue of
presidential terms has caused public protests in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo
and in 2014 led to the ousting of Compaore - long-time leader of Burkina Faso (BBC,
2016). Some have a long way to go when considering electoral democracy like The
Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Burkina Faso where less than 37% of the
voting age population on average are registered to vote. Ironically Zimbabwe, Uganda,
Angola, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic and Mozambique have over 80% voters
as percentage of the voting age and yet still hold most of the least accepted elections.
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Where democratic progress has been made e.g. through the encouragement of
participation in exercising rights to vote, citizens are robbed of their choices. Ghana the
oldest independent African country is still not considered a full democracy almost six
decades now.

When democracy promotion was popularized in the 80s and 90s two categories of
countries existed the ‘post-breakthrough countries’ (significant political opening) and
‘pre-breakthrough countries’ (still authoritarian) (Carothers, 2007). In post-independence
African states, democracy promoters simply encouraged the transition dynamic while
assisting pre-independent states to transition, hence donors made significant progress
there. Today nonetheless, a fraction of post-breakthroughs has maintained their
democratic status with many remaining in the grey-zone between consolidated democracy
and full dictatorship; some like Zimbabwe are semi-authoritarian “resisting or distorting
reform processes to block democratic progress” (Carothers, 2007).

The problem is that in the post-independence period, most if not all Sub-Saharan states
held competitive democratic processes guided by well written constitutions. But getting
into their third terms, power struggles led to a decline in democratic standards. This was
the case in two of the three cases investigated in this study - Zimbabwe and Tanzania. The
two served as examples of democratic accomplishment in the 80s and 90s but have since
been criticized for failing to uphold quality governance and democratic processes.
Ethiopia having experienced internal revolutions and wars has developed into a fullfledged authoritarian state. Quantitatively, these cases contribute to global democratic
recession but specifically democratic recession in Sub-Saharan Africa as summarized by
Freedom House in the graphs below. This takes place at a period when on average
developed economies have increased commitments for democracy promotion abroad
averaging US$ 2 billion per annum according to USAID. Why then have such
commitments not led to the advancement of democracy? Does democracy promotion
actually promote democracy? Or can democracy work in Africa?
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Source: Freedom House (2014), Sub-Saharan Africa Fact Sheet

Democratisation by elections
Part of this project’s aim was to investigate why donors continue to fund democratization
in cases where progress is slow. However, Lindberg (2006) in his quest to investigate the
role of election in democratization in Africa found that it is not how many times elections
fail to unseat authoritarians or result in extreme political transformation but that repetition
of elections (even when flawed) builds a democratic culture and its repetition deepens
democracy. As mentioned earlier most African countries are in their third decade of
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electoral practice, but their regimes remain the same and freedoms in their societies
continue to wane. Lindberg states that electoral activities create “incentives for political
actors by fostering the expansion and deepening of democratic qualities in society”
(Lindberg, 2006). As leaders are continuously held accountable through elections, they
are stimulated or induced to change. Although this researcher believes this is only relevant
for leaders with a will to change. For those without, elections act as a reinforcement
mechanism or validation process and only encourage polarization and tension with those
who oppose them. This is not to deny that elections have power to transform societies, but
there are exceptions. Certainly the practice of election processes listed above ensures that
citizens keep candidates in check.
Hope lies in the survival of electoral democracy decades after its establishment in Africa’s
former colonies; as Lindberg (2006) theorizes “complete breakdowns of new electoral
regimes, when they occur typically happen short after first elections, by the second or third
elections regimes are highly likely to survive.” The fact that authoritarians continue to
allow electoral conduct means there is hope for democratization. As more and more CSOs
are formed and continuously demand the respect of constitutional guidelines and respect
for the will of the people. Lindberg (2006) adds that a series of elections not only
contributes to increasing the democratic quality of a regime but also broadens and depends
civil liberties in the society, so elections are a set of factors with causal effects — “the
process of holding an uninterrupted series of de sure participatory, competitive and
legitimate elections not only enhances the democratic quality of the electoral regime but
also has positive effects on the spread and deepening of civil liberties in society”.

Related to Rustow's (1970) argument that democratic behavior produces democratic
values and not the other way round, Lindberg supports constant efforts made by the
international community to pressure non-democratic regimes to accept democracy as the
only mode of governance claiming the process of democratization is not about how long
it takes but how deep it is established and consolidated in a society. Creating incentives
and disincentives such as elections fosters democratic behavior that in turn leads to a more
democratic culture. The results in better quality democracy and a culture of accountability
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and participation; hence the theoretical argument — “repetitive elections even though
flawed are one of the causal factors in democratization” (Lindberg, 2006). From
Lindberg’s findings, democratization policy point of view, democracy promotion does
promote democracy and validates the international community’s focus on elections for
democracy enhancement. Elections are an effective mode of effecting democratization or
‘positive changes’ (Lindberg, 2006). The benefits are incremental and if continuously
implemented will result in political transformation, consequently refuting claims on the
inefficiency of democracy promotion institutions for democratization. This study assumes
it is for this reason that donors continue to fund democracy even when the progress is
unimpressive.
Lindberg therefore concludes, “Elections do not signal the completion of the transition to
democracy but rather foster liberalization and have a self-reinforcing power that promotes
increased democracy in Africa’s political regimes” (Lindberg, 2006) meaning, Zimbabwe
will become democratic if it continues to uphold electoral practices. The fact that elections
have not resulted in power transfer does not mean democracy promotion has failed. To
this study’s previous assumption that after a certain period, donors might need to realize
elections have failed to democratize a society, African ‘political renewal’ (Gyimah-Boadi,
2004) takes different paths and varies in the time it takes. Lindberg (2006) therefore
suggests the need for international community to sustain support to transitional countries
over an extended period — typically 12-15 years. This means the dramatic political
reforms we are witnessing across the continent signal an appreciation for transformation
— which is an important platform based on Lindberg’s findings.
According to Ihonvbere (2003), Africa’s democratic transition cannot be compared due to
its unique background and past experiences, its post-colonial account of ‘brutal
dictatorships, predatory regimes, military juntas and one-man 'misrule’ have negative
consequences coupled with ‘conditions of dependence, foreign domination, structural
distortions, underdevelopment, weak state structures and the politicization of the national
question’ does not make governance in postcolonial societies easy (Appiah-Thompson,
2015). This is true, but how can the efficient democratization of former Asian countries
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like India, Japan and Malaysia be explained; or African countries like South Africa and
Namibia? And, how adequate is history to explain the inability to conduct agreed
processes free of fraud. Before investigating democratic quality, the occurrence of ‘free
and fair’ elections in Zimbabwe has been rare. Countries experiencing ethnic or regional
tensions, rampant clientelism and limited democratic experience are able to hold
successful electoral processes, in a poor an underdeveloped country (Sandbrook, 1996).
Being so, history is not an excuse, although theorists like Carothers states that elections
are largely insignificant to democratize.

Lindberg (2006) cautions that the role of elections in democratization does not mean
elections are the only important factor in expanding civil liberties and democracy;
however, they have so far not received adequate recognition in the literature. Thus his
creation of a comprehensive empirical data set of all elections in Africa from 1989 - 2003,
chronicling democratic qualities of the elections and testing generalizations made in
earlier studies on the development of African politics. His desegregation of more than 40
African cases and his evaluation of different methodological approaches to the study of
elections there leads him to challenge existing pessimism on the state of democracy in
Africa, as he claims scholars of African politics study single cases and make
generalizations that democratization has failed but his wholesome study shows renewal
and progress. Lindberg also argues that existing studies on transitions to democracy and
election in Africa have fallacies inherent in their focus on ‘founding elections’ and not
recent ones and that those are cannot adequately explain the current state of democracy.
His findings show ‘first elections’ were not necessarily founding but steps in transitioning
towards democracy and these elections indicate their reinforcing and self — improving
quality. But, the gap in Lindberg’s findings are: if democracy takes root after a sequence
of three electoral cycles, what about countries like Zimbabwe almost in their tenth election
but experiencing deepening authoritarianism. Instead this study finds that repetitive
electoral practice can lead to competitive authoritarianism.
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Competitive authoritarianism
The repetition of elections can have unintended effects where elections enhance
authoritarianism as argued by Levitsky and Way (2010) and incumbents “combine
electoral competition with new forms of autocratic rule”. Developments in Zimbabwe and
at least half of Africa contradict the assumption that a country’s movement from strict
authoritarian rule means a transitioning towards democracy. As will be explained in the
findings, this study finds that democracy promotion through its quest for repetition for
perfection through elections might be facilitating and deepening the problem of
competitive authoritarian regimes. Answering the research question: yes, democracy
promotion does promote democracy, but is increasingly promoting a different political
model - competitive authoritarianism.
Often a country’s level of democracy is measured by the ability to hold transparent or less
contested elections under a conducive environment that enables competitors and voters to
express themselves fully. The problem is authoritarians have mastered this as an avenue
for accommodation on the global political arena and importantly (in developing
countries): as an avenue for aid. In turn, the practice dilutes or compromises future
democratic standards (mentioned earlier - e.g. competitive authoritarian or pseudo
democracies). These terms all limit democracy to elections which is not an adequate
representation, but are nonetheless important in understanding the development of
democracy in Africa. From the studies carried out in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania, it
is evident that most democracy promotion activities in Africa are nurturing such
democracies. As donors increase pressure on authoritarian regimes to conform to
democratic norms by various forms especially ‘conditionality’ (the carrot and stick
practice), more and more competitive regimes are developing. Non-democracies will
experience prolonged periods of ‘controlled’ transition (Diamond, 2014) as they use
elections as a legitimizing tool and make it difficult for any institution to hold them
accountable. This idea is investigated based on the works of Zakaria (1997), Levitsky and
Lucan Way (2002).
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Elshtain (2007) on the other hand agrees that the commitment to democracy and human
rights must not waver but states; its “tensions and complexities” must be discussed
“critically and candidly”. Linked to the problem of hybrid democracies, Elshtain’s study
of democracy promotion found — democracy promotion based on Western democracy
translates to a triumphant ‘majority vote’ above all others — a scenario potentially
yielding plebiscitary authoritarianism and is the case with emboldened African
authoritarians. Another challenge she says is the practice of coupling democracy with
human rights and internal measures that divide and check power which is ‘worse’.
Democracy assigns a great deal of power to the leader and “power in human hands will
ever be abused” since, when promoters emphasize on the “will of the people,” Elshtain
says,” will" in politics tends to promote intolerance and turns the opposition to enemies;
so it is better to speak of “interests, concerns, ideals, even dreams” instead. She however
adds that democracy not a sacrosanct principle but the best devised for freedom, human
dignity and fairness so far hence the need to spread it.
“As China continues to grow at its pace and hard-liners retain control over Chinese policy, by
midcentury China will oppose democratisation around the word, control information about
China available globally through censorship of the Internet and influence over mass media and
intimidate critics by means of cyberattacks and the withholding of economic favours"
(Pilsbury, 2015)

The rise of China, its increasing global influence and its strengthened partnership with
African authoritarians further complicates the future of Western democratic consolidation
in Africa. This study also proposes that the more China increases its influence under
authoritarian rule and prospers, the more it is a model for other authoritarians and the
lesser the value authoritarians place on Western democracy. Furthermore, the more
developed democracies impose conditions for development cooperation the lesser they are
attractive to authoritarian states. The more China cooperates with the outlying or isolated
authoritarians (under severe sanctions), the lesser the pressure for democratic reform. Or
rather, as Western support becomes less important so will the need for authoritarian
regimes to democratize. Also as developing economies advance (such as BRICS’ Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa), they become stronger in their defense for
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sovereignty and are less receptive to international pressure to democratize (Zakaria, 2003).
And, as the West loses its hegemony to China, the lesser will be its influence on
authoritarian states to democratize. The more the pressure to conform to Western
democratic values, the greater the growth of hybrid regimes or pseudo democracies.

Democratization in Africa
Nevertheless, Lewis (2015) studies of democracy assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa
indicate a remarkable process of democratic progress. He claims there is “abundant
evidence across Africa” highlighting subsequent transitions in Ghana, Senegal, Kenya,
Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and briefly in Mauritania (Lewis, 2015). Lewis in
opposition to the notion that democracy is in recession as argued by Diamond and
Carothers attributes democratic success in these countries to Western democracy
promotion efforts. Lewis confirms there is a missed picture to an extent and different
trends of readings of the evidence that democracy promotion promotes democracy. The
third wave of democratization that traversed the globe also landed rather forcefully in
Africa in the 1990s after the subsidence of the first wave, but it continues to face
democratic pressures. According to Lewis, early pressures for democratization were
exerted in no small degree by foreign donors partnered with powerful domestic forces. He
found that in all these successful cases of democratization, besides international pressure
and economic distress were some of the domestic factors that acted as major contributors.
Lewis (2015) adds that poor performance by authoritarian regimes instigates citizens to
rise up and demand regime change. However, what is missing is an explanation for cases
like Zimbabwe where incumbent’s poor performance and international pressure does not
result in regime change.

The subject of democracy is often pessimistic when discussed or investigated in the
African context, however Diamond (2015) adds to Lewis argument highlighting recent
developments in countries like Nigeria where democracy is revived (a development
formerly thought impossible) as a result of societies uniting, rising and organizing
themselves from grassroots to renew democratic possibilities and promises and
successfully organize elections with foreign support to unseat long standing leaders and
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parties. Nigeria’s incumbent government lost to opposition after several electoral attempts
and peacefully handed over power. Outside Africa, dictatorships and corrupt kleptocratic
leaders have been replaced by democratically elected candidates as seen in Sri Lanka and
Taiwan. Meaning there is hope against evidence of a recession that democracy could have
a new lease of life in countries where citizens were increasingly pessimistic. Diamond
(2015) on progress in Nigeria suggested that the world be open to and strategize about
ways to achieve renewed democratic progress and unexpected breakthroughs with a
renewed sense of commitment and purpose in terms of promoting democracy. He stresses
the importance of global factors and the role of the US and other major democracies in
helping to create a facilitating global normative climate for democracy — and
international pressures: diplomatically, economically, assistance through aid and
democratic programming to advance democracy’s Third Wave.

According to Lewis (2015), it is incontrovertible that there has been a degree of
institutionalization of some forms of electoral democratization across Africa and attributes
these successes to democracy promoters who have been undervalued in democracy
literature. Many governments have had multiple electoral cycles, diversification of
political parties increased in competition. He found that, with this political opening has
also come (even in some hybrid regimes and in some regimes which are still regarded as
authoritarian) an opening of political space across Africa. Lewis, 2015 found that, there is
more room for civic organizations, political associations, for unguarded speech, social
media and independent electronic and print media. Furthermore, donors have led the
facilitation of a broad opening of political discourse. Africa has a large emerging middle
class which is rising to demand a voice and there is stronger civil society than before in
most of Sub-Sahara Africa. Lewis (2015) identifies positive changes in media coverage
led by a social media transformation which gives a certain cover to people and a certain
degree of anonymity as well as an explosive growth of telecommunications which has
been a vehicle for expansion of discourse.

There is a downside however as Lewis findings indicate stagnation and backsliding on
some democratic elements. Lewis states that, despite IDP efforts, it is equally undeniable
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that democratic performance and its institutions in particular have not necessarily
followed suit. Highlighting problems of executive discretion and clientelism which are
still widespread and dominant not just in authoritarian states but in many electoral regimes
too; Lewis (2015) found, legislatures are often self-interested and self-dealing and not
very good transmission vehicles for aggregating popular interest or moving much
legislation — although they are adept at increasing their own salaries. Political parties
have evolved in many of these countries into dominant parties that compete but scarcely
have any fear of losing or diminishing their role, representing few elites (Lewis et al.
2013).
Lewis found — on democratic performance, governance problems are both qualitatively
and quantitatively mixed as indicated by the Afrobarometer (a comparative series of
national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society in Africa and
Public opinion), indicators from Freedom House on African politics. He highlights three
challenges to democratization in Africa. First, the problem of accountability where
particularly in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa - an abundance of transparency is clouded
by limited accountability, where we know much more today than we did 10 or 15 years
ago about corruption, malfeasance, misuse of public finances, closed door deals and how
things go wrong behind doors of official power: thanks to a “constant stream of
information through various local transparency organizations or initiatives” including
multiple parties and civil society, although, a few have been prosecuted, ousted, jailed or
in other ways held accountable (Lewis, 2012).

So local transparency without accountability is a severe challenge to democratic progress.
Second, economic growth without inclusion and prosperity is linked to inequality, or what
he considers ‘elite democracies’. This is a problem because some segments of society are
excluded from development due to a lack of corresponding spread of economic gains in
tandem with the political equalization conferred by citizenship and the vote (Lewis, 2015).
Lewis equates unequal democracies to highly corrupt, extractive and dominant
democracies and reiterates Carothers’ concerns that such local issues are difficult for
external actors to solve. Linked is the third problem of public goods, where basic services,
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infrastructure, broad qualities of the rule of law which he says are better served in many
Sub-Saharan countries than they were under authoritarian regimes, but are still grossly
inadequate to provide basic education, public health, essential foundations of
infrastructure for sustained economic growth.

To the question of whether there is a democratic recession in Africa Lewis et al. (2012)
state that, there are very mixed signals. They believe, though Freedom House ratings show
somewhat of a recession evident in declines in Central and Eastern Africa since 2003,
advances in Southern and West Africa have been made. Similar to Lindberg’s (2006)
claims that “even when elections left a lot to be desired in terms of freedom and fairness,
the process of repeated competitive elections tended to generate momentum for greater
democratization”; Lewis found that, despite some ‘quantitative’ subsidence in the quality
of democratic performance in the last five years (Freedom House, 2014), by the same
token according to Afrobarometer scales, public attitude data showed both a frustration
with poor performance but a resilience in commitment to democracy. Concluding that
domestic and foreign assistance’s continued persistence on democratic norms, coupled
with continued resilience of electoral regimes and democratic preferences (as reflected in
the opinion data across the region) has resulted in successful turnovers in Zambia, Malawi,
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal. Lewis (2015) also applauds peaceful and successful
legal successions after the death of leaders in Zambia and Malawi which a decade ago was
a common cause for war.

Still, the countervailing role of civil society; emerging and rising middle classes in many
of the better performing African countries; and a constructive role of diasporas is very
encouraging. Van Donge et al. (2012) believe the ‘degree of shifting norms’ on the
continent as expressed through regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the African Union (AU) and others gives hope that there
is change and locals realize and are in charge of their initiatives for change. They
recapitulate international actor’s efforts have significantly contributed to Africa’s
democratic progress but setbacks are mostly internal and can mostly be solved by
domestic efforts (Hackenesch, 2015).
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Compliance for change
On the other hand, on conditionality as a strategy to encourage political reform in
authoritarian states; from an international relations perspective, democracy promotion
strategies have been explained by three main theories — compliance, international
socialization and conditionality. Compliance has been a key factor often connecting
policies and issues of human rights with democracy promotion. The increasingly
multipolar nature of politics involving state and non-state actors allows states to include
issues championed by non-state-actors (NGOs mostly) for use as conditions to advance
political transitions. The Reagan administration considered democracy a pre-condition for
human rights and developments to date take human rights as a pre-condition for
democracy. Pressure is put by Western donor agencies on recipient governments insisting
on the upholding of human rights causing a “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Here donors and transnational advocacy networks have most influence in an ascending
order on agenda-setting, state discourse, institutional procedures, and state behavior,
giving them power to influence change.

Compliance is linked to the idea of international socialisation, a rationalist approach to
explaining the need for states to adhere to liberal international human rights and
democracy norms through a process of reinforcement, whose effectiveness depends on the
balance between the international and domestic costs and benefits of compliance over an
extended period of times (Schimmelfennig, 2004). Conditionality, though considered to
have failed to produce sustained compliance in anti-liberal regimes, has been a key
strategy in maintaining international pressure in democracy promotion. Of the
international dimensions of democratization, negative political conditionality is most
common, seen as imposition of sanctions or rewards. Whitehead (2001) categorizes
methods of democracy promotion into three-incorporation, invasion, and intimidation and
conditionality involves the third. Because coercion does not require the consent of the
domestic actors, it is not surprising that powerful states employ it as a democracy
promotion strategy.

Nonetheless as Magen and McFaul (2009) suggest, this research rather than focusing on
the international relations theoretical aspects of democracy promotion focuses on the
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‘logics, targets and pathways of influence’ by international donor agencies. They however
help explain the variances and commonalities in donor practices based on their interests.
A common question is: to what extent can external agencies influence the processes of
democratization in aid recipient countries (Crawford, 2001). How legitimate is the
practice of conditionality? Should donors impose conditions? Furthermore, scholars like
Knack (2004) based on his findings on economic aid and democratization states that
economic aid is a better strategy for democracy promotion and coupled with political
conditionality is guaranteed to advance democratization. An interesting perspective when
studying third world cases. Controversially, donor states have enacted laws to stamp their
commitment to democratization through legislature, bills, and acts — “tying aid to
performance on political standards”. Western donors especially the US often condition
general budget support on performance evidenced by the US administration’s addition of
Section 116 to their Foreign Assistance Act, conditioning aid particularly to the respect of
human rights (Knack, 2004).
Authoritarianism and conditionality
The European Union (EU) has actively been involved in African democratization
processes since the early 2000s through the provision of financial and technical
inducements as well as disincentives like sanctions. Hackenesch (2015) in her studies of
EU democracy promotion initiatives in Africa found, it had made considerable efforts in
establishing elections, growing and nurturing democratic culture, fostering civil society,
supporting multi-party democracy and pressurizing incumbents to change. Nonetheless,
the Union’s efforts through the imposition of political conditionality as well as those of
other international actors there, were limited by power for external actors’ force reforms
in dominant party systems. “Conflicting donor interests and insufficient donor
coordination have been blamed in previous studies for limiting successes of
conditionality” (Crawford, 2001) while research on authoritarian regimes has long
concentrated on the domestic factors of authoritarian longevity while neglecting the
effects of political conditionality in authoritarian regimes (Hackenesch, 2015). Scholars
like Wright (2009) who claim general development aid contributes to democratization in
authoritarian regimes with a large ruling coalition inspired Hackenesch’s investigation of
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the efficacy of negative conditionality (especially sanctions) in authoritarian regimes, with
particular attention to recipient states of Ethiopia and Rwanda. The dominant party
systems in these cases have occasionally been forthcoming in engaging with EU on
democratic reforms since 2000 despite their dependence on EU aid. Hackenesch also
investigates Cornell’s (2012) findings that democracy aid seems to have a positive effect
only in single-party regimes; no effect could be detected for dominant party systems.

The EU has not resorted to sanctions in Rwanda and Ethiopia but combined development
aid, democracy aid and dialog to support political reforms (Hackenesch, 2015). She found
positive changes in Rwanda’s attitude and response to international demands as early 2000
but has readily done so to date and sometimes “proactively” by engaging with the EU.
Ethiopia however has “remained highly reluctant to engage on political reforms and only
became more forthcoming in 2011” (Hackenesch, 2015). The differences in the
willingness of African authoritarian regimes to effectively engage and implement foreign
political changes lie in the “interplay between the government and (potential) opponents”
according to Hackenesch (2015). This interaction created opportunities for the EU and
other donors to support democracy and counter authoritarianism. Where authoritarians
cannot permit higher levels of political liberalization and uses high-intensity coercion, EU
sometimes exerts pressure “however, at times when the government has more leeway to
engage and to allow for political liberalization, the EU has difficulties using the
opportunity to promote reforms” (Hackenesch, 2015).

The EU has shifted it democratic promotion strategies from aid and conditionality as
sanctions were simply ‘reactive instruments’ through responding to complex problems of
human rights abuse and political closure. Its policies have shifted to ‘respond to imminent
political crises, support slight political openings and prevent degradations in political
liberalization’ (Hackenesch, 2015). The Union claims to have successfully used ‘aid
negotiations’ with authoritarian regimes to raise the prominence of political reforms.
Progress on democratic reforms is now a key criterion in deciding on the allocation of aid
through the European Development Fund (EDF), according to the Cotonou Agreement
signed between the Union and African, Caribbean, and the Pacific Group of States (ACP)
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in 2000. Conditionality therefore sets ‘direct incentives’ for reforms as theorized by Beck
& Conzelmann (2004).

Confrontation
___________
Sanctions, budget
support,
suspensions .etc.

Criticism
___________
Naming & shaming,
Shifting of aid
funds .etc.

Cooperation
___________
Political and policy
dialogues,
democracy aid

The EU’s strategies to promote democratic reforms. Source: Hackenesch, (2015)

Hackenesch (2015) also found budget support strategies of democracy promotion allow
for dialog between donor and recipient on reforms and incentivizes for change. There is a
considerable amount of literature indicating the effectiveness of incentives for change in
developing countries, which depending on the circumstances have an impact on dominant
systems. Failed political conditionality has provided a number of lessons to donors who
now increasingly see aid as a leverage to induce or support governance reforms in
recipient countries according to Molenaers (2012). EU’s 2006 governance incentive
tranche provides additional financial incentives for authoritarians to engage in and grow
democratic governance cultures added to their “increase in aid” (Hackenesch, 2015). As
mentioned earlier, political science scholars criticize donors uncoordinated approach to
governance issues emanating from conflicting interests hence the EU’s ‘aid coordination
dialogs’ among donors for effective democratization. Hackenesch (2015) as well as
Schimmelfennig et al. (2005) theorize that, conditionality or international pressure are
only effective where the regime is willing to engage the donor and that active engagement
with recipient governments is imperative.

Hackenesch, (2015) concludes, the EU and other donors face tough choices when
engaging with dominant party systems which have strongly entrenched themselves in
power. EU’s combination of development aid, democracy aid, and dialog for democracy
promotion has received varied responses in both Ethiopia and Rwanda forcing them to
adjust their strategies. “The Rwandan government willingly and at times proactively
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engaged with the EU on political reforms, the Ethiopian government was quite reluctant
and sometimes even unwilling to engage”. When authoritarians face intense international
pressure, “Target coercion at the broader society and use high-intensity coercion” and are
unwilling to engage on political reforms. However, when faced with intra-party defections
they tend to be under pressure and willing to engage with the EU on political reforms if
incentives are high (Hackenesch, 2015). The findings also indicate - the EU is “illequipped” to respond to this dynamic and take advantage of rolling party splits and their
weakness to resist aid. This is an important aspect for this study as Zimbabwe is faced
with mass culling party defections while faced with international sanctions. Hackenesch,
(2015) suggests, “Policy-makers and academics pay more attention to periods when the
ruling elite splits or when members of the ruling elite defect and when governments use
low-intensity coercion to minimize challenges to political survival” this is the period
Zimbabwe is in and this study will fill this gap with the Zimbabwean example as she found
implications for the effectiveness of political conditionality have rarely been explored.
Hackenesch’s attempts are positive developments in explaining the effectiveness of
conditionality for democracy promotion strategies in authoritarian systems but academic
studies on cases where all the criteria are met but the country remains closed given
differences among dominant party systems are lacking.

Accordingly, the next chapter is an analysis of democratization in Africa as well as a
contextual investigation of Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania (case selection).
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Chapter 4
Africa
The earlier chapters explored the various dimensions, concepts and academic
interpretations of democracy and democracy promotion. This chapter looks into
democratic progress in the context of Africa and includes an empirical analysis of
developments in Zimbabwe.

After experiencing what Larry Diamond refers to as its "second liberation" opening up
new prospects for democratic development on the continent (Diamond, 2007), electoral
democracy in Africa started gaining popularity from the late 1950s as countries engaged
in struggles for independence. However, even before that countries like Senegal in 1848
already conducted elections for parliamentary representatives to the French parliament
due to their successful assimilation into the system. The democracy concept was a form
of tutelage by the colonial masters in preparation for independence. It is important to note
that these elections just before and not long after independence were considered peaceful,
free and fair.

Shortly after their independence, most African states remained democracies, enjoying
high levels of public participation, respect of fundamental freedoms and free; but by the
late 1980s few democracies remained. By the time mature democracies declared their
commitment to democracy promotion as part of their aid packages to African countries,
cracks in their political systems were becoming visible though some African democracies
remain resilient. According to a report by the World Institute for Development Economics
Research (WIDER) in 2013, despite its enormous natural resources, Sub-Saharan Africa
remains the most aid dependent region to date with four times as much foreign aid as a
share of gross national income as the next most dependent region - North Africa and the
Middle East (Resnick, 2013).

Later, democratic establishments, at least in terms of electoral politics and constitutional
changes of government had become common. Many countries (those that had gained
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independence early) were into their second or third round of multiparty elections, while
others struggled with authoritarian rule and even autocratic tendencies in some of the new
democracies. Weak state institutions, lack of experience with and commitment to
democratic procedures and intense political rivalries (often ethnic) led to the premature
death of democratic structures in Africa (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Repeatedly, success
stories of democracy assistance efforts have been ruined by authoritarian backsliding,
military coups and the resumption of civil wars. Some new democratic regimes over the
last three decades have been replaced by single-party regimes and some have been
overthrown internally mostly through coups setting stage for military dictatorships. This
has resulted in several intra and interstate wars. At this point the future of democracy was
seriously questioned. Clearly, the trajectory of this wave of democracy in Africa has been
quite complex and uneven (Diamond, 1999).

Even the few democracies in Africa are still fragile, particularly electoral democracies.
After their independence, a number of African countries in the 1990s transitioned from
one party state to multi-party regimes becoming ‘electoral democracies’. They held
regular elections that were considerably ‘free’ and ‘fair’; multiple parties could compete;
and opposition parties competed on relatively equal playing fields. Unfortunately, since
this positive development, at least 13 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have gone back to
one party regime (Resnick, 2013). About 10 or 12 elections are still considered electoral
democracies by Freedom house which shows that after the improvements of aggregate
scores from 2004 to 2013 by country, at least two countries decline each year on average
in freedom trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (Freedom, 2014). Only nine out of 49 SubSaharan African countries and none in North Africa could be classified as ‘free electoral
democracies’ in 2012 (House, 2012). This is a sad indication that two decades of
democracy promotion have had little visible impact in Africa, especially since two of those
nine had been democratic since independence and donors played little or no role in the
democratic transitions of most of the others.

Debate on Africa's democratization processes and prospects has entered on four
interrelated issues: the relative roles of internal and external factors, historical and
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contemporary dynamics, structural and contingent factors, and economic and political
dimensions. Those who stress the primacy of internal factors behind the democratic
transitions tend to underscore the strength of domestic political protests and prodemocracy
movements engendered or energized by the failures of development, the economic crises
of the 1980s and 1990s, and the disintegration of the postcolonial state's legitimacy and
capacity. Additionally, the imposition of structural adjustment programs and political
conditionality’s by Western bilateral and multilateral financial institutions after the end of
the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe are considered a factor
(Encyclopaedia, n.d.). Nonetheless, the West's commitment to democracy promotion in
Africa has been questioned, arguing that it is more rhetorical than real and is motivated
by donor interests rather than recipient needs.

After 1990, most of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa legalized opposition parties
and held competitive, multiparty elections (Diamond, 2007). Nonetheless most of these
elections have often not met the minimal democratic criteria of freeness and fairness.
Suffering from incumbent dominance, institutions like legislatures and judiciaries do not
have a large check on the activities of the executive. With rooted political advantages,
incumbents are re-elected 85% of the time — much higher than in other developing
regions making it difficult for opposition parties to get onto the national political arena
(Resnick, 2013). Incumbent parties have exploited institutional advantages to deny the
opposition any chance of winning power in the new multi-party regimes (Diamond, 2007).
Diamond refers to them as "pseudo-democracies" similar to Richard Joseph’s “virtual
democracies” (Joseph, 1998).

Why focus on Africa?
It was important to focus on Africa, as of all continents, Africa has the largest constituency
of authoritarians to date. The international community and donor agencies have
particularly focused on Africa as a region desperate for freedom and justice given the long
record of challenges emanating from bad governance. Authoritarianism continues to
dominate politics decades after independence. Following the independence of most of
Sub-Saharan Africa around the 90s, there was great optimism that new ‘local’ political
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leaders (nominated through democratic process in some instances after war) would carry
the democratic culture on and allow for the transfer of power among their electorate.
Besides, learning from the experience of other states that had gained independence earlier,
post-independence leaders were expected to implement free and just governance ideals.
Western governments had maintained their presence in a several administrative and
advisory structures in government after leaving and were expected to help encourage
Western values: briefly ‘demo-optimism’ was high (Lindberg, 2006).
Not long, ‘demo-optimism’ turned to ‘demo-pessimism as political liberalization was
replaced by authoritarianism resulting in a need for term extensions creating what Joseph
(1997) refers to as ‘virtual democracies’. Equality of participation and free competition
— the main characteristics of legitimate elections (Lindberg, 2006) are almost nonexistent in Zimbabwe. Africa presents unique test cases for democracy — constituently
conducting elections (common democratic standard, but remaining undemocratic or
deepening in the opposite — authoritarianism). Despite huge efforts made internally by
advocacy groups, CSOs, NGOs, opposition parties, etc., and that made by external actors
especially powerful-influential states, regional bodies, international organizations, etc.,
progress has been very slow. Significant financial commitments, expert technical support
and energies are constantly availed; but it seems, as Chabal (1998) states — debate on
democratization in Africa is like ‘a dialogue of the deaf’. In cases like Tanzania where
optimism remains high, common weaknesses in a reluctance to let the ‘will of the people’
prevail freely.

Academically, case by case evaluations of whether the ever growing field of democracy
promotion is actually promoting democracy have been lacking. Where efforts are made,
Lindberg (2006) identifies weaknesses as he claims, political scientists working on Africa
pay too little attention to careful conceptualization of dependent variable, clear
delimitation of hypotheses about the relationships between cause and effect or rigorous
measurement and compilation of comparable data. In addition, Lindberg found, studies of
political change in Africa suffer from “inadequate theoretical specification,
methodological rigour, and most important, insufficient collection of data suitable for
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comparative analysis — not enough cumulative work has been done”. Hence this study
aims to fill this gap by contributing with an in-depth study of Zimbabwe, a popular case
for democratization’s failure resulting from authoritarian rule.

Democracy development in Africa
The effective enforcement of legal participatory and competitive democracy affects
democracy's development. Experiences in Africa indicate democracy involves
incremental processes that require commitment especially from internal parties, resulting
in high political payoffs. The challenge with democracy’s ontologies is their ability to coexist with non-democratic characteristics for long periods of time. Basic electoral
democracy (the practice of constantly holding elections at periods stipulated by the
constitution, with a degree of accommodation for multi-party competition and a seemingly
equal opportunity to participate or have their voices heard), can and has existed alongside
grave violations of human rights, strategic manipulation and the disenfranchisement of
electorates. Hence on the outlook, democracy exists though deficient and holding
incumbents accountable for non-democratic practice is difficult. This is the situation with
Africa’s long standing rulers and the state of governance. The issue is, democratic
practices are constantly withheld but significantly lacking in quality hence Levitsky and
Way’s (2010) ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ or Zakaria’s (2012) ‘iliberal
democracies’. But then again, Lindberg (2006) insists “holding formally participatory and
contested elections is a necessary condition for those elections to be democratic and the
political system to be a representative democracy”.

Just as it is important to draw a line between democracy and development aid, it is
important to distinguish between electoral and liberal democracy to understand the
opportunities and limits of democratic development in Africa. Liberal democracies take
pride in having elected officials with power and authority, prevailing over the military and
police. Their independent judiciary upholds the rule of law. Resultantly, their citizens
enjoy political and legal equality. Individual and group liberties are respected. No one is
above the law. People are free to organize, demonstrate, publish, petition, and speak their
minds. Likewise, “Newspapers and electronic media are free to report and comment, and
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to expose wrongdoing. Minority groups can practice their culture, their faith, and their
beliefs without fear of victimization. Executive power is constrained by other
governmental actors. Property rights are protected by law and by the courts. Corruption is
punished and deterred by autonomous, effective means of monitoring and enforcement”
(Diamond, 1999). These are indicators of liberal democracies reiterated in most literature
on democracy. They form the premise on which this study states that Zimbabwe and other
Sub-Saharan African countries have a long way to go.

According to Diamond, to understand the prospects for Africa’s democratization, we must
have a clear conceptual framework for measuring the real extent of that progress. It is also
important to examine the relationship between the extent of democracy and the likelihood
of its consolidation (Diamond, 2007). Based on the Western model, upon attaining a
‘democratic’ status, a state is broadly valued and considered legitimate and later
consolidated. Diamond cautions that this is not to suggest, however, that a rapid transition
to liberal democracy is everywhere realistic, or the only path to democratic progress. This
research shares the optimistic view that, democratization could be developmental
(happening at different times in different ways). Could it be that Africa has taken the
longer route? Considering the fact that it took now mature democracies centuries to
establish Westphalian models of democracy? Sklar (1996) talks of democracy emerging
in fragments or parts by no fixed timetable or sequence, then the presence of one fragment
of democracy can provide space, experience, initiative, or inspiration for the emergence
of others. Diamond adds that, based on this consideration every increment of democratic
progress is significant and should be encouraged (Diamond, 2007). But then again, what
about repressive regimes? Is the relapse part of its democratic development?

Based on the hypothesis stated earlier, elections alone might not effectively democratize
a country but their repetition is certainly hopeful, just as the existence of opposition parties
and civil society groups that organize and educate the people. Democratic practices at least
in the case of Zimbabwe have gradually eroded the hegemony and domination of ruling
parties. Bratton and Van de Walle in their work on Democratic Experiments in Africa
highlight such important implications as holding of frequent election (Van de Walle &
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Bratton, 1997). “By the same token, although electoral democracy may have many
illiberal features, the ability to turn the ruling party out of power is a crucial threshold for
democratization, especially given Africa's harshly authoritarian experience. Most liberal
democracies that do emerge in Africa will probably do so after passing through (or even
slipping back to) some period of "merely" electoral democracy” (Diamond, 2007).
“Of sovereign states with a population of over five hundred thousand, elections and a
variety of other democratic institutions are nearly universal” (Hyde, 2014). In her survey
on global trends of elections; as of 2012, most countries held elections at least once in ten
years except for six countries - China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and the
United Arab Emirates who did not hold national elections from (2003-2012). This might
be considered a remarkable trend. Nevertheless, not all election holding countries in the
world are democratic. Some nations hold elections periodically but do not meet
democratic standards by any means, as is the case with North Korea (where elections are
tools of authoritarian control). So what does the constancy of elections mean for
democracy? Can elections also be used as a tool for autocratic rule? Unarguably,
democracy assistance efforts make it more and more difficult to manipulate or short
change election results, the law and human rights and get away with.

The state of democracy in present day Africa is very unstable. In as much as progress has
been made with a sizeable number of democracies, authoritarian systems are still strong.
Encouraging though is the fact that as the model is increasingly becoming unpopular; their
domestic support bases are shrinking and face a more vigorous opposition. Where the
opposition lacks in strength, an enthusiastic and dynamic civil society makes up for it.
Some electoral democracies like Senegal and Ghana remain strong, unlike some
remaining repressive authoritarian regimes such as that of Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea,
Cameroon, Sudan, Chad, Rwanda and The Gambia. The continent is still troubled facing
the breakdown or disintegration of the state altogether, proving that East-Asian
developmental dictatorships styles are almost impossible in Africa.
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Diamond contends the pessimism in today’s literature, insisting “the roots of Africa's
developmental crisis—and the hopes for its renewal, and are political and institutional”
(Diamond, 2007). He believes that it is imperative to strengthen state structures, and
implement procedures for greater transparency and accountability in governance. He
suggests careful and creative institutional designs to give political leaders and groups,
incentives to behave in ways that will enhance democracy, lawfulness, stability, and trust,
rather than destroy them. This research believes it is from this standpoint that donors have
undertaken democracy promotion initiatives targeting institutional change and increasing
awareness and pressure from civil society.

The state of democracy in Africa
Democracy’s third wave though carrying in intensity has been felt unevenly across SubSaharan Africa. Their consolidation has varied to great degrees although falling short of
Western democracies. In 46 sub-Saharan African countries, multiparty elections have
been held consistently on an average on five year terms. Constitutions have been written
and revised to guide political processes that are generally abided to although manipulated
in some parts. Since the 1990s, there has been general stability although unrest continues
in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. Authoritarians have been displaced
in some parts though continue to hold power in Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Sudan, Chad,
Rwanda -- although conducting regular elections. Elections continue to incorporate and
provide participation alternatives for the electorate. Political parties provide opportunities
for interested individuals to participate, challenge and provide alternatives. Legislative
Parliaments are consistently elected to represent electorates, formulate laws, and supervise
government and the judiciary. Again, these vary to great extents as Sub-Saharan Africa
has four categories of governments: consolidated democracies (e.g. Ghana, Zambia,
Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius); semi-democracies (e.g., Tanzania, Nigeria, and
Benin); hybrid — authoritarian regimes (e.g., Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Uganda); reversed
transitions or collapsed regimes (e.g., Somalia). Domestic and international pressure for
democratization (1989 - 94) in about 41 Sub-Saharan countries led to political transitions
through elections; 65 multiparty presidential elections were held (1989 - 2000) in 42
countries (Rakner et al. 2007). Similar to Freedom House’s 2015 rankings of political
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rights and civil liberties in Sub-Saharan Africa, ranging on average 2.9 (Freedom House,
2015), quantitatively democratic progress has been positive. The promises of democracy
in terms of political accountability, economic development and peace (Rakner et al. 2007)
have not been fulfilled, hence the dominant pessimism in democracy scholarship.

Zimbabwe
After attaining independence from British rule in 1980, fell under one party rule — led by
Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF).
Since then regular elections were conducted without much contention and according to
analysts, they met democratic standards. This might be because: as Brown mentions “a
democratic façade — and sometimes not even that — was all that was required to escape
pressure to democratize” (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Until 1998 when the first viable
opposition party was formed — the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by
Morgan Tsvangirai, multi-party competition was almost non-existent, with the exception
of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which was later co-opted through a
power sharing arrangement. The entrance of the MDC gave confidence to three other
smaller parties who filed their candidacy for the 2000 parliamentary elections, where
ZANU-PF won with a slight margin against the MDC. Until then voter turnout had been
low; however just before the 2002 presidential elections, more than five million
Zimbabweans (mostly new voters) registered to vote. Simultaneously, several NGOs were
formed primarily for the protection of civilian rights and the promotion of democracy
(including community outreach programs and awareness of electoral processes). A
number of international agencies began their operations in the capital aimed at promoting
democracy.

The next Presidential election was held in 2002 where Mugabe won with 56% against
Tsvangirai’s 42%. These were the closest presidential elections in Zimbabwe’s history.
The conduct of the election was heavily condemned by the Commonwealth and other
international observers, the MDC, media and Western governments; while the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) pronounced them ‘free and fair.’ Followed by the
2005 parliamentary elections where ZANU-PF won 59.6% against MDC’s 39.5%. The
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MDC denounced these elections as "sham," claiming the elections were marked by
massive electoral fraud. It further claimed it would have won 90 seats (more than 60% of
the vote) if the elections had not been rigged.

International agencies in preparation for the 2008 elections began training election
observers, strengthening the capacity of local NGOs and raising funds for democracy
assistance. This was besides an NGO bill enacted in 2004, but not signed into law,
prohibiting local NGOs from receiving foreign funds. In autocratic systems like
Zimbabwe, even a proposed law like this one prohibiting the operation of foreign
organizations adversely affects the institution’s activities and disadvantages their intended
beneficiaries. Inflation became uncontrollable, industries closed; unemployment
increased, making the country ungovernable. Zimbabwe became heavily reliant on foreign
aid. An economy once considered the ‘bread-basket of Africa’ crumbled. Nonetheless, the
situation was advantageous to opposition parties as its citizens were in dire need of a new
administration.

Another round of elections was held in March 2008 to elect the President and Parliament.
Yet again, the MDC was critical of the conduct of the electoral process and accused the
government of manipulating the election. The electoral commission withheld the results
for more than a month. Their actions were heavily criticized by CSOs and the opposition
— which futilely sought an order from the High Court for the release of the results.
Hitherto, Tsvangirai was projected to have won based on parallel vote tabulations (i.e., a
collation of results displayed at polling stations around the country). He however did not
have an outright majority to avoid a re-run, but his party declared he won by a narrow
majority.

Human Rights Watch declared the elections "deeply flawed” (CNN, 2008). After a
recount, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) officially announced that Tsvangirai
had won with 47.9% against Mugabe with 43.2%, requiring a run-off. The opposition
initially refused to participate in the second round but eventually agreed. The period
leading to the run-off was marred with reports of human rights abuses, like attacks on
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opposition supporters particularly in the rural areas and abductions of opposition
supporters and leaders. Both parties blamed the other for perpetrating violence, but
international organizations blamed ZANU-PF for the attacks. The opposition withdrew
from the race because of attacks on its supporters; leaving Mugabe to contest alone. He
won with an outright majority, but had lost the majority in the House of Assembly (a first
in Zimbabwe’s politics).

An interim government was later negotiated leading to the formation of the Government
of National Unity (GNU). A stalemate broke the arrangement ahead of the 2013 elections
— which were considered the worst by democratic standards, due to accusations of a
flawed voter’s roll; a disorganized ‘special vote’ process (particularly for security forces
to be deployed out of their areas on election day); fake voter slips and ‘bused in voters’
(not residing in the areas they vote, to vote twice). The opposition lost and split affecting
its strength and significance. All these developments took place in the eyes of international
donors who immensely contributed for the success of each process.

While an increase in financial support for democratic elections is assumed a key factor in
speeding the democratization process as proposed by scholars like Lindberg (2006), it has
not had the same effect on Zimbabwean politics — this will be expanded in the findings.
With increased trends of donor funding for electoral democratic processes,
authoritarianism continues to grip the state. DFID, USAID, the EU and the UN have been
leading supporters in Zimbabwe’s democratic transition. Voice of America in December
2010 reported “Western Donors Pledge US$ 500 Million in 2011 Aid to Zimbabwe”
quoting an international group of donors who were “cautions that the pace of reforms and
credible preparations for elections will determine the level of interaction between donors
and the unity government” (VOA, 2010).
The Zimbabwean State newspaper in April 2013 also reported that “Our investigations
revealed that between march 2009 and April 15 this year, ZESN received a total of
US$ 5,043,044, 69 from the UNDP, Canadian Embassy, Norwegian Embassy, The
Ministry of Foreign affairs, Netherlands, The Royal Danish Embassy, The Electoral
76

Reform International, Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, Freedom House, the
National Endowment of Democracy among a litany of donors who have nefarious
electoral interests in Zimbabwe.” The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) is
one of the leading democracy promotion networks of CSOs and this banking information
was gathered from its bank transactions. For a country whose GDP is only 13.49 billion,
this is evidence that huge investments have been made for its political transition.

The Zimbabwean participation and contestation trend is summed up here:
No opposition — no multi-party democracy
No opposition — better democratic standards
No opposition — less external assistance
Opposition entrance — increased external assistance

Standards
Funding

1993

1998/9

2013

The researcher assumes that, during the time that Zimbabwe was predominantly a one
party state (assumed to be democratic), election malpractices existed and maybe
contentious issues were diverted. However, the entrance of a viable opposition party led
to increased international attention, magnifying all democratic misconduct. Or are
democratic standards easier to meet in a one party state than a multi-party one? The
formation of more local NGOs paralleled increased political funding, why? Without much
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political aid, why was there less disagreement on democratic standards than after the
entrance of the MDC? Is money a precondition for successful electoral democracy?
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Chapter 5
Methodology

Case study
Since most studies on democratization in Africa are largely theoretical or comparative —
assessing the effectiveness of democracy assistance strategies in different countries over
a period of time; it was important to have an in-depth study or detailed exploration of
democracy promotion activities in Zimbabwe. Existing studies on democracy promotion
and democratization showed a linear effect of their cause and effect relationship, though
it did not adequately explain Zimbabwe’s democratic stagnation and backsliding. The
study sought to understand the larger phenomenon of democratization resulting from
democracy promotion through closely examining Zimbabwean political developments.
The descriptive nature of a case study also enriches our knowledge of democratization in
an authoritarian state.
Coppedge (2012) in his book on democratization and research methods suggests this
research makes use of qualitative research because its theories are probabilistic, since
there are always exceptions due to unknown causes that cannot be demonstrated
systematically. Also because its theories are partial as in most social science works, as “no
political outcome has just one cause…and none determines it alone” Coppedge (2012). Its
theories are also conditional because of the different periods of events, places,
relationships and conditions. This case study also tests competing explanations of
democratization in other regions and generates explanations for political developments in
Zimbabwe.
The process of democratization is influenced by various factors including a country’s
history, actors and circumstances and these particularities can only be fully understood
through a case study. Zimbabwe like most Sub-Saharan states has received significant
financial and technical support for democratization but has failed to conduct free and fair
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or minimally contested elections, improve civil and political rights, or transfer power after
three decades of electoral democratic practice. This is unique and deserves special
attention as it has been a topical authoritarian case, widely covered in the news but there
is limited scholarly work on why the political crisis has taken long.

Although it is not a cross case analysis, other cases of similar democracy promotion
strategies in Africa are used to help explain commonalities and differences to strengthen
the hypothesis. The challenges faced by different African countries are difficult to
generalize and the contexts and people differ. Donors likewise, do not operate uniformly
across Africa.

So, following visiting research opportunities availed to the researcher in Ethiopia and
Tanzania during the period (May - August 2015), the researcher took these as
opportunities to enrich the study by conducting interviews with relevant actors in the two
countries after a month’s study in Zimbabwe. At that time, general and presidential
elections were taking place in both Ethiopia and Tanzania respectively hence the decision
to observe electoral processes there too. Ethiopia hosts the African Union (Africa’s
continental union involved in democratic processes such as election observation under the
African Union Commission’s Program for the Promotion of Democracy and Democratic
Elections as enshrined in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
(African Union). It is worth noting that the African Union has deployed observers to
monitor Zimbabwean presidential elections over the decade and consistently declared
them ‘free and fair’.

All interviews were conducted in capital cities: Harare (Zimbabwe), Addis Ababa
(Ethiopia) and Dare Salaam (Tanzania) where all offices of the key informants are located.
Preliminary assessments indicated the possibility of entry into the three countries for
interviews.
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Sampling
Without access to a solid sampling frame for the population Bryman (2001) suggests
snowball sampling, also due to the sensitivity of issues involved. Purposive sampling was
first used to select the first respondents guided by the research objective. Based on contacts
already established, the researcher depended on referrals to relevant individuals and
organizations willing to participate. An actor network mapping exercise aided by common
actors in the theoretical analysis had been conducted prior to the field study. The sample
size was pre-estimated to 30 respondents, however 32 were then interviewed and this
catered for representativeness.

Design
Investigating the effects of a phenomena and evaluating programs requires the use of
qualitative interviews according to Rubin and Rubin (1995). In-depth qualitative
interviews help to explain why and how concepts are created and evolve and explore
topics at length, hence their use in this inquiry. Experts in the area were sought to solicit
personal experiences and generate practical and informed recommendations for future
policies e.g. how a leader holds period elections but remains authoritarian.
This research employed the qualitative approach because Zimbabwe’s democratization
processes are contemporary developments. Democracy promotion is a fairly recent
phenomenon only popularized in Africa over the last three decades and research
methodology scholars like Hamel et. al (1993) recommend the use of case studies for its
inquiry. Yin (1984) also suggests that the study is conducted in a natural real life context,
hence the decision to hold face to face interviews in the same context. Resultantly, the
study aimed at forming explanations and theories grounded in the collected details and
evidence. With the understanding that, qualitative interviews are both academic and
practical tools, the study aimed to come up with a grounded theory or explanation of
democratic processes in Zimbabwe from key informants (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

Opportunities for each interview were sought via email, telephone and verbal
conversations, where the researcher introduced herself by name, her capacity as a graduate
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student at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, the study as a course requirement, who had
referred her (or where prior contact had been made, in what capacity and where), available
times, the interview duration, the importance of their participation and contact details.

Structure and approach
Interviews
The structure and approach of the interviews varied depending on the respondent, nature
of relationship, starting discussion (entrance point) and the general flow of the
conversation.
“Elite interviewing can be used whenever it is possible to treat a respondent as an expert about
the topic in hand”.
Leech (2002)

Elites here include CSO leaders, donors, diplomats (African Union), ministers and
informed individuals. As qualitative research relies on detail and thick descriptions
(Rossman and Rallis, 2012), the researcher aimed for depth in responses from
respondent’s experience and opinions. Hence the choice of subject experts. Unfortunately,
the researcher was unable to interview leaders from the ruling party despite personal visits
to their offices, emails and phone calls over a month. Hence the decision to interview
referred leaders of various ruling party groups and activists.

Unstructured and semi-structured interviews
The researcher did not limit the interviews to a semi-structured nature — which often seek
to find more specific information and are focused. In some instances, the interviews were
unstructured, where the researcher suggested the subject for discussion however with
specific questions in mind. Most of the interviews nonetheless combined both approaches
(structured and unstructured), often starting from unstructured moving on to more focused
questions.
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The unstructured interviews began on two main levels: prior or no previous knowledge of
the respondent. Both questions meant the interviewee did most of the talking. For the
structured approach, the interviewee consistently posed specific questions.
With the semi-structured interviews, though formal, the interviews did not have a limited
set of questions. The researcher formulated the questions derived from questions raised in
the literature review section. Due to the flexibility of the interview, the researcher allowed
for different questions, following what the interviewee would have said, while guiding the
interviews as she intentionally introduced, a limited number of questions at a time for indepth exploration by the respondent. The researcher encouraged respondents to reflect on
experiences or think about the subject and questions were modified as the researcher saw
fit, depending on the flow of the conversation questions were sometimes modified to
specific organisations and roles. Interviewees were not given questions before to increase
objectivity and allow for natural responses.

The capacity of the interviewee was a major factor as the researcher found out during the
first two interviews (an aspect rarely covered in available social science research
literature). With elite interviewees, the interview approach is often different or changes
faster from unstructured to more focused questions. Considering that two of the donors in
Zimbabwe and one from the AU were diplomats and did not have much time for the
interview and the researcher felt compelled to stick to set questions and control the
conversations for effectiveness. However, depending on the interviewee, the interview
could take longer. Hence, their interviews took the least time ranging from between 15 30 minutes. With other respondents, interviews were more relaxed with controlled
flexibility between structured and unstructured questions. The approaches were based on
the fact that, the researcher listened to every response determining the next question,
following previous responses. Conversations followed logical structures and the
researcher and interviewee take turns talking.

The empirical findings of this study in Chapter six are drawn from thirty-two expert
interviews conducted firstly in Zimbabwe with ten CSO leaders, two ministers, five donor
83

representatives, five informed individuals; in Tanzania with, two CSO leaders and one
donor; and in Ethiopia with, two donors, three representatives to the African Union and
two CSO leaders. Respondents are referred to by their positions or broad field (e.g., CSO
or Donor) and where the responses include public information, the researcher mentions
the affiliate organizations where necessary.

Interview questions
All research questions referred to the research focus (democratization by Western
democracy promotion) and main concepts (contestation and participation) from reviewed
literature. Since most were elite interviews, the study followed Rossman and Rallis’
(2012) recommendation for “broad based topics to allow respondents to use their
knowledge and imagination”. Questions in Ethiopia and Tanzania focused on SubSaharan Africa generally and not limited to Zimbabwe, although due to the research
question, respondents focused on Zimbabwe. The following questions were asked:

●

General (most respondents)
What is your understanding of a successful democracy?

●

What is your understanding of political contestation and participation?

●

Do you think democracy promotion has been successful in democratizing Zimbabwe?

●

Since democracy was not a major issue after independence until the 90s, is
democratization easier in a one party state? (Zimbabwean respondents)

●

Does opposition party strength affect the success of democracy promotion?

●

Does the nature of the donor organization affect democracy’s success? (Institutional e.g.
UNDP vs. Government supported e.g. USAID)

●

Does the nature, operation or attitude of recipient organizations affect the success of
democracy promotion?

●

Two decades after — do you think there is hope for democratization in Zimbabwe / Africa?
Donor specific

●

How have you been promoting democracy in Zimbabwe / Africa?

●

What kind of organizations or initiatives do you support?

●

Has there been an increase in your organization’s financial commitment to democracy
promotion in Zimbabwe / Africa?
84

●

What are the challenges in democratizing Zimbabwe / Africa?
Diplomat specific

●

What kind of pressure has your government put to ensure democratization in Zimbabwe /
Africa?

●

Are there any international measures put in place to guarantee the compliance of states to
democratize?

●

Are there any diplomatic steps you are taking to encourage democratization in Africa?
Civil society

●

How can donors ensure successful democratization?

●

Has there been an increase in funding to your organization for democracy promotion
activities?

●

How much have you received in the past year (range)?
African Union

●

Does the AU get any democracy assistance from Western agencies?

●

From your experiences having observed Zimbabwean electoral processes for two decades,
what do you think are the major setbacks to its international acceptance?

Data analysis
Most interviews were voice recorded so data analysis began with transcribing interviews
from voice to text, noting key facts. The facts were interpreted for linkages between the
research questions (Soy, 1997) before being purposely sorted under different categories
— mainly ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors and linked to ‘contestation’ and ‘participation’.
Facts were also cross-checked for inconsistencies against existing data before being
categorized by frequency in responses.

Ethics
The study was designed to be conducted in ways that honored its participants hence an
initial consultation of ethics in social science research. An ethical guide was sought from
the university on studies involving human subjects — which the researcher signed. Ethical
considerations were taken, mainly based on two issues: the sensitivity of the research in
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its context or setting and the different cultural settings in which the interviews were
conducted. Verbal consent was sought at the beginning of each interview for permission
to voice record the conversation and a verbal reassurance that information would be
confidential was given.
Private and confidential
This qualitative study involved contact with ‘real’ subjects so it was important to mention
that the respondent’s identity would be confidential although some of their statements
would be quoted or paraphrased when documenting. The researcher at the beginning of
each interview informed respondents, their names, organizations, roles and settings would
not be disclosed to a third party including the written report. The challenge was when
other high level diplomats and donors wanted to know who else the researcher had spoken
to. The researcher however politely declined mentioning names but used broad categories
such as “other donors” and emphasized the confidentiality clause — which, according to
the researchers’ observations made them more willing to participate.
Security
The researcher often asked herself “what could happen as a result of this action” during
the field study. Qualitative research when investigating sensitive issues such as the
effectiveness of ‘regime change’ strategies in an authoritarian setting may be potentially
harmful. Considering the level of security surveillance in both Zimbabwe and Ethiopia by
Central Intelligence Officers (Zimbabwe) or Secret Police (Ethiopia), it was important
that the researcher carefully thought of private or secluded interview settings. Interviews
were conducted in quiet hotels, restaurants, offices and even cars. This was for the safety
of the researcher as well as her respondents. Since the study involved opposition ministers
and CSO representatives (often linked to opposition) and both being highly surveilled, the
researcher when planning the interviews asked where the respondents were comfortable
meeting e.g. “Would you like to suggest where we could meet for the interview”, “Do you
have a preference on where we could meet”, “Would you be fine with me coming to your
office” or “Is it safe to talk in your office” (particularly for opposition respondents and
well-known critics of the regime). Often, respondents in Zimbabwe ‘chuckled’ (as
surveillance is a known government tactic).
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In both Dares-Salaam and Addis Ababa, the researcher having little knowledge of the city
and due to security concerns, used personal contacts to hire a ‘permanent’ driver who
drove her and waited outside during the interviews. Where interviews were conducted a
distance away from the town center, the researcher was joined by a known contact for
security. This was especially important however in Harare, where the researcher
previously had security concerns after being followed to her residence. During one
interview with a donor representative, a group of about eight Zanu-PF youths (identified
by the car they drove as well as party regalia they were dressed in), came and sat at a table
next to the researcher and respondent during the course of the interview. Because this was
a secluded restaurant, not very popular for political party meetings — the researcher and
respondent felt they were being surveilled. So research questions were modified to a more
general discussion as evacuating the premise would raise suspicion. In another instance,
the researcher had to conduct an hour long interview in the respondents’ vehicle (in a
parking lot) as the respondent had suspected the researcher was being followed and needed
to go to a ‘safe’ place. Similarly, in Addis Ababa, police men approached the owner of
the researcher’s rented accommodation saying they had “seen a foreigner around” and
wanted to “know what she was doing” and “for how long” she was going to be in the
country, before they asked to take her passport to the police station for a copy. Research
in authoritarian states requires ethical considerations on both the part of the researcher as
well as the respondent.

87

Chapter 6
Findings
Does democracy promotion promote democracy? Based on the assessment of the
democratic threshold here of participation and contestation, as well as information
gathered during the field research: Yes, democracy promotion promotes democracy, but
there are several internal (domestic) and external (international) factors that limit it. This
section summarizes the research findings from collected responses as well as the
researcher’s interpretation of arguments made in the democratization literature. The
findings are divided into two, internal (domestic factors affecting democratization in
Zimbabwe) and external (international or foreign factors affecting democratization in
Zimbabwe).

Internal factors

Nature of the state
The imposition of top-down political institutions that prolonged colonial rule in Africa
created a new form of neo-colonial dominance. Sub-Saharan African polities remain under
the control of dominant political parties led by authoritative and uncompromising
individuals who control not only the means of production but weak political institutions.
In Zimbabwe, after independence, power was centralized in the executive and opposing
parties or institutions legislated out of politics. Though their power diminished, judicial
and legal institutions remained but closely surveyed. The civic capacities (collective
action) of both citizens and non-state actors representing them were reduced while
“constitutional concentration” (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990) increased giving the executive
with excessive constitutional power. Democracy’s greatest threat in Zimbabwe is the state
and its power.

Zimbabwe is a one party state that suppresses multi-party or competitive politics; does not
allow for the formation of independent political institutions; and has a dominant executive
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systematically controlling electoral, judiciary, legislative, media and private institutions;
while bureaucratically defining and overseeing the implementation of state policies. This
centralization of power, while necessary as a developmental ethos for national unity in
post-independence Zimbabwe, is no longer compatible with open public participation.
This research found, the nature of Zimbabwe’s present state markedly affects its
democratization. Democracy is more than the consistent conduct of elections or the
creation of democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is about quality institutions that
ensure and genuinely safeguard the independence, effectiveness and objectivity of those
institutions. Zimbabwe has become a competitive authoritarian regime that combines
democratic rules with authoritarian mechanisms, combining coercive and distributional
strategies with state machinery executives to incapacitate opposition groups and maintain
power.

Democracy promotion has been difficult in Zimbabwe because formal democratic
institutions such as elections, judiciary and law enforcement are principal sources of
government’s exercise of political authority (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Government often
contravenes democratic regulations, seemingly legitimately; the president and
parliamentarians are elected in relatively ‘free’ and ‘fair’ environments when following
formal Election day procedures; citizens outwardly participate equally; rights and
freedoms seem safeguarded; and electoral authorities appear independent with real
authority to govern divorced from state control or influence (Mainwaring et al. 2001) yet
in reality these institutions are closely aligned to the incumbent and advantage him.

Systemic factors limit the influence of opposition parties, civil society groups and foreign
donors on the inception and protection of democracy in Zimbabwe. The manipulation of
the electoral system, the terrorization of opposition parties, the incarceration and
expatriation of opponents that threaten executive security in power are facilitated by the
control of state institutions by the executive. This study divides the state into two: its
institutions and the political leader. On institutions, findings on the challenges to
democratization are grouped into electoral institutions, security (police and military) and
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judiciary, while findings on the leader focus on his will to change. Other internal and
external factors raised by respondents and gathered from available literature are also
highlighted. Nonetheless, this study found that, state institutions and the law are the main
challenges to democratization in Zimbabwe.
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ELECTORAL
DEMOCRACY

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Lindberg (2006) and other aid advocates insist elections are
a key or the most significant aspect for democratization in Africa. To facilitate
successful elections, they call for international funding and technical support through
CSOs, opposition parties and structural institutions like parliament. They believe a
strong correlation exists between aid, elections and democratization. This study however
finds; the effects are not so linear or straightforward since elections in Zimbabwe are the
domain of state institutions. The state limits it with bureaucracy, dominance and lack of
transformative will. This study also finds that, the Zimbabwean state now suits the strict
definition of a competitive authoritarian state that is ‘competitive’ but authoritarian
hence a major limitation to democratic advancement. Scholars like Hyde (2014) support
Lindberg’s assertions saying, there are more democracies today than ever before as
Freedom House estimates that at least 65% of the world is now democratic and this in a
sense can be attributed to efforts of democracy promoters. So donors continue to aid
elections for democratization in Zimbabwe.

1. Competitive Authoritarianism
There is a thin line between democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes on the
outlook. The difference is in the levels of freedom throughout the electoral cycle; the
fairness of the playing field for all parties and the fairness of the vote (levels of
contestation against the result); the level of inclusiveness (Diamond 2002) of all
stakeholders and citizens; and the meaningfulness of elections (Diamond 2002).
Opposition and CSOs’ inability to fully prove electoral fraud seems to automatically
validate incumbent victory claims. Feigned abidance to electoral rules complicates shortterm observer’s views of elections. Normally international observer missions provide the
third ‘objective’ eye but the problem is, Zimbabwe does not allow international observers
except those sympathetic to the incumbent (e.g., Pan-Americanists or regional groups like
AU) and the African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) for instance
monitors elections according to AU principles for democratic elections (AU, 2013) or
Zimbabwean electoral laws. Being in the country a week before Election Day limits the
overall assessment. Since 1998, all non-Western observer missions have passed
91

Zimbabwean elections as “free and fair” against local and Western observer assessments
hence the general view that they are superficial, premature, and politically driven
(Diamond 2002).

The more authoritarians participate in democratic processes or seemingly exhibit signs of
relaxation the more the world will accept them as practicing a form of democracy. There
has not been much change in rule of law practices in Zimbabwe, the laws and their
custodians remain the same. However, because of internal struggles and the persecution
of newly turned enemies of the state, the system seems just although the same with a
change of victims — from opposition and civil society to factions from the ruling party.
Dictators are increasingly emboldened by their accommodation. This then presents
challenges in trying to measure the state of democracy, as non-democratic governments
and leaders are stepping up strategies to imitate democratic arrangements and are sadly
succeeding in doing so.

Almost all respondents from the ruling party said Zimbabwe is a democracy and had met
Western pre-requisites particularly peaceful elections. They said, the West and its
domestic agents attack the government because Zimbabweans did not consider their desire
for regime change. But, analyzing Levitsky and Way’s (2002) characteristics of
competitive authoritarian or hybrid regimes, democracy promotion is failing to
democratize Zimbabwe because of the current nature of its state. Elections are conducted
on time and are seriously contested, albeit by a few opposition parties — actually one
viable one, Tsvangirai’s MDC. Though opposition contention is allowed, its leaders are
often detained. Domestic observers can monitor and observe electoral processes but not
international observers. Vote verification is the domain of national election managing
bodies and parallel vote counts are forbidden. Abuse of state power, biased and complicit
in deceptive media coverage, (often violent) harassment of opposition candidates and
activists, and an overall lack of transparency are challenges to democratizing competitive
authoritarian regimes. This answers part of the puzzle why democracy promotion had
succeeded in other Sub-Saharan states but not in Zimbabwe.
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"Zimbabwe has a long tradition of despotic and oppressive government. There has always been
some concern about the presence of a functioning opposition in Zimbabwe but the hard work of
vote-riggers and brutal police has always made sure autocracy has prevailed”.
(League of despots, 2008)

The Zimbabwean State is intrusive and interferes in the affairs of non-state institutions
and increasingly its citizens’. Where the affairs coincide, oppose or threaten the state, it
responds ruthlessly. Hence, barriers are constantly formed and deepened between the state
and its people. As long as non-state actors lack infrastructural power or influence over it
(as is the case in mature democracies where institutions are independent and organizations
and citizens can accept a fair judgement), democratization is far coming. There is an
overwhelming presence of the state over weak institutions.
1.1. Opposition parties
Despite massive domestic support (votes) and foreign aid, Zimbabwean opposition is
disadvantaged due to its disconnection from key institutions. It entered the political field
with its competitor in full command of institutions meant to facilitate democracy. Political
parties particularly opposition parties are key in Africa’s democratization. According to
Crotty (1993), democratic governance is unlikely and may not be possible in the absence
of competitive political parties. Multi-partism can be both a cause and consequence of
democracy, enabling the participation of citizens in representation. Opposition parties
keep a check on incumbent regimes and hold them accountable. This study considered the
strength of opposition as having an effect on the effectiveness of democracy promotion.
Opposition parties often work together and represent similar missions as CSOs and are in
most cases heavily dependent on donor aid. This project found that Zimbabwe’s biggest
and most viable opposition party the MDC has affected its democratization efforts.

MDC was formed concurrently with the establishment of donor institutions in Zimbabwe.
Previously, donors had mostly dominated humanitarian fields specializing in health and
education. Since MDC was a conglomeration of trade unionists and student movements,
local financial flows were low and foreign donations would allow for the faster
institutionalization of opposition, (unfortunately few studies have been conducted on the
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role of opposition parties in democratization). In Zimbabwe, the MDC was considered the
hope for change as it was a party comprising young, energetic and open-minded
academics, lawyers and professionals with new policy alternatives. Interest in politics was
revived. The practice of never questioning ‘elders’ was defied through public debates,
showing citizens that the regime could be held accountable (vertically) through regular
elections and was not as ‘scary’ as it had seemed. Their participation in the 2002 elections
gave rise to CSOs which we're just as energetic and demanded the participation of all
citizens, educating citizens that their voices were worth listening to and educating citizens
of their rights and the importance of their participation in political processes.

Most respondents attributed opposition strength to international support (mostly
financially) and enabled the young aspiring politicians to compete during elections. The
MDC won in most urban areas, reviving hope in democratic processes. The entrance of
the opposition into parliament threatened the incumbent (another form of ‘horizontal’
accountability — government to parliament) as the opposition asked them to account for
their achievements during their tenures; and for those who had lost, the message was
clearer: times were changing. The same happened during the 2008 and 2013 elections
where the opposition won significantly in a number of polities including in 2008 where
Morgan Tsvangirai President of the MDC won but without enough votes to be declared
president, although the opposition has criticized the government of rigging and short
changing them of their victory.

Although democracy support has assisted in the development of a viable opposition, the
MDC remains weak. In all major elections since its formation — in 2002, 2008, 2013, the
opposition claims to have won all the elections but has been short-changed. It is too weak
to defend its victory. Respondents said, other challenges explaining why democracy
promotion through opposition support has not been effective are around ‘Internal party
democracy’ within the MDC, as after the 2013 elections some members felt they needed
a new leader with new strategies after suffering ‘stolen victories’ from ZANU-PF. The
splits have weakened the opposition significantly and only made the possibilities of a
coalition difficult. There is however hope that a future coalition in preparation for the 2018
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elections would see the defeat of ZANU-PF. Additionally, horizontal accountability has
been lacking as evidenced by allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds by
leaders and their lack of accountability. One MDC minister said the party was almost
broke to the extent that it was failing to pay salaries and could not organize meetings or
campaigns effectively anymore. He added, the party was suffering from donor fatigue and
a significant reduction in donor funds after the 2013 elections.

Issues of patrimonialism and clientelism were also highlighted as the opposition
leadership was in many ways a “replication of the system they are fighting against”.
Corrupt means of hiring or tendering — as leaders hired relatives or acquaintances for
jobs or for tenders, demotivated others. Similarly, one opposition MP said, the democracy
the party was fighting for had been replaced by gross nepotism for those in support of the
party leadership, and any objections or disagreements resulted in side-lining or
displacement. African opposition parties, similar to incumbent parties face the strong men
versus weak institution problem. Unless African political parties shift focus away from
party leaders to policies, the authoritarian challenge will remain. Respondents also
mentioned the opposition leader’s character as a potential limitation as it points to the
creation of more 'strong men' with dictatorial traits, unwilling to transfer power within the
party and dismissing anyone who does not agree with them — as is the case with
Tsvangirai. So, democracy might only be short lived.

Nonetheless, respondents said the power-sharing period between the MDC and ZANUPF was refreshing as emerging from the hyper-inflationary period, the economy was
revived, the MDC gained accesses into government apparatus and managed to lure
investors as it was in charge of the Ministry of Finance, and the electorate according to
ministers MDC interviewed, claimed they successfully represented their constituencies
and effected various changes despite the bureaucratic limitations presented by the ruling
party. The MDC motivated an interest in democratic processes according to two of the
MDC respondents and has led the initiative of fostering a democratic culture (Lindberg,
2006) saying, “Zimbabweans are now accustomed to democratic procedures”. The
technical abilities that came with the MDC e.g. legal expertise to draft and interpret the
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constitution have limited the incumbent’s ability to manipulate procedures unquestioned
as well as enabled opposition and civil society to educate citizens on specific clauses and
rights.

Political arrangements of accommodation like power-sharing agreements have positive
and negative effects. On one hand, they can strengthen the capabilities young forward
looking opposition leaders but they might also be an opening for manipulation by
authoritarian incumbents (Magaloni, 2008). In developing countries, material goods such
as cars and houses can easily dilute and slowly replace the resilience of any leader.
Respondents talked of MDC’s tenure in the Government of National Unity where they
were allocated cars and other benefits (sometimes more than once in less than five years)
and MDC president Tsvangirai was allocated a US$2million State house specifically built
for him without rejection and without consideration of the suffering masses living below
a dollar a day. Knowing their inability to refuse the ruling party (ZANU-PF) took
advantage and ‘silenced’ them. All parties benefited, hence accountability was
compromised and it became slowly evident, they were similar to the system they were
fighting.

Another weakness highlighted was the inability of opposition parties to break the elite
mentality, as being ‘experts’ they have excluded the general citizens in discussions
particularly those in rural areas. There has been marginalization to an extent as highlighted
by one respondent who observed that while the incumbent focuses on the rural
constituencies, the opposition has focused more on urbanites. She said it was ‘impossible’
to win a Zimbabwean election without focusing on ruralites. Van de Walle and Butler
(1999) summarize challenges of African political parties as that of “weak organizations,
low levels of institutionalization and weak links to the society that they are supposed to
represent”.

On the number of political parties and their competitiveness, An AU representative said
multi-partism was strong in countries like the Republic of Congo, Senegal, Kenya,
Madagascar, Chad and Cameroon with an average of about 40 parties competing in any
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election meaning according to him, the importance of political rights is stronger than
before. The downside is, most of them could be splitter parties indicating more complex
problems of division and the inability to unite which in turn limits removal of repressive
systems. Zimbabwe's seven well known parties are mostly 'irrelevant' when challenging
the incumbent except three. They do not adequately explain the level of competitiveness
except the MDC. So, quantity is not an adequate measure of competitiveness.

Democracy is easier in a one party state spanning from electoral management to freedoms
and justice. When competition increases (especially with viable opposition) — threat
arises as loopholes cannot be easily bypassed. This is why it took twenty years to identify
and introduce adjustments to democratic institutions there. Respondents highlighted
opposition successes during the 2008-9 power sharing period saying it showed the ability
of opposition to fight for itself; the power of the vote (in the incumbent’s failure to fully
manipulate MDC’s victory); and the seemingly imperceptible but actual transfer of power.
One respondent said the power sharing period was the “best thing that had happened to
Zimbabwe in a long time” because, for the first time another party dominated parliament
and caused notable socio-economic changes. Both opposition ministers said
Zimbabweans through repetitively winning (though cheated), saw their ability to compete
and meaningfully contribute to economy and parliament and so the electorate would
continue to vote for them. Although Zanu-PF supporters said their ‘continued victory’ and
failure of opposition to take over showed elections — although Western, simply showed
Zimbabweans were ‘anti-Western’ rule.
Some respondents pointed to global changes in responses to authoritarian leader’s failure
to transfer power e.g. Burundi’s current conflict and other uprisings and coups, and their
power in influencing Mugabe’s response to electoral outcomes. They said, these lessons
motivate his manipulation of electoral outcomes and this signifies the power of electoral
democracy.
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1.2. Political party financing
Issues around political party financing were raised and according to one opposition
minister, there were no state provisions for foreign funding restrictions for political parties
before MDC’s rise. But as MDC rose and attracted foreign support, the government passed
the Political Parties (Financing) Act “prohibiting foreign funding, whether directly from
a donor or indirectly through a third person…political parties are required by law to
disclose sources of party funds and audited accounts” (ZESN, 2006). One donor based in
Tanzania, having worked in Zimbabwe before pointed to the abuse of state resources by
incumbents in elections in most African countries including Tanzania. He said campaign
finance laws limit opposition parties from effectively participating as much as ruling
parties, adding that Mugabe’s government corruptly redistributed farms for votes in the
run-up to the 2002 elections for support. While a pro-Zanu-PF respondent said opposition
also receives significant support from foreign donors “both camps are guilty of illegally
financing their campaigns”.

Another respondent said the government has started housing cooperatives corruptly
distributed among supporters in urban areas for votes and to dilute opposition strongholds.
Zimbabwean parties do not adequately disclose their financial sources as stipulated under
the Electoral Act (2004) and this allows for corruption and the abuse of state resources by
the incumbent. Normally CSOs are critical in highlighting flaws in campaign finance and
lobbying for fairness, but this is only possible when the ‘advocates’’ financial sources are
legitimate. Nevertheless, one donor talked of ERIS’ (a UK based pro-transparency
organization) work with CSOs in Zimbabwe to train them on the importance and
evaluation of campaign finance. Issues of financing affect smaller opposition parties
which do not receive significant external support and limits their participation. Democracy
assistance here can cause unequal participation as donors tend to favor dominant
opposition parties (Smith, 2014).

Also a dependency on donor aid by African opposition parties does not help the future of
democratization in Africa as parties need to organize themselves to become more selfsufficient to ensure their sustainability in the event that donor funds are reduced. This is a
challenge the researcher observed in Zimbabwe, where the opposition has become almost
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non-existent at a time when the incumbent regime has also suffered internal divisions; a
period expected to be an opportunity to regroup and re-strategize. Hence, donor-fatigue
has coincided with opposition weakness. Most of these weaknesses are internal that aid
cannot solve but at times perpetuate. The same issues were highlighted for CSOs failures
despite continuous efforts to advance their missions.
1.3. Police and military
The state should have a degree of monopoly of force in its territory (Weber, 1946) to deter
external threats to its sovereignty and internal threats to social order through police and
armed forces (Wang, 2002). There is little justification for force as necessary factors
suggested by Wang (2002) are almost non-existent e.g. the threat of foreign invasion is
for now non-existent to Zimbabwe. Due to ruthless repression in the past, possibilities of
widespread deviant civilian or social unrest are slim. Internal rival groups relatively
coexist, although the incumbent has permanent control but remains insecure. Zimbabwe
has become a police state to an extent as government exercises power arbitrarily through
the police and military. Violence and repression limits the successful functioning of
democratic institutions especially CSO and opposition activity (Garcia-Ponce and
Pasquale, 2015).

Zimbabwe’s leadership is desperate to maintain power that intimidation has escalated to
the abduction and killing of opponents. According to one opposition minister and human
rights activist, these violations worsened after MDC’s formation and escalated in the runup to the presidential ‘run-off’ election in 2008. In 2015, Dzamara a journalist and
opposition supporter known for publicly calling for Mugabe's resignation and
demonstrating against and criticizing the government (often alone), was abducted from a
hair-salon by five armed men who seized and shoved him into an unmarked truck and
sped off (Aljazeera, 2015). Nonetheless, many other Zimbabweans have disappeared and
one Director of a Human Rights organization said they were “overwhelmed” with reports
of murdered, assaulted and abducted opposition members and supporters, but frustrated
that a few of the incriminated faced justice — considering the record of state intelligence
and its ability to catch perpetrators if they wanted to.
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CSO directors like Mukoko of the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) have been abducted in
the past, raids of CSOs and opposition offices are common, including the intimidation of
opposition members, anonymous ‘hit list’ messages to opposition leaders, harassment, the
disruption of public meetings and civilian beatings. The leadership has monopolized the
state and its infrastructural power using legitimate means. It is in charge of key state
institutions such as the judiciary and security sectors. Military commanders and police
commissioners are appointed by the president and report to the president. The problem is
most institutions supposed to guard democratic processes are too weak and under the
control of a ‘strong man’. The executive reigns over key institutions without consultation
or negotiation with other parties, yet power is supposed to be derived from a majority vote
in parliament. Despotic power is extensively used over institutions and citizens and the
power is not checked, therefore unlimited compared to mature democracies (Mann, 1986).
“…We should stand behind our Commander-in-Chief. Soldiers are not apolitical … Only
mercenaries are apolitical. We have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party’s
principles of defending the revolution. If you have other thoughts, then you should remove that
uniform” (Herald, 2008)
“This is up to you, if you want peace, you vote for us. If you vote for the MDC, we will go to
war”
(Mumbengegwi, 2008)

According to Masunungure (2009), Zimbabwe currently has two key organs of authority
the “ruling party and the security forces” arguing, “both ‘organs of authority’ were
important in the last two elections but their visibility and significance differed
fundamentally”. Security forces spearheaded Zanu-PF’s violent run-off campaign in 2008
after receiving instructions from Mugabe, who was reported to have told his ZANU(PF)
Politburo in April 2008 that, in order to win the run-off, the party must establish a ‘warlike
and military-style’ or ‘bullet and ballot’ leadership to campaign in the ‘sink-or-swim’
election (Masunungure, 2009). It is evident, Zanu-PF carried its pre-independence
“militaristic conception of the source of political authority: the bullet is supreme and the
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ballot is subservient to it; and the gun which provides the votes, should remain its security
officer, its guarantor (Mugabe, 1981 in Masunungure, 2009). Lately, security chiefs have
been rewarded with involvement in policy design and implementation as leaders of
strategic state institutions e.g. the Zimbabwe Prisons Service, Zimbabwe Republic Police,
Central Intelligence Organization, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), and
parastatals e.g. the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, Grain Marketing Board and the
Department of National Parks and Wildlife (Masunungure, 2009).

The last harmonized elections in 2013 were under military control disguised under the
“Joint Operations Command” meant to monitor and control citizens and opposition in
every constituency (Cross, 2016). With an over-recruitment of intelligence officers similar
to Ethiopia, everyone is watching everyone resulting in the erosion of liberties. There is a
thin line between the military or police and the government. The state machinery is abused
to safeguard and represent the interests of the president. The government has succeeded
in subduing citizens and instilling fear in the uniformed citizens. In 2015, Zanu-PF
confirmed the militarization of its structures proving the military's partisan nature when
Defence Commander Chiwenga was introduced as the party's commissary by Vice
president Mnangagwa (Nehanda, 2015). In recent ‘faction wars’ emanating from ZanuPF’s intra-party split over leadership ambitions, Chiwenga has been accused of backing
the Vice president in his presidential ambitions against the first lady.
According to Cross (2016) that was also Member of Parliament at that time, “During
Zimbabwe’s power-sharing period from 2009 to 2013, the reality that the military and not
politicians called the shots was painfully obvious. Zanu-PF simply maintained a cardboard
front which reflected a civilian administration and a “democracy” that held regular
elections”. The rule of law is compromised as authoritarians take control of military
institutions and satisfy them to insulate themselves from displacement (Weeks, 2009). In
Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, patronage in state institutions is high therefore it limits
democratization.
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1.4. Judiciary
The routinization of elections which would normally perfect them, is a formality for legal
protection. Following electoral guidelines, Zimbabwe has a clear legal framework guiding
electoral processes. It went through a referendum and the last constitution was drafted and
passed in 2012, legislation guiding the conduct of democratic institutions was passed,
electoral systems and boundaries were drawn with all parties in agreement. The president
legitimately nominated members of the electoral body who swore to abiding by legal
proceedings governing them and electoral codes of conduct were agreed to.

However, these institutions are not utilized adequately. The constitution is amended
according to the executive’s desire. The constitution protects selected interests and
remains flawed and unable to substantively promote and protect the human rights of all
the people of Zimbabwe today. All amendments made have been in favor of entrenchment
of state power and have compounded the attack on, rather than the protection of, civil
rights and liberties as confirmed by the courts and otherwise (Zimbabwe Lawyers for
Human Rights, 2007). Civil society, opposition and donor operations are limited by its
provisions. Since Independence, the constitution has been amended seventeen times and
almost all amendments “sought to reverse judicial rulings which have set standards for
constitutional conduct by the state” and “others have been a direct and unadulterated
assault on the very liberties espoused in the Constitution” (ZLHR, 2007).
“Amendment No. 7 (Act 23 of 1987) abolished the system of a Ceremonial President and a
Prime Minister and instead introduced the Executive Presidency which subsists today. Executive
power of the presidency was entrenched by this and concomitant amendments in the following
years, leading to the current crisis in which the country finds itself today”.
(ZLHR, 2007)
“The Amendments have become an everyday method by which judicial decisions can be
subverted, human rights defenders increasingly repressed, the status quo maintained by way of
political patronage and the rule of law and separation of powers subverted”.
(ZLHR, 2007)
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Judges are appointed by the president and sometimes dismissed by the executive at his
mercy. One respondent talked of an incident where the Supreme Court wrote encouraging
the president to respect the rule of law following three High Court orders to release
arrested journalists and not use intelligence officers to hold civilians. The president went
on national television in retaliation and attacked the judges before challenging them to
resign, because they had “no right to instruct him to do anything and that, because of their
biased petition, the government could no longer trust them on any case involving the
executive” (Shaoul, 1999). The judges have since been dismissed.

Respondents said a strong legal system was required to protect the independence of
democratic institutions from executive dominance but even the parliament has failed to
uphold the rule of law. The state undermines civil liberties, breaches constitutional
provisions of ‘hate speech’ and incites violence including intervening unconstitutionally
in legal processes as also found by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001).
Respondents also highlighted the disappearance of opposition complainant’s files, the
systematic loss of court cases by opposition members, the ‘rubbishing’ of issues and
bureaucracy (to buy time until it ‘loses steam’). There is a need to revert to
constitutionalism.
1.5. Strong people and weak institutions
Economic interests, power and dislike of Western influence or opposition came up as
limitations to democratization efforts in Zimbabwe. Two pro-government respondents
said he was “people’s choice”. Mugabe, widely known for his anti-West stance has
increasingly been agitated by Western interference in Zimbabwean political affairs. All
donors said the government was ‘welcoming’ on issues to do with humanitarian aid,
although talks of political reforms had often “stalled talks”. They said Mugabe has
retaliated against a pro-democracy push and imposed repressive measures on intervention
guidelines. Local respondents pointed to his love for power and that he did not see anyone
suitable replacement in his party. Mugabe in reaction to UN Chief, Ban Ki-moon’s call
for African leaders to leave at the end of their terms in February 2016 said, though 92 he
would contest the 2018 election and would remain in power till “God says come” (Reuters,
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2016). Respondents pointed to Mugabe and his wife’s economic interests as limiting his
possibilities of resigning because their interests and security might not be guaranteed.
Ranked in 2015 as Africa’s eighth richest president, Mugabe was said to be worth around
US$ 10 million (Africa Ranking, 2015) although respondents believe he is worth more
due to diamond and gold mining.

Also, Kpundeh (1992) in his study on democratization in Africa found, in Ethiopia - like
Zimbabwe, personality issues challenge as rulers encourage personal cults, with portraits
prominently and extensively displayed (Mugabe in April 2016 even bowed before his own
portrait) and popularly called the “Father of the nation”. Kpundeh (1992) found, in Benin
similar to Zimbabwe, local leaders ask why new leaders should be selected yet “the old
one is still alive” (Mugabe at 93 years even declared he will die in power). Making
presidents ‘irreplaceable, unchallengeable and above the law fathers’ who cannot entertain
contestation or change. Furthermore, the ‘zero-some’ nature of Zimbabwean politics
where the winner takes all limits continuous competition as after Zanu-PF’s victory,
opposition is almost eliminated with the exception of post 2008 elections that led to a
power-sharing agreement. Victory by one party should not equal total elimination of the
other, multi-partism must be continuously encouraged to keep incumbents on check. This
is a problem in Ethiopia especially where politics is seriously ethnically divided and
victory of one party leads to unequal distribution of wealth and development. These neopatrimonial tendencies exist in Zimbabwe’s politically divided society where the
incumbent constantly discriminately awards its supporters. According to Kpundeh (1992),
bargaining and compromise is necessary.

2. Democracy by Elections
Paya takatambwa asi tinoramba tichirwa.
(They cheated us that time but we will keep fighting)

Kunyangwe vakaunza dziri mombe, hatirambe asi tosangana mu box.
(Even if they give us cows, we won’t refuse, but we will meet in the ballot box)
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“This is why they invest so much in these Israeli firms, vanoziva kuti election yakapenga”
(This is why they invest so much in these Israeli firms (NIKUV), they know how powerful an
election is)
(CSO respondents)

This study found significant trust is placed on elections for Zimbabwe’s democratization.
During an interview with one of Zimbabwe’s prominent CSO Director, the researcher
asked if elections were still significant in democratizing Zimbabwe. He talked of how
Zimbabweans are excited each time they visit both rural and urban communities for
outreach programs mostly for civic education “but the discussion always turns to Mugabe,
politics and elections”. He said, Zimbabweans still believe in the power of the ballot to
change their circumstances. He added, not only the citizens but the incumbent too as the
Registrar Generals’ office paid US$ 10,578,335 to manipulate central records systems and
voter registration information for the 2013 harmonized elections (Independent, 2013).
Adding that, citizen’s participation during elections gives people a voice in a country
where people are subdued and silenced on political discourse.

When asked about the effectiveness of democratization by elections, most respondents
said elections remained the only “sensible” “peaceful” “participatory” forms of
democratization. Donors on one hand did not indicate any intentions to change strategies
although acknowledging implementation aspects needed modifying. The majority of
donors interviewed in all three countries indicated, progress observed through the last
decades could eventually lead to successful democratization based on the willingness of
all stakeholders. Similar to Lindberg’s argument, continuous emphasis was made on the
need for ‘time’ considering the countries’ histories. Significant hope was placed on the
existence of constitutions in almost all Sub-Sahara African states and their ability to guide
political processes and maintain a degree of the rule of law. In both Zimbabwe and
Ethiopia, respondents pointed to the state as the biggest challenge, although maintaining
that, positive changes they had witnessed in Zimbabwe - though flawed elections are
increasingly instrumental in entrenching the culture of accountability as the authoritarian
regime is now aware of the ‘real will of the people’.
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Elections in authoritarian regimes empower citizens to speak and hold government
accountable (Schumpeter, 1942). Electoral practices contrary to present day pessimism is
not in decline in Sub-Saharan Africa as representative democracy including participatory
and contested elections still exists — perceived as the legitimate procedure for translating
rule by the people into workable executive and legislative power (Lindberg, 2006). It was
interesting to note; Zimbabweans remain hopeful they will oust the regime in every
election without success.
Because of elections’ “self-reinforcing power” (Lindberg, 2006), their constant promotion
makes them a sustainable option for Africa’s future. Constant elections develop a
democratic culture necessary for accountability and participation in authoritarian regimes.
Elections are a constant reminder for authoritarians that, ‘time is up’ (term limits) and that
they have to perform for re-election. Electoral cycle events from constitutional making,
planning, education, to Election day — each phase allows for participation and
competition whether it results in power transfer or not.
Electoral assistance promotes democracy due to its “self-improving quality” (Lindberg,
2006). Lessons are learnt with each round of elections. Most respondents said, democracy
promotion efforts promoted democratization and although time, money and energy
consuming, electoral conduct in Zimbabwe keeps improving. They pointed to the
challenge being that, authoritarians keep growing sophisticated and advancing their
fraudulent techniques. From ballot stuffing, to ballot transportation incidents, to results
fixing, to voter registration manipulation, to the bussing of voters — election monitoring
and observation needs to change move the times and catch up. Also, looking at relapses
in West Africa where coups have displaced democratically elected governments, it is
important to note, successful electoral transitions do not mean their completion but are a
stimulant for greater liberalization. Because the authoritarian culture has been rooted for
too long in African politics, it might take long for consolidation so consolidated
democracies should not relax as is being witnessed in South Africa’s reversal (Bratton and
Gyimah-Boadi, 2015).
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2.1. Electoral conduct
“Even with four duplicated offices and one commission guarding our votes, they are still stolen.
They are all Mugabe’s puppets.”
(CSO representative)

Zimbabwean Presidential elections have been consistently held in 1990, 1996 and 2002,
2008 and 2013 whilst Parliamentary in 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 as stipulated by the
constitution. EISA (2015) in its study on challenges to democratization in Zimbabwe
found the executive to have “enormous powers” over electoral processes including “the
capacity to change electoral laws by proclamation after the announcement of an election;
issue statutory instruments and regulations in relation to the conduct of elections; institute
regulations that have the potential substantially to affect electoral competition or
participation.”

2.1.1. Vote rigging
2.1.1.1. Electoral managing bodies
The degree of autonomy of electoral commissions in all three countries the researcher
conducted interviews is very limited (Mozaffar, 2002). Although scholars like Mozaffar
classify Zimbabwean Election Managing Bodies (EMB) as “autonomous” general
sentiments were, EMBs lack constitutional independence due to their strong ties and
accountability to the executive. It is understandable however as mentioned earlier,
competitive authoritarian structures are seemingly autonomous or independent yet they
are not (Slater, 1999). With the state controlling EMBs, credibility is low requiring
vigilant and strong willed monitoring to ensure transparency.

The president and government designated the Registrar General of elections (RG),
Delimitation Commission, Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and Election
Directorate, supported by the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) that actively handle
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all election maters. Among the sectors, confusion and imbedded mistrust limits their
operation (EISA, 2015). Their independence is questionable given their close ties to the
incumbent. The commissioners and staff often appear at ruling party functions, take
instructions from the incumbent and maintain close ties with him. Nonetheless, the RG
and ZEC are the popularly known as the main election managing bodies.

The RG is supposed to conduct elections in accordance with the Electoral Act (EA) and
according to Section 15(2) of the EA “shall not be subject to the control of any person or
authority other than the Election Directorate” (EISA, 2005), but realistically, it is under
the executive. It is responsible for voter registration, preparing the voters’ roll, presiding
over the nomination court, providing ballot papers, setting up polling stations, providing
electoral staff, proclaiming election results and protecting election materials. Respondents
said these dynamics limit the possibilities of an objective and bias free electoral process.
They complained of duplication between the sectors (e.g., both supervise elections, voter
registration and report to the president) but the boundaries are not clear (the ESC is
provided for under the constitution but the RG is under the Electoral Act and their
functions are similar). This results in constant tensions between them.
The ESC “has no powers to intervene or conduct the actual polls but report on the conduct
of elections and make recommendations about legislative reforms” (EISA, 2015). To do
this, the ESC must access reports on registration and other electoral matters from the RG.
But, legally the RG is not obliged to pass any information to the ESC. The ESC in
exercising its responsibilities, shall not be subjected to ‘the direction or control of any
person or authority’ but at the same time does not give it the power to access information
necessary to permit it to exercise its functions. Respondents said, though both groups
received and reported to the executive, if ESC executions were not limited, the electoral
process could have been more credible as each sector would check on the other. But, the
ESC and its commissioners lack the authority to order the correction of any irregularities
that might be identified” (EISA, 2015). The ESC must supervise the RG, but the RG now
dominates due to strong alliances with the executive. One respondent said, “The Registrar
General is a civil servant, has held the title since independence and often dines with the
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president. What do you expect?” The RG should report to the ESC of any changes e.g. in
voter registration, but he bypasses it and reports to the president leading to the resignation
of ESC chairperson, Hatendi (EISA, 2015). The institutions are meant to be nonpartisan
but are actually close to the incumbent who allocates their budgets and according to one
respondent “allocates those farms” (patronage).
“They told them there were cameras in each ballot box”
“Chiefs had books to show who had voted or not, they also said they had voter slip numbers and
they would check who had voted for whom”
(CSO respondent)

Almost all CSO and opposition respondents in Zimbabwe pointed to the election
management process as the biggest limitation to the credibility of Zimbabwean electoral
processes due to the following observed vote rigging strategies.

2.1.1.2. Manipulation of constituency boundaries
A donor specializing on elections and democratization in Africa said, “The Zimbabwean
case is more complicated because from my experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, the
delimitation of constituency boundaries, which is a necessary process in elections is done
in consultation with election managing bodies with the knowledge of voter’s roll statistics.
But here state institutions do it alone. This is why you see more polling stations in remote
areas than urban areas which should not be. They conducted a national census before,
which should have informed their mapping. We offered to assist with the technical
expertise we have but we got no response. I suspect it was deliberate because the statistics
I have show a systematic decrease in urban polling stations and an increase in rural areas.
This is surprising because the populations of Harare and Bulawayo alone have almost
doubled.” EISA (2015) found the same strategy had been used for the 2002 elections with
an increase of polling stations in Zanu–PF strongholds, where for the year 2000 elections
244 stations were reduced in Harare to 167 in 2002, compared for example to an increase
in Mashonaland East Province where 378 stations in 2000 were increased to 542 in 2002.
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Some CSOs and donor respondents noted weaknesses in their observation strategies, as
past irregularities they were concerned about were improved and replaced by the above.
They confirmed ZESN’s (2013) findings that ballot boxes were confirmed empty before
sealing, most voters’ fingers had no indelible ink signs, all names were checked against
the voters roll before voting, ballot papers were stamped with ZEC stamps, there was no
campaigning within polling stations, no incidents of disruption, intimidation or
harassment near stations, all voters in line before voting ended were allowed to vote and
counting processes were clear. These irregularities were common in previous elections,
confirming this study’s earlier proposition that: the more authoritarians grow desperate
for power, the more sophisticated their tactics become. To date, ZESN observers observe
the continuous use of two voter’s rolls in by-elections (the main roll and a supplementary
roll, based on the previous ward based voters’ rolls) as this compromises electoral
transparency and integrity including the use of marker pens to mark voters’ fingers instead
of the stipulated indelible ink (ZESN, 2016).
“It was surprising to many that E-Day (Election Day) proceedings seemed clean, but little did
we know we had lost the election before it even started”.
(Opposition Minister)

2.1.1.3. Voters and registration
In 2002, 2008, 2013 the RG went ahead with the production of a Supplementary roll
without notifying competing parties, neither were stakeholders informed of registered
voter statistics. Electoral democratization cannot effectively advance without
transparency on central tools like the voter’s roll, considering it is a public asset with
respect to the Electoral Act. Concerning the right to participate, modifications made under
the Electoral Act - Notice 2002, according to a legal CSO representative, was an
intentional move by the president to limit postal votes from Zimbabweans in the diaspora
— considered opposition supporters as a sizeable number claimed asylum in South Africa
and other Western countries. She said the move was unconstitutional and strips citizens
of their voting rights. Issues were raised by one opposition minister of previous limitations
on the participation of approximately 200,000 “aliens” (those born of foreign parents in
Zimbabwe or migrated to Zimbabwe, who later naturalized especially from the UK,
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Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique) (EISA, 2015). Zimbabwe’s Citizenship Act had
barred them from voting before 2013 presuming they supported the opposition as a result
of frustrations from internal displacement, land invasions and the fast-track land reform
program (EISA, 2015). Most ‘aliens’ did not have national identity cards before the 2013
voter registration exercise which ran concurrently with a national identity processing
program.

2.1.1.3.1.
Voter’s roll issues
The voters roll is heavily guarded by the RG despite the new Electoral Act entitling
constituencies to electronic copies. 8 out of 10 CSO respondents pointed to voter’s roll
fraud, claiming the roll is a key electoral tool supposed to be availed in time for inspection
by all Zimbabweans. However, the RG’s office has refused to avail the 2013 roll for
inspection to date and stakeholders had problems accessing it in 2000, 2002 and 2008 too.
Zimbabwean constitutional lawyer Mavedzenge, in 2014 filed a High Court application
that sought to pressure ZEC to publicize the roll after it had insisted its inability to "retrieve
it from its system as its machines have broken down". The roll containing names, dates of
birth, national identification numbers and residential addresses, should be availed to
paying political parties, candidates and observers, within seven days of the calling of an
election (Booysen and Toulou, 2009). One donor said, from his experience in more than
28 Sub-Saharan Africa elections, “the voter’s roll was the election and actions by
Zimbabwean EMBs indicated the process was biased”. Another respondent said, when
available, the roll is expensive and opposition parties are given limited time to inspect it;
in 2008 it was provided in PDF making it difficult to search for ‘ordinary people,' CSOs
were banned access and opposition complained about its manipulation (Booysen and
Toulou, 2009).

Rural vs. urban voter bias
In 2002 similar to 2013, voter registration opened a few months before election. The
Zimbabwe Election Support Network reported “The voter registration process was
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systematically biased against urban voters. The voters’ roll of 19 June as provided by the
Office of the Registrar General clearly showed that urban voters had systematically been
denied the opportunity to register to vote. A total of 99.97% of rural voters were registered
while only 67.94% of urban voters were registered” (ZESN, 2013) because the incumbent
has its stronghold in rural areas.

Table 1: Comparison of Registered Voters with Estimated Eligible
Voters by Rural/Urban Wards
Urban/Rural Voters Roll

2012 Census

19 June 2013

Difference

Estimate

Per cent
Registered

Rural Wards 4,278,103

72.64%

4,279,336

64.33%

1,223

99.97%

Urban

27.36%

2,372,522

35.67%

760,456

67.94%

1,612,066

Wards
Total

5,890,169

6,651,858

761,689
Source: ZESN, 2013

According to ZESN (2013), more than 750,000 potential urban voters were missing from
the voters’ roll compared to 1,223 rural voters. On Election day, voters were
“systematically disenfranchised and at 82% of urban polling stations many potential
voters were turned away and not permitted to vote for reasons including names not
appearing on the voters’ roll and turning up at the wrong ward for voting, contrasted with
rural areas where only 38% of polling stations turned away many potential voters” ZESN
(2013). ZESN (2013) alone deployed over 7,000 observers comprising “mobile teams,
stationary polling station observers, constituency observers and a special group of more
than 700 observers to a sample of polling stations in every province and constituency to
provide national representative data in real time”. Opposition MDC-Tsvangirai had
polling agents at 96% of polling stations and ZANU-PF at 98%, MDC (Ncube) at 48%
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and other political parties 46% combined. However, the full coverage of observers was
not sufficient to deter fraud. Below are more irregularities noted:

Deceased voters
Deceased voters or 'ghost voters' on the roll have been contentious as the Electoral Act
stipulates, constituency registrars must remove dead and disqualified voters from the roll
based on a family member or descendant’s sworn statement - ZESN in 2011 reported,
27% of names on the roll were of deceased persons, yet relatives upon registering or voting
would report someone had voted in their place (Chikuhwa, 2013). Respondents also
mentioned the duplication of names on the roll attributing it either to incompetency or
fraud.

Voters turned away

CSO and opposition respondents complained
about new tactics such as the “turning away”
of voters in urban areas. At “49% of polling
stations ZESN (2013) observers reported 25
or more potential voters being turned away
and not permitted to vote (39% rural and 82%
urban) because they were not on the voters’
roll, despite voting in previous elections.
They were now registered in the wrong wards (Chikuhwa, 2013) and their unauthorized
movement on the roll from one ward to another is fraudulent. Some had registration slips
and names not appearing on the voters’ roll” ZESN (2013). One respondent said, it was
to limit opposition votes in their strongholds.
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2.1.1.3.2.

Voter intimidation

“Assisted” voters

ZESN (2013) reported that at 38% of polling stations
25 or more voters were assisted to vote, with a sharp
contrast observed between urban and rural polling
stations. “At 49% of rural polling stations, more than
25 people were assisted to vote compared to only 5%
in urban polling stations. At 88% of polling stations
assisted voters were allowed to be assisted by a
person of their choice” (ZESN, 2013). One CSO
representative said they were “shocked at how desperate the regime had become” as
Zimbabwe was “ranked the highest in African adult literacy”. He said he was informed
the elderly were forced to ‘ask for help’ from Zanu-PF aligned ‘assistants’ to ensure they
vote for them. Other issues raised included the ‘bussing-in’ of voters across wards to
double vote (as observers said the indelible ink used during the 2013 elections was not
original and could easily be washed off) and the presence of police in 83% of the polling
stations (ZESN, 2013) despite them being allowed only upon invitation by the presiding
officer due to concerns of intimidation as they resemble the state. Issues were also raised
against the Special Vote period were security forces were forced to vote for the incumbent
under the inspection of their superiors and voted multiple times (BBC, 2013).
2.1.2. Transition of power
Democracy promotion has failed to a great extent considering post-election events.
Normally characterized by citizen’s acceptance of results, Zimbabwe’s post-election
periods for the past two decades according to respondents often start with opposition
results contests. CSO and opposition respondents shared experiences of discrepancies
between results posted at polling stations and those presented by ZEC during
proclamation. Following the 2013 elections, 101 election petitions were lodged
challenging 2013 election results in the Electoral Court, of which: 95 came from MDC-T
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candidates and 6 from ZANU-PF. This is a significant number; most were either
withdrawn by petitioners on various grounds or dismissed by the Electoral Court for
procedural reasons. Many of the petitions were withdrawn because of the inability to raise
security deposit (approximately US$ 10000 cash), non-availability of the Electronic roll,
or petitions withdrawn for procedural reasons e.g. failure to provide contact details of
persons accused of electoral malpractices or witnesses and legal fees.

Respondents said, electoral petitions and appeals in authoritarian states require vigilant
follow-up coupled with resilience against common judicial soft power tactics of ‘delay,'
‘diversion,’ ‘suppression,’ ‘belittling’ or ‘bureaucracy,' as authoritarians thrive on
frustrating opponents to their advantage. Democratic stakeholders need to be legally aware
of and defend constitutional provisions limiting the arbitrary introduction and
amendments of inhibiting laws. Astute opposition representatives must lead negotiation
processes in processes like constitution making as the MDC did in 2013 in defense of
citizen’s rights. Respondents mentioned the withholding of election results in 2008 after
Zanu-PF’s loss to MDC for more than a month after vote counting and Mugabe’s
announcement of his readiness for a run-off election before results were announced
(Masunungure, 2010). The authenticity of the process was questioned.

3. Contestation and Participation
On the two main attributes of this research: contestation and participation, this study finds
both are existent to varying degrees. Contestation, one of electoral democracy’s attributes
is existent in African authoritarian states as evidenced by multiple parties, party splits and
other fierce competitive forms for power e.g. internal displacements (coups). Participation
based on the equality of citizens can be contested although in the case of Zimbabwe is
allowed to a great degree when it suits the authoritarian’s needs e.g. incumbents can
forcefully mobilize citizens to participate in a referendum furthering their interests or in
areas they know they will collect the greatest votes (strongholds).
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When asked about the attributes of political competition and participation, some
respondents referred to the candidate nomination process saying it was a necessary starting
point of investigation. To be fielded as a party or independent candidate in Zimbabwe,
one is required to file for nomination with the courts. Another respondent said, they
deployed local observers to observe the nomination court proceedings in provincial courts
and found, opposition parties are free to register and run as long as they meet the legal
requirements. The challenges are, candidates turned away due to nationality issues (e.g.,
migrants without formal identification particulars), also the complicated, bureaucratic and
expensive nature of the process limits participation.
“We affirm that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the
people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions
improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity, and popular enthusiasm of the
vast majority of the people. After all, it is to the people that the very benefits of development
should and must accrue. We are convinced that neither can Africa's perpetual economic crisis
be overcome, nor can a bright future for Africa and its people see the light of day unless the
structures, pattern, and political context of the process of socioeconomic development are
appropriately altered”.
(African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, 1990)

Respondents indicated, Zimbabweans have not fully understood the effectiveness of
popular participation. According to Bratton (1998), popularly participated elections are
difficult to manipulate. Another donor said, democracy activists do not put the people first
in transition planning, apart from their voting role, they focus mostly on programming and
reporting, yet he observed that all democratic processes can be solely pushed by a willing
people (Peeler, 2009) and (Hagopian, 1993). Respondents also said, voter turnout statistics
did not meet their expectations compared to the state of the economy and hardships. They
expected economic decline to motivate voters to participate, for regime change (Resnick).
While a Zanu-PF youth leader said, “Zanu-PF understands the electorate’s power, this is
why it has strong grassroots structures yet the opposition focuses on urban areas. More
than 50% of this country stay outside urban areas and we know they will vote for us”.
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Zanu-PF has been accused of forcing citizens to participate (Newsday, 2016). The people
are ‘objects’ used as a symbol of popular support by authoritarians (although forced
mostly) for media projections. Kpundeh (1992) found, “There is ‘true’ and ‘false’
participation…’False participation’ has been used by many African governments to
project an appearance of support for government policies, but actually tends to promote
the cult of personality and to stifle individual and local initiatives. As such, critics of the
government either are intimidated or absorbed. ‘True participation’ in contrast, constantly
must seek to present the views of individuals from the grass roots level”. Two respondents
said, areas of participation vary and are selective as the incumbent does not consult the
public on policies that affect them. However almost all respondents in Zimbabwe,
Tanzania and Ethiopia said democratization had failed due to legal and security
restrictions on public participation.

Zimbabwe’s historical transition from authoritarian dominant one party rule to multipartism in the 90s was not easy. Almost three decades down, this is an auspicious time to
evaluate challenges and prospects. Prior to the mid-90s, Zanu-PF had not experienced
viable political competition after co-opting post-liberation foes, the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU). Elections were commendable by international standards,
freedoms were respected and the rule of law was strong. There was popular participation
between stakeholders and government through dialogue. There were no term limits and
Mugabe’s constant nomination ensured his rule without limit.
3.1. Popular beliefs or culture
The concept of opposition being a fairly new concept was not acceptable to many ZanuPF supporters, nationalists and Zimbabweans at large. Similar to Asian Confucianist
values, hierarchy, loyalty and respect for elders and seniors is important - Mugabe was
and is still considered by some as the ‘Father’ or ‘Jesus’ of Zimbabwe ‘Ordained by God’
(Southern Eye, 2016). It is not common to oppose the leader, thus multi-partism was
received with a lot of suspicion as having been sponsored by external forces that did not
understand the system (Western). Opposition was equated to rebellion deserving
punishment. Citizens however have the right to form political parties and practice basic
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political rights like campaigning. Although, respondents said, like CSOs, contestation by
opposition parties was limited by strict registration requirements. These beliefs are
popular, mostly deriving from socialization processes and often open to the abuse of
authoritarian leaders like Mugabe. Recently, Mugabe invited critics from war veteran
groups to come forward and make clear their desire or intention for leadership change.
Opposition groups have often been invited to do the same. The calls have not been sincere
as they have attracted state retribution.

USAID has over the last decade promoted the re-establishment of the rule of law in
Zimbabwe through the promotion of Free and fair political and justice systems, the
protection of human rights, vibrant civil society and public confidence in the police and
the courts. In the past seeking individual justice against individuals in positions of power
has been difficult as elites abuse their positions to avoid the rule of law. Institutions of
justice have often been abused by elites either through covert threats or the corrupt
provision of benefits to presiding officers. So, the necessary climate for democratization
has been negatively affected and so has public confidence in governance systems and
subsequent economic growth. USAID’s objective in governance initiatives is to improve
the relationship between civilians and state actors by directly linking those who are
governed with those who are democratically elected to govern. USAID also works to
support the rule of law by promoting legal and regulatory frameworks that improve order
and security, legitimacy, checks and balances, and equal application and enforcement of
the law (USAID, 2016).

Too much respect for any individual has the potential to limit demands for accountability
from the individual. Democratic principles particularly the electoral form are founded on
demands and rewards for accountability. It is not until citizens are strong enough to
question their leadership that real change can be delivered. There are exceptions however
as since June 2016, Zimbabwean citizens have begun to mobilize among themselves to
stand up against various governance ills. One main motivation was a movement initiated
by a Zimbabwean Pastor - Mawarire, titled “ThisFlag”. According to Zeilig (2016), author
of the Struggle reawakens in Zimbabwe, “a national shutdown, or “stay away”, in
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Zimbabwe in July 2016 paralyzed the country, as for the first time in years, the country's
ruling party ZANU-PF and the tenure of 92-year-old president Robert Mugabe, were
seriously rattled”. To date various movements such as “Tajamuka” have given life or reenergized opposition political parties to re-group and demonstrate.
Opposition MDC-T has joined with the Zimbabwe People First’s (ZPF) party in country
wide campaigns demonstrating against Mugabe failed regime. Being the two most viable
parties with ZPF attracting former supporters of the ruling party following their leader’s
fallout; citizens have re-gained interest in political participation as evidenced by increased
online trends of current political events there as well as their physical participation through
attendance at the coalition rallies. Slowly, the culture of docility, strict loyalty and respect
of Zimbabweans is fading as fear in the ailing regime has significantly decreased. To say
however that the traditional beliefs of the Zimbabwean locals affects the process of
democratization would be an over statement.
3.2. Election boycotts
Election boycotting was raised as a challenge to democracy promotion as the MDC
boycotted the 2008 and post 2013 by-elections. Respondents said the MDC is not
proactive as a number of candidates and supporters had already been assaulted, abducted
and killed over a long period. Opposition boycotts have not been effective in Zimbabwe
as supported by Frankel (2010) and the MDC has not had widespread support in its
boycott. When authoritarians force electorate to go and vote, voters have two choices —
either spoil the ballot or vote for the next available option. Resultantly, Zanu-PF has won
all uncontested seats. Even worse, coordination among opposition parties lacks as parties
like the National Constitutional Assembly have continued contesting to date, though
unsuccessfully.

The relationship between parties and their supporters is based on trust. When the MDC
announces it is boycotting until certain conditions are met e.g. availability of the voter’s
roll, and then changes its position and decides to participate, potential voters are confused
and lose trust. The MDC has said it will now contest the 2018 elections despite no electoral
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changes having been made to address previous concerns (The Zimbabwean, 2016).
Boycotting decisions have led to MDC splits in the past i.e. 2005 and 2013 (Chronicle,
2013). Zanu-PF to-date either ignores MDC boycotts; ridicules them as a cowardly move;
denigrates them for being too weak to challenge; cracks them down e.g. before the highprofile run-off in 2008, where even the MDC president was arrested and supporters were
beaten for not participating; or negotiates insincerely as Zanu-PF did following
international pressure. Zanu-PF’s downplaying of opposition boycotts gives a false image
that citizens approve of existing electoral conditions, citing high turnout. One respondent
said, the challenge is donors like the US encourage participation even though the election
is flawed for a representative election Frankel (2010), but this increases competitive
authoritarianism.
3.3. Mass action
Opposition protest marches to date are constantly blocked for "lack of enough security
detail" as and this inhibits participation. Some respondents insinuated democratization had
a lot to with the local population and their will for change; indicating a correlation exists
between a ‘pro-transformation’ society and the rate of democratization. One respondent
said, “Zimbabweans are too peaceful and keep adjusting to a worsening economy. They
will not rise up, if they did not rise when we were buying loaves of bread for a million
Zimbabwean dollars, we don't force them rising up.” Another diplomat — donor gave
reference to experiences in West Africa, where a Zimbabwean economic woes would have
quickly resulted in uprisings. Another respondent said unity of purpose lacked among
Zimbabweans with a "what effect does marching have” mentality. She said civilians had
lost interest in mass action arising from previous arrests of civil society and activists as
the government has succeeded in instilling fear and subduing citizens. Yet according to
Resnick (2013), vertical accountability is enhanced by social movements as citizens have
the ability to assess government performance and sanction or reward accordingly.
Normally, when bad governance persists, a crisis emerges through mass action and if
unsettled, a crisis of democracy should arise (Wang, 2002). This however has not been
the case with Zimbabweans. Outside trade unions and NGO demonstrations, the general
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masses have not collectively mobilized to demand executive accountability. When they
try, they face retribution.
3.4. Civil society
Donors in Zimbabwe were happy overall with progress CSOs have made between the
2000 and 2013 elections — lobbying, coordinating, educating, observing and reporting.
CSOs on the other hand attributed several changes in public participation to their efforts,
including demystifying falsehoods around ballot secrecy, emphasizing on voting as a
human right and information on the availability of pro-bono lawyers for human rights
issues or pluralizing flows of information (Diamond, 1999). On equal participation, CSOs
said patriarchal dominance was slowly challenged by women’s participation especially in
rural areas as they are now consulted in constitution making and civic education processes,
as the country’s majority. They found women to be effective mobilisers and campaigners,
often convincing their husbands, children and communities to attend CSO meetings and
campaigns and also raise voter awareness, although the limitations around patriarchal
dominance and poverty limit them.
CSOs said their division of roles i.e. election monitoring, media, outreach, research and
advocacy, they are more efficient. They said, following the incumbent’s re-election in
2013, CSOs have suffered from reductions in funding, are fatigued and lack the creativity
required to move forward. Lewis (1992), in his assessment of the problems of emerging
civil society formations in Africa states that, civil society does not only consist of the
above kinds of democracy-building groups and functions, it is also an arena of conflict
(and often very intense conflict) between organized interests of various kinds—economic,
social, and ethnic. Zimbabwean CSOs face the same problems of poverty, corruption,
nepotism, parochialism, opportunism, illiberalism, and willingness to be co-opted that
plague the society in general and limit their effectiveness. Learning from South Africa,
Malawi and Zambia, when CSOs unite to overthrow autocracies, they are a force to reckon
with, hence joint action is imperative.
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Development NGOs and CSOs have become some the highest paying sectors in SubSaharan Africa. Popular for per diems often received when employees travel for work
related activities or when they attend workshops and conferences especially. The
researcher found, a significant amount of funds is used for such purposes. Corruption is
rife and CSOs tend to organize countless conferences and workshops on similar issues,
with the same people. Some respondents said, their directors had become “frequent
business class flyers” yet these funds could be used to fund grassroots. One respondent
exclaimed, “How expensive should democratization be?!” Sentiments were raised on
donor’s lack of effective monitoring and evaluation that has created these ‘elite clubs’.
Furthermore, respondents said most donors publicly state their preference for certain
causes over others, forcing recipient organizations alter their causes to qualify.
Democracy aid requires modification, continuous aid inflows with the current situation
increases dependency, and resultantly some said, some CSOs and donors did not want the
situation to change as they stand to benefit from the stalemate and do not negotiate in good
faith as they might not have the stamina to modify their missions and survive in fully
democratic societies. A CSO representative in Ethiopia said, “Yes, democracy aid
promotes democracy but it also creates dependency”. He said Ethiopia had been
dependent on foreign aid since the 1950s due to civil wars and famine, but now the locals
have become “lazy…even where they can fight for their cause, they want hand-outs” and
some did not want the situation to change as they benefited from the crisis. The same can
be said about Zimbabwe, where a decrease in aid after the disputed 2013 elections has led
to the downsizing and closure of a number of CSOs. General conversations with
Zimbabwean CSOs indicated a near end to their activism due to limited resources, yet one
would expect the cause to escalate however resulting from their ‘suffering’.
Other limitations raised were the inability of trade unions and CSOs to ‘move with the
times’ and modify their strategies for an ever changing political system. Before, focus was
on corruption, welfare and political rights issues — all issues relevant to Zimbabwe during
the 90s, they managed to successfully expand their focus to political liberalisation
(constitutional discourse) including human rights (EISA, 2015). However, governance
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continues to evolve and internal revival strategies are necessary to avoid exhaustion.
Another challenge with changing times was that, from around 1999 to 2013 CSOs and
opposition received huge donations each year. One respondent said her organization
would receive at least US$ 5 million and this has made democratization more of an
“industry” than a “cause”. Some said extant democratic deficit and state repression meant
CSOs had failed to facilitate democracy. While others commended CSO efforts for
pushing for and constantly organizing advocacy campaigns and debates despite given state
bureaucracy in seeking permission. They also complained about state exclusionary tactics
against them in high level issues e.g. the SADC power-sharing negotiations given the
wealth of civilian concerns they collected. CSOs are able to tie different facets of society
if managed well for successful transition and Diamond (1999) in his analysis of
democratic development in Africa stresses on their importance, almost to say — it is
unavoidable to work with them in the process. Their democratic functions range from
regulating the power of the state and challenging its abuses of authority to monitoring
human rights and strengthening the rule of law Diamond (1999).
3.5. Media
Donors in Zimbabwe said they had extended their focus to media enhancement for civic
education and participation, particularly from Rapporteurs sans Frontières, DFID and the
Ford Foundation. Authoritarian regimes like Zimbabwe’s normally dominate information
outlets with propaganda and do not allow alternative sources. Most independent media is
opposition aligned — often facing hostility from government. One media related CSO
representative said, they had successfully broken incumbent dominated spaces as
independent newspapers such as the Daily News and NewsDay widen information bases;
provide CSOs opportunities to include their opinions on democratic processes as well as
advertise public awareness events; it does the same for opposition parties as they can sell
their manifestoes or policies as well as information on party events. They however said,
Zimbabwe was still far from accommodating independent media evidenced by the
introduction of repressive anti-participation laws such as the Access to Protection of
Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA).
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Implemented in 2002 and 2007 respectively, the government legitimized extensive media
control through Zimbabwe's main media outlets — radio and television and turned them
to campaign platforms for the incumbent particularly following the contentious fast-track
land reform program. AIPPA also limited contestation as only Zanu-PF could campaign,
disadvantaging opposition parties as most rural areas were difficult mostly accessible via
radio. Independent media houses like the critical Daily News were closed and journalists
(VOA, 2014). Government also introduced the Private Voluntary Organisation Act (PVO
Act) in 1995 obliging NGOs and CSOs to register as voluntary organizations under the
Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare and restrict the abuse of funds and
limit foreign interference. Due to massive backlashes, the Act was not fully implemented.
Donors however noted great successes in Liberia and Congo where indigenous media was
enhanced and countries like Ghana maintained high levels of press freedom, although
Zimbabwe is among the eight countries that suffered the largest declines in 2015 (Freedom
House, 2016). Zimbabwe’s main media outlets e.g. national television remains partisan
and is used to indoctrinate and spread propaganda against democratization champions.
Concerns were also raised on media’s lack of consideration of remote areas,
professionalism and donor co-ordination.

Access to information is an important component of democratization, so stakeholders aim
for a free and reliable media. In Tanzania and Ethiopia too, donors said besides electoral
technologies they have tried to upgrade electronic media. In Zimbabwe, they had provided
small solar radios accessible to the international Voice of America (VOA) station before
the government banned them. Becker and Vlad (2005) in their study on democracy
promotion and media found, foreign commitments on media ranged between US $600
million and US $1 billion a year. In Tanzania, remarkable progress has been made in
accommodating independent media though very little in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe
respectively.
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External factors

1. Donors
Summarizing respondent views, democracy promoters are not the main limitation to
democracy promotion's success. Dating back to the introduction of Economic Structural
Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) by the IMF and WB, foundations were laid for “lowintensity” democracy, through “‘good governance’ initiatives with very little or no effort
at stimulating or forcing political changes” (EISA, 2015). But, improvements in
governance and liberalization through an adherence to constitutional provisions, regular
elections and an increase in freedoms were noted. Respondents said these developments
unlocked opportunities for unions and other interest groups to protest and hold
government accountable for unfulfilled promises, and with the assistance of foreign
donors, momentum rose to mobilize across Zimbabwe and demonstrate against a failing
economy and deteriorating governance. They said there was notable improvement in the
efficiency of state institutions that also enabled electoral democracy’s improvement,
although two respondents attributed this to Britain’s significant investments in Southern
Africa before independence. They said the incumbent inherited a well-functioning system
but the real test is now.

The tripling of budgets by major donors like DFID, USAID and the European Union
according to interview responses has facilitated the increase in the number of NGOs
according to one respondent — from less than fifty in 1996 to over 700 today, and of those
about a third focus on democracy related activities and the rest on humanitarian and other
social issues. Donors have increasingly restructured their governance interventions.
Realizing Zimbabwe required targeted US support, USAID introduced a series of strategic
interventions focusing mostly on aiding civil society. Zimbabwean CSOs are better skilled
and adept to participate in political decision making.
Unfortunately, as will be expanded in the limitations section, actual data on each country’s
aid commitments was a challenge to obtain due to strict restrictions on foreign financing
by the Zimbabwean government. One donor however said, all major Western donors
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committed at least US $30 million each year for democracy assistance and governance,
he however did not disclose if these amounts were declared as ‘democracy’ for
‘governance’ funds and he said there had been an increase in these commitments
particularly in the run up to the 2008 and 2013 presidential and harmonized elections,
although a decrease can be noted since 2014. Another donor said the EU’s commitments
for Zimbabwe’s democracy and governance assistance increased and averaged about
US$ 1 billion since 2009. In Tanzania, donors informed me the German government alone
had increased its commitments from around US$ 350 million in 2001 to about
US$1.4billion in 2012 and the UK from about US$ 680 million to more than US$ 2.2
billion by 2009, saying a similar trend could be noted in Zimbabwe.

In Ethiopia, both donors said aid commitments had notably increased particularly between
1985 and 2009. Due to the sensitivity of issues around donor commitments, they were not
willing to disclose the actual amounts, although they said food aid made up at least half
of their commitments, although 'other programs' including government related funding
had increased from about 200million in 1991 on average to a billion by 2009, although
there has been a 'slight decline after 2011'. They did not have actual statistics of all major
donors after 2013 therefore they could not say if the trend had gone up at the time of the
interview. Ethiopia banned a number of NGOs and CSOs under the Civic Organizations
Law in 2011 which control NGO and CSOs’ functions as well as monitors and controls
their funding. From their work with the African Union and information collected across
West and East Africa, they could confirm the same trend in increasing aid in most SubSaharan Africa cases.
“The ‘African way’ was quite foreign to us before we started operating here. Politically, we
thought democracy was slowly taking roots although I must admit we were more concerned
about civil wars. If maybe we had done our research into what had looked like the consolidation
of democracy, we would have detected these problems a long time ago. Elections are widely
practiced but the quality is low and there has not been any power turnover.”
(Donor respondent in Zimbabwe)
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All CSO representatives in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania attested to having benefited
immensely from international support. One Zimbabwean CSO Head said, “My friend,
without foreign aid we could have only dreamt of all this being possible. There is so much
work to be done and because we are starting from scratch or negative in some cases, it
takes a little longer. This government had never had anyone questioning its actions. They
don't like us, we know! But it is not about them, it’s about the people. But, we are hopeful
Zimbabwe’s story will soon change.”

CSOs are increasingly prominent domestically and said their causes are receiving more
attention particularly concerning legal and rights violations. Donors said they had been
more successful in non-political projects e.g. humanitarian, gender and environmental, but
experienced more bureaucratic challenges and were “frustrated with the distrust in other
issues”. Two donors said their support included parliamentary reform where they helped
assist in the appliance of Parliamentary Reform Committee recommendations, however
executive control limited their involvement and it is “difficult to trust the government’s
sincerity”. They however noted more progress during the power-sharing period between
Zanu-PF and MDC as the dilution meant little dominance by one party and there was
“greater understanding” of the need to reform parliament. They said the objectivity of
most legislative processes after the MDC’s loss of parliamentary majority backslid as
Zanu-PF tries to show ‘they are in charge’.

One donor running a parliamentary project highlighted that, government is backtracking
on provisions of the Cotonou Agreement between EU and African states, which besides
poverty eradication also stresses on the promotion of criminal justice and impunity
through the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Zimbabwean government does not
subscribe to some of its provisions and Mugabe in his capacity as SADC and AU
Chairperson is reported to have recently influenced South African President Zuma not to
surrender ICC fugitive, Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir during his visit to South
Africa. So, this is a common problem with governance intervention — donor states have
to depend on the willingness of recipients, which is often a challenge when the issues
threaten their authority which often forces compromise. Capacity building support and
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training provided to key local democratic networks such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights
Association (ZimRights) and the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) over
more than a decade according to one donor has made them internationally competitive
compared to other elections in his opinion.
1.1. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
The idea behind democracy promotion, as mentioned earlier is to elevate non-democracies
to resemble mature democracies by a transformative process of ‘institutional modelling’
with naturalistic and self-reinforcing qualities, through peaceful gradual political change
(Carothers, 1997). Carothers identifies US’ three main categories of institutions and
processes: the electoral arena, governmental institutions and civil society. In the electoral
arena, promoters aim for ‘free’ and ‘fair’ elections and provide technical assistance to
electoral commissions and voter education. Donors said despite challenges with election
credibility in Zimbabwe, they had succeeded in assisting CSOs in almost all aspects in the
electoral cycle, with one donor saying: “Zimbabwe had never included opposition parties
and CSOs in its constitutional making process. We helped them develop advocacy tools
for negotiation and shared our expertise on inclusive electoral legislation terms”. Other
CSOs said they had received assistance recruiting, training and deploying observers.
Another CSO representative said, “Besides general observation procedures, I would want
to believe most of us did not know about processes such as constituency mapping”.
Respondents pointed to successful political party development to strengthen key parties’
thorough technical assistance and training. Through governmental institutions, where
promoters believe a ‘top-down’ strategy is necessary, donors have provided expert advice
e.g. on constitutionalism. Respondents said areas like parliamentary support and judicial
reform, where promoters aim for an efficient and independent judiciary by training legal
personnel and establishing arbitration mechanisms were less successful due to
government involvement. They said civil society support had been successful as CSOs are
able to amplify citizen concerns to government and media organizations have diversified
and are more resilient.
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Problems
However, CSO representatives pointed to a number of challenges with donor aid which
this study summarizes here. First, donors lack consensus on the model to replicate as some
donor requirements conflict e.g. one donor encourages organizations to work with state
bodies to penetrate and effect change while another strictly monitors to ensure none of the
funds benefit the state due to corruption. They said there is need for coordination. Second,
CSOs observed that some donors want to promote causes that protect their interests,
mentioning the problem of ‘systematic dependency’ where, because election monitoring
can be technical, some donors do not want to train locals to be independent but want to
“remain the experts”. One CSO representative said the experts probably want money (per
diems) and “expat benefits”. Third, corruption is rife among donors resident in Zimbabwe
and their local employees, evidenced by the corrupt allocation of funds to CSO allies for
their own benefit. One respondent talked of a CSO that was organizing a voter campaign
program and needed to print more than 100000 t-shirts and a deal was struck to give the
donor a dollar for each t-shirt when the funds were allocated.
Forth, two respondents in Zimbabwe and Tanzania highlighted issues of ‘discriminatory’
funding — based on the size of the recipient CSO, saying it is difficult for smaller CSOs
to get as much funding as bigger CSOs even when their proposed projects are the same.
Fifth, an opposition minister said donors were rather reactionary and not proactive as they
depended on inter-party progress to start funding yet “money could hasten the process
instead”. Pointing to an increase in political party splits and their lack of cooperation, he
said sometimes disagreements were around financing proposed processes e.g. crosscountry mobilization which is cost intensive rather than ideology and funding could hasten
the process. Sixth, some donors and CSOs believe tension and polarisation between
donor’s limited successful democratization as donors needed to engage the state more
rather than focus on opposition and CSOs in non-democracies for progress. Seventh, in
Zimbabwe as well as Tanzania and Ethiopia, CSO representatives said, there is a tendency
amongst NGOs and CSOs to ‘follow the trend’. One respondent said, donors since 2000
particularly focused on ‘people issues’ (affecting the populace) including political rights

129

and democratization, so every organization modified their programs to fit the requirements
for funding.

A common complaint in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania was, donors dictate on how
they think democratization should be achieved learning from their experiences elsewhere
without much consideration and incorporation of ‘local’ ideas. So, if the problem is
context specific like Zimbabwe’s, the lack of ‘flexibility’ is a problem. Funding then goes
to any organization with a well-written proposal without much focus on the cause. And
one CSO representative said these developments led to the pugnacious relationship
between them and the Zimbabwean government, which accuses them of being “Western
puppets”. They said, before MDC’s entrance, NGOs’ relationship with the government
was positive as most represented welfare issues but now even humanitarian organizations
such as Christian Care have been accused of working with opposition community
representatives to distribute food along party lines. So, Zanu-PF now distributes ‘state
donations’ to its supporters as a counteroffensive.
This research had proposed the nature of the donor affects aid effectiveness — multilateral
organizations would record more successes in foreign political reform than foreign state
representatives. Some CSO representatives said they had observed UNDP as being more
successful due to its government cooperation strategy. One pro-government supporter said
Westerners come with clear “regime change attitudes and expect to be received well?”
Sometimes state engagement even when insincere might be necessary. Due to donor —
opposition cooperation, conflict emerges so some level of neutrality is necessary. Another
pro-government respondent said government was working with UNDP on certain projects
and they “prefer UNDP rather than the British and Americans who simply want regime
change”. The concentrated critique against the ruling party through the support of
academics, student union and labour movements (EISA, 2015) hardens authoritarians.

But then, respondents said, the possibility of CSOs remaining apolitical (though
appealing) was not practical, similar to assumptions that donors can affect the political
development of recipient countries without ever directly intervening in politics (Ottaway
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and Carothers, 2000). Ottaway and Carothers (2000) also give examples of Peru,
Romania, South Africa and the Philippines where Washington funds intensely politicized
NGO communities deeply involved in struggles against authoritarian rule. The researcher
observed, donors in both Zimbabwe and Ethiopia anticipated government retaliation
hence their defense against government. Western donors need to loosen ties with
opposition and CSOs and demonstrate their independence as well as demystify
perceptions of Western propagandists. The UNDP claims to ‘impartially’ intervene
through its Governance and Strategic Initiative and mediates between donors and the
government (EISA, 2015); resultantly the Zimbabwean government asked for electoral
assistance for the 2005 elections.
1.2. DEVELOPMENT VS DEMOCRATIC AID
That said, the initial separation between development and political or democracy aid
(Resnick) due to the susceptibility of aid to corrupt administrations, diversified causes and
made aid focused and effective. However, some respondents felt development aid has
taken greater strides than political aid in Zimbabwe. Despite declines in Official
Development Assistance as a share of gross national income from 6.2 to 4.9% since 1990,
Africa remains the most aid dependent (Resnick, 2013). Resnick's findings in Sub-Saharan
Africa indicate, “Development aid rather than democratic aid has played a stronger role
in facilitating democratic transitions”. Some donor respondents also said their
development aid programs were more successful than political aid in achieving its
missions.

However, the government began to ban humanitarian aid as well accusing donors of
partisan disbursement. So donors might need to consider channeling funds through
development rather than democracy programs as Resnick (2013) says, there are two
possible channels: first, “Direct coercion” (conditionality), popular in the 90s where
donors withheld aid in response to severe human rights abuses and coups. The problem is
there is an increase in alternatives with Zimbabwe’s cooperation with the East. It was
effective Malawi, Kenya and Zimbabwe too to an extent in the 90s and early 2000s with
the unavailability of alternatives. Now China provides few conditions and Western donor
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leverage is lower. Second and more ‘indirect’ — the imposition of structural adjustment
programs, that normally lead to protests against high living costs, and have succeeded in
Benin and Zambia (Resnick, 2013). They however did not work in Zimbabwe during the
90s and were used by the government as an excuse for economic decline.
1.3. CONDITIONALITY
Donors have also employed contentious disincentives as democracy promotion means.
Crawford (1997) carried out a case study on 18 cases of aid suspension (carrot and stick)
between 1990 and 1995, in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results showed that political
conditionality was only successful in two of the cases: Kenya and Malawi. International
pressure on authoritarians for transformation made ‘modest’ or ‘significant’ contributions
to democratization efforts there. In the other 16 cases, the contributions were either absent
or unclear (Crawford, 2007). In another study on 25 cases of politically conditioned aid in
Africa, Bratton and Van de Walle found that only eight of these resulted in democratic
transition constituting a modest success rate (Van de Walle & Bratton, 1997). They found
that domestic factors are far more important than international ones.

The investigation of democracy assistance in developing countries or with regimes that
do not value integrity can be complicated by dishonest recipient governments and
institutions. They all want the carrot but are not willing to pay the price. Bratton and Van
de Walle in their study of the impact of democracy promotion in Africa found out that a
‘large number’ of authoritarian regimes pre-emptively enacted democratic reforms
specifically to avoid a suspension of aid (Van de Walle & Bratton, 1997). Regimes or
political institutions can put in place cosmetic reforms for international support.

Withholding budgetary support, food aid and other development aid in Zimbabwe has
only made the poor suffer as the government diverts blame on economic failure and bad
governance on sanctions. The executive took advantage of discovered diamond fields to
enrich themselves and fund their campaigns. Food and other goods were imported from
neighboring countries like South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique who
welcomed Zimbabweans for their business development and enrichment of their small
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border towns. Neighboring countries have benefited from Zimbabwean’s educated
workforce to grow their industries. Politically, the government was never really isolated
as it found solace in regional powers, China and Middle Eastern powers for financial and
development support. Travel bans to Western countries are not effective today as Asia and
the Middle East provide viable alternatives for shopping, education and business.
Economic sanctions and asset freezes only work when developed economies are united
against lending or investing for sanctioned individuals. Without this, the West is made
‘foolish’ as over the past five years, sanctions are being lifted gradually even though there
isn’t much political change, but the West realizes it is losing hegemony and leverage. In
short, conditionality has not worked.

Pro-Zanu-PF respondents reiterated on the failure of sanctions or conditionality to effect
political transformation in Zimbabwe. They blamed Zimbabwe’s bankruptcy, ill
performing sectors and political discord on international sanctions led by the US and UK
equating them to ‘bullies’. On the contrary opposition respondents and some CSO
representatives said sanctions were used by the incumbent for his defense. They blamed
Zimbabwe’s failing economy on massive fraud and the regimes routinely abuse state
resources.

Sovereignty
"So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe.”
(Mugabe, 2002)

Linked to conditionality challenges, Carothers (2006) sites democracy promotion’s very
legitimacy as a major challenge resisted by authoritarians and citizens actively due to
increased fear of its potency. Revolutions, strikes, sanctions, travel bans and the
sovereignty threat that outsiders can promote, stir resistance to authoritarianism hence
their unpopularity. As former aggressors, many African countries saw and still see
Western states as disguising capitalist imperialism in the name of democracy promotion.
Besides, Iraq and the War on Terrorism have hurt International Democracy Promotion’s
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(IDP) legitimacy and widely drawn criticism that IDP policies do not promote democracy
but reinforce powerful state’s interests.
Democracy is having to “return to the challenge of engaging in global debates over its
very value” resulting from the rise of alternative political models from the ‘third wave’
(Carothers et. al., 2007). Carothers considered the rise of China and the growth of
“alternative” political models (competitive-authoritarian) as a challenge in that there is no
longer global consensus on governance. China’s “authoritarian capitalism” and its
assertiveness demystifies democracy as the ideal source of legitimacy, slowly replaced by
the market and emulated by African authoritarians. He is however cautions that
democracy promotion is not doomed but the initial generation of democracy aid has ended
and a new generation is under way and the old generation’s advances should be
appreciated before we quickly focus on emerging challenges.

2. Chinese complications
Initially, this study had not considered China as a factor affecting democratization in
Zimbabwe. However, 15 out of 22 respondents in Zimbabwe, 1 out of 3 in Tanzania and
4 out of 7 in Ethiopia mentioned China’s rise and its cooperation in Africa as affecting
Western democratization efforts in Zimbabwe and Africa. Today, it is almost impossible
to talk about African development issues without mentioning China. Summarizing
respondents’ views: China’s minimal political conditionality principle enhance its chances
of influencing political values in Zimbabwe faster than Western ones. The ‘carrots’
formerly incentivized by Westerners are now competing with Chinese types availed at
minimum costs. Authoritarian regimes are looking ‘East’ for loans, aid and technical and
political support. China compared to most Western countries does not put pressure on
states to democratize.
The sovereignty of a state is threatened normally by negative political conditionality.
Authoritarian regimes in particular are not receptive or willing to trade-off, they intend to
maximize their gains. The problem is, according to Hyde (2014) the Chinese development
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strategy has become increasingly attractive to developing states and this is one of the main
factors that could contribute to a decrease in international demand for Western democratic
support and contribute to the rise of hybrid regimes. It has become apparent over the past
decade that Chinese influence in Africa, South East Asia and elsewhere has made a
number of countries less dependent on Western support and therefore less likely to be
influenced by Western international pressure in favor of democracy Hyde (2014). An AU
representative said, they had observed that, China was willing to support most African
nations regardless of their political problems evidenced by its support of African civil
wars in arms.
“What distinguishes China from other donor countries is her guiding principle that
economic aid must not bring economic profit to the donor” (Bartke, 1975). China’s White
Paper on foreign aid is “guided by five principles: first, unremittingly helping recipient
countries to build up their capacity to self-develop; second, imposing no political
conditions; third, adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development; fourth,
remaining realistic while striving for the best; fifth, keeping pace with the times and
paying attention to reform and innovation” (Zhang and Huang, 2012). Chinese aid’s
consistency and coherence, distinguishes it from Western policies as it appears that the
rules do not significantly change depending on the recipient country. It’s emphasis on selfdevelopment makes it easier for states in transition to accept as states seem to favor any
form of independence or at least feel in charge of their development. This in turn means
less interference from the donor compared to Western strategies of constant monitoring
and sometimes go to the extent of opening an office in the recipient country to actively
monitor development.

Hybrid democracy & China
Complications arising from Jacques’ (2009) When China Rules the World indicate
hegemonic hurdles for Western powers given China’s rise. US President Obama during
the researcher’s field study in Ethiopia, referred to the Ethiopian government as
‘democratically elected’: an indication that Western standards have been compromised or
relaxed with changing times. To hold a ‘successful’ election despite domestic and
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international concerns now seems to qualify a country as democratic — a notion this study
does not agree with. As previously stated, democracy as a value is in decline or “is slipping
back," and the validation of competitive authoritarians by powerful actors further
strengthens illiberal democracy. If an increase in the number of countries with acceptable
or ‘free and fair’ elections would be considered an ultimate and correct measurement of
the state of democracy, it would be subjective as it eliminates other key principles
including human rights and the rule of law. This study suggests validation or classification
of ‘democracies’ based on all democratic values (inclusive of civil liberties and the rule
of law) not elections solely.
As authoritarians like Mugabe are shunned, criticized and sanctioned by the West for
fraudulent electoral victories, corruption, undermining the rule of law and abusing human
rights; they resort to adopting ‘look East policies’ where they easily trade, cooperation
and borrow. But Western ideas of development are not independent of good governance
and democracy; hence a powerful China threatens democratization as we have known it.
With a negative human rights record, China perceives Western models of good governance
as contentious and believes in the respect of the sovereignty of all states. China perceives
Western democratization efforts, human rights diplomacy, humanitarian interventions and
international criminal law ‘strategic gain’ strategies to “weaken rivals and expand their
influence” (Nathan, 2015). Beijing has widely rejected both a move towards democracy
and the acceptance of human and civil rights (Nathan, 2015). This is against Western
expectations that as China rises it would embrace democratic ideals. With a foreign policy
based on and driven by self-interest, China continues to challenge the Western
International Democracy Promotion (IDP) mission. The main rationales of IDP - universal
value and instrumental value stand against self-interest; of which China aims to maintain
good relations with whatever regime is in power wherever it has economic, diplomatic
and security interests (authoritarian or not), as “attempting to undermine a foreign regime
would cost more than it would be worth” (Nathan, 2015).
“Chinese model grows, even without Chinese efforts to propagate it, other authoritarian
governments are encouraged by the idea that authoritarianism is compatible with
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modernization and the try to adapt. China and Russia may represent a viable alternative
path to modernity which in turn suggests, there is nothing inevitable about liberal
democracy’s ultimate victory or future dominance”.
Nathan (2015)
This study uses Nathan’s (2015) findings on China’s challenge and the future of Western
democracy promotion to frame respondents’ views. China encourages authoritarianism by
the power of its example: Its successful rise demonstrates that authoritarianism can result
in advanced modernization as Beijing has successfully created a ‘large middle class and
co-opted’ it, ‘established a rule of law framework and used those institutions to outlaw
authentic civil society’. The Chinese model like many authoritarians successfully co-opts
its citizens and uses them to secure its position and sometimes provides gratification to its
citizens and patrons. China also burnishes its national prestige abroad through the
promotion of authoritarian values (by employing soft power offensives mostly through
media), therefore the globalization of democracy is threatened Nathan (2015), via Xinhua
News, China Central Television (CCTV). Also, in Africa especially, China plays a “key
role in a circle of authoritarian states that pickup techniques of rule from one another”. Its
‘rhetorical strategy’ of rebranding the regime not as authoritarian but a different form of
democracy has been emulated.
Authoritarian’s use of law to support repression exemplified by China’s criminal
procedure contrasts democratic rule of law. Fear is instilled by means of abductions,
arbitrary arrests, arrests without charge and sometimes death. The Zimbabwean
government has announced proposals to restrict the internet inspired by China’s Great
Firewall to punish government critics (TechZim, 2016). Chinas’ intentions to “roll back
existing democratic institutions or stifle sprouts of democratic change territories where it
enjoys special influence” Nathan (2015) e.g. in Hong Kong and Macau indicate the future
of democratization might be endangered in authoritarian regimes cooperating with China.
However, learning from Beijing’s reaction to Hong Kong’s 2014 Occupy Central
Movement (Lo, 2015), chances are few that China would use its influence to encourage
democratization in Zimbabwe.
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Wiewei (2012), author of The China Wave dismisses possibilities of multiparty democracy
ever prospering in China saying, “It is unimaginable that most Chinese would ever accept
multiparty democracy”. According to Wiewei (2012), multiparty democracy is not
necessary for political development and developing states can advance under authoritarian
rule, adding that, non-Western states cannot successfully implement Western democratic
political systems as doing so “ends up in two scenarios — either from euphoria to despair
or euphoria to anarchy” e.g. Libya and Iraq. This however is not true with respect to the
whole of Africa as democracy has been compatible with its established democracies like
South Africa, Botswana and Ghana although imperfect and its resilience signals it does
not automatically result in anarchy. This argument disincentivises authoritarians from
adopting democracy, hence this project argues, China’s cooperation with Africa has
negative political effects.

3. Regional organisations
African regional organizations would normally be expected to encourage and objectively
monitor political processes in member states; the AU and SADC however have become
patrimonial, and are limited by cultural values of loyalty and respect that limit their ability
to emphasize on the need for transformation resulting from government and institutional
separation or independence. Until regional organizations are led by a different crop of
individual who value justice and freedom, regional missions and interventions will be
'rubber-stamping' missions, legitimizing illegally elected leaders. They're opinions are
important for restraining authoritarian's actions as witnessed by the AU's refusal to accept
Burundian president Nkuruziza's third term. Democracy promoters might need to consider
strengthening such institutions' election monitoring techniques (to avoid focusing on
election day events alone as they do, but at the whole cycle).
Recently, the AU was financially challenged with African states failing to honor payments,
and Mugabe in his capacity as AU chair pledged 300 herds of cattle 'to avoid Western
dependence' for funding. Whitehead’s (1996) theory on democratization by ‘contagion’ as
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non-democracies are ‘contaminated’ by advanced democracies has not worked in Africa.
Such regional platforms would have been an opportunity to spread democratic norms, but
instead the opposite ensues as respondents said other African leaders cheer and emulate
Mugabe instead of shaming him. Hence, reliance on African authoritarians limits the
organization’s power to objectively hold them accountable. There are inefficient to an
extent in their operations as during the time of this study, the researcher visited the AU
more than once to no avail as representatives were often out of office or without adequate
information.

Effects of democracy promotion
According to Lindberg, elections are most often a step in the transition towards democracy
(Lindberg, 2008) and that, “In Africa democracy tends to take root after a sequence of
three electoral cycles”. Despite the fact that Lindberg’s theory recommends the need for
the international community to sustain support to transitional countries over an extended
period, typically 12 - 15 years, this has however not been the case as Zimbabwe in its
seventh electoral round still has not established democracy. According to CSO
representatives, they have over the years improved in conduct and their understanding of
the processes, however. One respondent said, because elections had not been observed
professionally before as they are today, the practices take time to perfect but added
“although the problem is, the more we try to better our observation, the more the
government develops ways to cheat”.

Freedom House ratings change
“The process of holding an uninterrupted series of de-jure participatory, competitive and
legitimate elections not only enhances the democratic quality of the electoral regime but also
has positive effects on the spread and deepening of civil liberties in the society”.
Lindberg (2008)

139

Pessimism surrounding the substance of African elections understandably comes from
low turnovers and their repetitive imperfection. However, based on its findings, this study
proposes a wholesome view of what the whole electoral cycle can do. Elections are
important in in-culturing democracy. In Zimbabwe, they have enabled stakeholders to call
for term limits and facilitated the revision of constitutional clauses that had long been
ignored, though hindering public liberties. 2015 - 2016 changes in the Mo Ibrahim Index
and Freedom House ratings — from a ‘not free’ status to ‘partly free’ are based on the fact
that, Zimbabwe is “one of the six countries that made strides in addressing governance
issues, despite its leader Robert Mugabe being one of Africa’s longest serving leaders”
(Ibrahim Index, 2015); and “gains in citizens’ civil liberties in 2015…while the country
continued to struggle with the internal factionalization of both its ruling and major
opposition parties, the judiciary showed increasing independence by deciding against
powerful political interests, including ruling party elites” (Freedom House, 2016).

Arguably, Freedom house as of 2016 now regards Zimbabwe as "partly free" from a "not
free" status between 2002 to 2015 saying, "Zimbabwe’s civil liberties rating improved
from 6 to 5, and its status improved from Not Free to Partly Free, due to some gains in
citizens’ civil liberties in 2015. While the country continued to struggle with the internal
factionalization of both its ruling and major opposition parties, the judiciary showed
increasing independence by deciding against powerful political interests, including ruling
party elites” (Freedom House, 2016).

This study disagrees with the assessment to some extent however, as jurisdiction on party
factions is an inadequate measure of state legislature. It could be a sign of extended
judicial factionionalism particularly on the part of the ruling party. In an interview with
the Ibrahim foundation on Zimbabwe’s rating changes, Zimbabwean political analyst
Ruhanya called the assessment “superficial in the sense that its analytic length is focused
on civil and political rights. Whereas we agree that there has been a recession and some
kind of stability, there is great abuse of civil and political rights. Because of the economic
recession that the country is facing is that there has also been substantive violation of
social economic rights. There is an appalling failure in the issue to do with the protection
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of social economic rights stated in chapter four of the new constitution: the bill of rights
that talks of issues of provision of clean water the right to health, the right to education.
All those social economic rights are not being realized” (Ibrahim Index, 2015).

Mozaffar (2002) says, the fact that authoritarians routinely attempt to manipulate election
rules indicates their understanding of the significance of these rules in shaping and
legitimizing election incomes. Advances in improving democratic capacities have been
made, but the limited self-governance of state institutions from the incumbent and their
ability to adjudicate electoral processes neutrally, remains problematic.

On election observation, CSO representatives said their election fraud detection
techniques had improved with each election aided by real-time reporting technologies,
rapid response mechanisms were in place. Their increase in polling station coverage (at
least on observer at every polling station due to CSOs joint fielding) has deterred potential
fraud, saying electoral managing bodies increasingly know they are being watched and
with the use of smart phones, information is relayed efficiently. One respondent said,
“Before, Zanu-PF members would intimidate voters in polling station radiuses for votes,
but now they can’t they know they are being watched”. They said, resultantly from their
community surveys, voter confidence has improved motivated by observer presence in
polling stations.

Reprisals by CSOs and opposition have increased pressuring the incumbent to explain
policy decisions. 2016 protests organized by opposition parties - MDC and People First
across Zimbabwe and South Africa, on the disappearance of US$ 15 billion from
government and Chinese joint diamond mining ventures have revived hope in mass
mobilization (VOA, 2016). Opposition and CSOs have united since 2015 to protest against
the disappearance of activists without much state limitation. These social movements are
important for an embattled opposition to remind the incumbent and electorate of their
viability and as a platform to share policy and revive distressed masses, since unionism
and student movements are almost extinct due to a failed economy and company closures
as well as disunity and partisanship respectively. Legal CSOs and student groups were
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applauded for encouraging civil transformative action attributing national constitutional
reform consciousness to CSO efforts, siting the “NO Vote campaign” rejecting a
repressive and ‘partisan’ constitutional referendum in year 2000 although it was followed
with violent attacks by the state (Mwonzora, 2010). Zimbabwean CSOs have nonetheless
survived several derailing attempts by government through co-option and pre-emption
(Raftopoulos & Savage, 2010).
“Things are changing. It was impossible at one point to comment in newspapers or the internet
as we do now.”
(CSO Leader)

Respondents said technological support had made operations easier and efficient while
integrating Zimbabwe into the globalized society of democratic processes. Computers and
smartphones were commonly mentioned as having enhanced reporting and result
verification processes in ‘real-time’. This has an effect on electoral fairness as incidents
could be reported and information would be conveyed to observers in the area for
verification. Platforms such as Ushahidi (for citizens instantly report incidents or air their
views about election related activities) supported by HIVOS and DFID were said to have
broadened participation and enhanced monitoring during elections for transparency and
accountability — although met with massive state backlash. In terms of popular
participation, respondents said the internet has largely contributed by providing free
access to information through news sites, instant messaging — mainly WhatsApp and
social media. For political parties, it has been used to campaign and share evidence on
abuses of power by the state. For CSOs, it is an advocacy tool especially. For citizens, it
is an interactive platform to share opinions (especially anonymously considering fear of
retribution). CSOs receive smartphones from donors for observation and have been crucial
in sharing images and videos from remote areas.

Regarding transparency, CSOs said through acquired knowledge of strategies like parallel
vote tabulations for the verification of results (illegal but a common practice among
Zimbabwean NGOs), they can now independently verify results using representative
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random samples of polling station results. This is how they managed to raise alerts
regarding vote fraud and challenge EMBs. Journalists through independent media
increasingly expose fraudulent activities and raise awareness around state abuse. Others
pointed to government restrictions in these areas and state unwillingness to invest in
surveillance technology.

Zanu-PF Internal Divisions
Respondents pointed to Zanu-PF’s 2014 splits following the expulsion of Vice president
Joice Mujuru on allegations of stirring “factionalism” or divisions to displace Mugabe,
treason and corruption saying, it could be a sign of intra-party democracy as previously
rare was the president ever opposed. She formed the Zimbabwe First Party in 2015 to
challenge Zanu-PF in the 2018 elections together with other former minister dismissed
from the party. According to media reports, Mujuru will form a coalition with other
political parties including the MDC against Zanu-PF. These respondents recommended
further investigation into democracy promotion’s effect on authoritarian regimes saying,
it could potentially be a new strategy for democracy promotion — destruction from within
rather than from without. Actually, the state newspaper accused Mujuru's entry into
opposition as a clear sign that, “She was a pawn of foreign interests seeking to perpetuate
Western hegemony on the country's economy” (Herald, 2016).

The unpopular splinters are calling for the respect of the rule of law given a series of
“votes of no confidence” passed on party members aligned to factions opposing the
president (as was the case with expelled former vice president Mujuru). Vice president
Mnangagwa who is under attack for leading one faction has queried the suspension and
expulsion of members without investigation or adhering to constitutional disciplinary
processes. Fear of expulsion and unfair action has led to constitutional reviews and the
valuing of legal provisions within the ruling party. Even notorious state violence
reinforcing instruments, war veterans, are calling for the rule of law given factional purges
among their leaders for disagreeing with the executive. Based on the “spoiler effect”
emerging from internal party divisions and their high political costs, splits in the
incumbent party between significant party leaders. Splitting candidate could draw votes
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from the incumbent resulting in opposition victory. Increasingly former staunch
supporters of the ruling party have changed their thoughts and attitudes towards
contemporary governance models and are prompted to leave old taboos (Kpundeh (1992).
“The new insistence by external aid donors and creditors on good governance also has
provided a window of opportunity for African democrats to push for transparency and
accountability in their countries (Kpundeh, 1992).

Democracy in decline?
Zimbabwean findings both challenge and confirm Plattner, Fukuyama, Diamond and
Carother’s (2015) propositions of democratic decline. Indeed, challenges of
democratizations are more complex today with such institutional co-option to form hybrid
democracies. Some respondents felt democracy had failed in Zimbabwe and events were
indicating an opposite trend, while others felt the interest in elections through contestation
and participation showed electoral democracy was gaining popularity as the democratic
culture deepened. But lessons from Iraq and North Africa were raised as current
challenges to democracy promotion by donors particularly, as they increasingly as they
do not reflect positively on Western democracy promotion strategies. One AU
representative added that previous hopes of sustainable democratic consolidation in Mali,
Cameroon, Guinea Bissau and the stagnation in South Africa are slowly showing a
negative trend. Zimbabweans continue to trust in electoral participation as the only
legitimate and peaceful means of regime change.

More and more citizens are challenging authoritarians' transformation to more democratic
forms of governance. According to some respondents, the persistence of both opposition
and CSOs that continues to force authoritarians in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia to maintain the
practice of participation for pluralism has contributed to authoritarian’s accommodation
of democratic practice. Some said the fact that authoritarians continue to hold elections is
a sign that democracy promotion initiatives have succeeded in emphasizing the
importance and significance of elections.
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Elections are surprisingly significant in Zimbabwean politics. While some respondents
said, some of the general public had lost hope in elections after their failure to translate
their votes to regime change, the majority will continue to ‘try’ — according to on CSO
director, “Africans believe in elections my friend…they symbolize change!” Adding that
electoral practice is still strong based on the beliefs that, the incumbent will eventually run
out of fraudulent tactics.

United States’ record
Considering current debates on democratic decline Fukuyama, Kagan, Plattner, Diamond,
Carothers, Schmitter, Levitsky & Way, Stepan, Mungiu-Pippidi, Mainwaring & PérezLi~nán, Gyimah-Boadi and Masoud. Democracy’s promoters especially the US has a lot
do to revive hope in international democracy promotion and improve ratings of democracy
as a key value. In a recent article titled “Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy
in Other Countries,” Waltapril (2016) talks of discouraging trends in US foreign policies.
According to Waltapril (2016), democracy promoters should realize democracy is more
than constitutions or elections and as argued by this study, democracy promotion’s success
is dependent on functioning internal systems including effective legal systems, a broad
commitment to pluralism, a decent level of income and education, and widespread
confidence that political groups which lose out in a particular election have a decent
chance of doing better in the future.

Waltapril (2016) like Lindberg and others argues, Western democratization took centuries
and therefore, donors must be patient and even prepare for contentious and violent
responses to the process. Building institutions and making them conducive for democracy
requires time and money. And shortcuts through hard or military forms only worsen
democracy’s record as well as the lives of those it hopes to preserve. Waltapril (2016)
says, force for democracy promotion almost always triggers violent resistance in recipient
states and also neighboring states whose interests are adversely affected by a transition,
may try to stop or reverse it. Impactful peaceful IDP strategies like conditionality
empower authoritarians who are good at manipulating facts. External actors do not “know
enough to pick the right local people to put in charge, and even generous and well145

intentioned efforts to aid the new government tend to fuel corruption and distort local
politics in unpredictable ways” Waltapril (2016).
“Creating democracy in a foreign country is a vast social engineering project, and expecting
outside powers to do it effectively is like asking someone to build a nuclear power plant, without
any blueprints, on an active earthquake zone. In either case, expect a rapid meltdown”.
Waltapril (2016)

Where “promoting democracy is desirable, but force is not the right tool, what is? Let me
suggest two broad approaches,” Waltapril (2016) suggests democracy promotion through
diplomacy and setting better examples. Unfortunately, both have not worked in
Zimbabwe. Diplomacy works where recipient governments are willing to listen and admit
change is necessary, the Zimbabwean government responds with pride and ridicules
Westerners before attributing the tactics to Western interests in Africa or a ‘hidden regime
change mission’ evidenced by the government’s response to sanctions. The ‘role model’
strategy works when the government could ‘potentially copy’. The Zimbabwean
government witnesses the successful rise of its neighbors - South Africa, Botswana, and
Zambia under democratic rule and emulates them, but does not model their example.
Worse still, as argued by Diamond and Carothers et al. the US is no longer the “just,
prosperous, vibrant, and tolerant society” (Waltapril 2016) it was known to be by the end
of the third wave of democratization. Western democracy promotion examples over the
decade are less attractive.

146

Chapter 7
Conclusion and recommendations
This study explored the puzzle that Zimbabwe has received significant financial and
technical support for democratization, but instead of democracy consolidation, Zimbabwe
has oscillated from a de facto one party state to an authoritarian, then to a competitive
authoritarian regime. Relying on 32 interviews with civil society representatives, donors
and government representatives in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ethiopia, the study explored
the effectiveness of Western democracy promotion on democratization in Zimbabwe.

Despite theoretical propositions that aid has a positive effect on democratization: hence
the assumption that an increase in aid would guarantee Zimbabwe’s democratization
(Lindberg, 2006), Western democracy promotion has not been largely successful in
democratizing Zimbabwe. The study highlighted democracy promotion characteristics,
concepts, aims, activities and actors with an investigation of other cases of successful and
unsuccessful democracy promotion. As discussed in the previous chapter, some of the
factors affecting democracy promotion in Zimbabwe include, the nature of the state i.e.
competitive authoritarian, electoral conduct, recipient activities (civil society and
opposition) and external factors e.g. donor practices, the rise of China and its
complications and the role of African regional organizations.

In conducting this research, the aim has been to contribute to research on democracy
promotion in authoritarian regimes. This is an area that has received minimal focus from
democracy and election scholars. As discussed in the chapter on findings, Western
democracy promotion and its effectiveness on contestation and participation in Zimbabwe
had not been largely successful because of lack of consideration of domestic factors such
as the nature of the state. It can therefore be argued that the most effective strategies are
those that are inclusive of internal dynamics of recipient states, ‘neutrally’ dispensed and
benefiting all stakeholders.
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Nonetheless, as discussed in previous chapters, democracy promotion efforts in
Zimbabwe have not been all to waste. Zimbabwe has progressed from being a purely
authoritarian to competitive electoral authoritarianism. Still it should be noted that this has
been a result of efforts by external actors together with other domestic and regional actors.

Recommendations

Nature of the state and the executive
Zimbabwe suffers from the problem of powerful individuals and weak institutions. Its
political institutions are too weak to ensure effective governance and accountability. Basic
mechanisms (for electoral democracy in this case) are existent, they however lack
autonomy. With a power deficient state, efforts can be made to build and increase its
capabilities and where it is too powerful; efforts should be made to limit it. The
government should create a conducive environment for constitutional values to
consolidate and thrive including a total separation of powers without interference.
Transition from years of despotism to real independence in Zimbabwe might take time
but it is worth pursuing. Basic rights of all citizens need to be respected, elitist mentalities
need breaking down, accompanied by executive de-monopolization of power, there is
need for decentralization on all levels.

Continuous disregard for the guarantee of individual rights is undemocratic and worsens
government legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. In Sub-Sahara African cases like Mali
and Burundi where an accumulation of state abuses has resulted in war — the executive
must revisit original commitments it swore by. But then, authoritarians prolong their terms
because certain camps genuinely want them to remain in power. There is need to
encourage the essence of power turnover within these camps. The judiciary requires real
legal authority to manage and control the state. In this regard, CSOs need to conscientise
citizens (particularly in rural areas) of their constitutional rights.
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Executive constitutional powers must be limited to those stipulated by the constitution
while acts such as the Presidential Powers and Temporary Measures Act are repealed as
they are biased towards incumbent parties. Some level of devolution is necessary to
transfer substantial amounts of decision making power to lower levels for effective
governance and accountability (Schmitter, 2015) and reduce existing gaps between the
executive and its citizens for inclusiveness. Given wealth disparities in Zimbabwe,
devolution could also enhance wholesome growth. As long as the incumbent continues to
use state resources for patronage "competitive clientelism” Lust (2009) will continue.

Electoral managing bodies
Electoral managing bodies (EMBs) must have the capacity to function independently from
the executive according to the constitution and be apolitical. For efficiency, the bodies
must be independent (run professionally) hence overhauling is necessary by reshuffling
current veterans to maintain vibrancy and innovation. The institutions need to be restructured with clear boundaries (division of roles) and chains of command to ensure
internal checks if they are to be independent. It is also necessary to improve reporting
mechanisms and change current practices of executive control i.e. because the incumbent
is an interested party. Processes such as voter registration and the update of voters’ roll
must be done by one office i.e. the former by the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission
(ZEC) as stipulated by the constitution and the later by the Registrar General. This will
also reduce gerrymandering problems as the Registrar General’s office can consult census
findings to define sensible and balanced polling centers.

This study suggests that professional checks similar to financial audits be carried out to
counter cases of duplication and missing names alongside the deaths registry, using
modern technologies. Voter registrations and audits must be done in time to allow
updating, checking and distribution. As long as EMBs are willing to rig elections,
authoritarians will continue to use clientalist tactics to manipulate or co-opt them.
Therefore, the revision of electoral laws is necessary to ensure electoral processes are
improved in their objectivity. EMBs must strictly abide by key provisions such as availing
the voter’s roll for inspection by all stakeholders in time. Regional organizations like the
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African Union must continue to emphasize in essence the need of good governance and
agree on disincentives for non-cooperating members. They must also ensure peaceful, free
and fair elections that respect the people’s will.

Elections and election cycle
“Elections alone are not sufficient to make a democracy — yet “no other institution
precedes participatory, competitive and legitimate elections in instrumental importance of
self-government” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). But, not all election holding
countries are or will be democracies. There is need to closely investigate structural
arrangements necessary for elections before recommending them as key governance
solutions. Elections in Zimbabwe have become a formality and while poorly organized
and providing publicity opportunities for stakeholders, they might not yield to much. The
deterrence of fraud must be prioritized in place of its detection and more pro-action than
reaction is needed. Stakeholders could take advantage of a democratic culture imbedded
in the routinization of elections and ensure all citizens contribute to deterring fraud. This
requires the flexibility of election officials to look beyond traditional observation methods,
focusing on the whole electoral cycle not just the Election Day and advance as
authoritarians get sophisticated. This will help improve voter confidence as accountability
is entrenched, although, large scale election observation has made it increasingly difficult
for incumbents to rig elections and get away with it due to the spread of strategic
manipulation (Hyde, 2014).

Power transfer requires reinvestigation of constitutional provisions to ensure term limits
are abided by. Mechanisms to investigate appeals and petitions must already be in place
before Election Day to ensure effectiveness. Election CSOs need advanced reporting
mechanisms to collect sufficient evidence of fraud to justify their findings e.g. using smart
technology to record suspicious activity. For inclusiveness, financial and legal support
must be provided for all candidates for appeals or the fees must be drastically cut. EMBs
must permit and easily accredit CSOs to field observers countrywide, while ensuring
ballot is secure. The rules for doing so must be easy to understand and unbiased.
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More advocacy is required to allow international observers though there is need for them
to observe the elections over longer periods to have a comprehensive and wholesome view
of the process and possibly deter fraud early. Learning from Zimbabwean events, election
fraud could start at the cycle’s commencement. There is also need for accommodation of
local observer views by international observers and verification before the issuing of
unified statements to avoid current conflict.

Competitive authoritarianism
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) assumed “any country moving away from authoritarian
rule could be considered as transitioning towards democracy” however this is not the case
with Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe over the decade has been slowly drifting away from the
traditional authoritarian form of governance predominant one-party state that does not
allow contestation or one that does not allow citizens to participate in public processes.
The act of holding national elections can itself be unpredictable and riskier for incumbents
even those experienced in vote manipulation (Hyde, 2014). Following Lindberg’s (2006)
argument, the act of holding “elections even though flawed” may in the long run introduce
much greater uncertainty for the leader to stay in power.
Though on the other hand, “Repeating elections even though flawed works where genuine
will for transformation exists. In the absence of transformative will, competitive
authoritarian and hybrid regimes will continuously threaten the future of real democracy.”
The risk is, “When long-time authoritarian rulers face serious challenges they may turn to
extreme levels of repression, deploying levels of violence and intimidation that are
unnecessary when political domination can be more subtly secured at the ballot box”
Diamond 2002 but it is worth pursuing. This important to understanding complications
and challenges to democratization in Zimbabwe and other authoritarian systems but to
find possible solutions. Diamond 2002 found that, “If we are to understand contemporary
dynamics, causes, limits, and possibilities of regime change, we must understand the
different, and in some respects new, types of authoritarian rule”.
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However, there is hope, as already, African authoritarians including Mugabe have
difficulties justifying authoritarian rule and guaranteeing their tenure, hence the adoption
of competitive authoritarian or hybrid democratic governance. More internal and external
pressure is required as electorate take advantage of modern technologies to educate,
mobilize, advocate and hold leaders accountable where physical demonstrations are faced
with state retaliation. Possibilities for transformation though hazy are higher today ever.

Democracy promotion efforts should not be limited to the election years alone but events
throughout the electoral cycle because learning from the 2013 elections, most
irregularities emanate from pre-election processes. Strict monitoring of state electoral
institutions deters or complicates manipulation e.g. CSOs and citizens could constantly
check their voter records as well as their family’s and insist on the removal of deceased
persons or correct existing details. Long term support also prevents the institutionalization
of election administration emanating from reliance on temporary rather than permanent
personnel who often possess little experience (Resnick, 2013). Though costly, some CSOs
have “Long term observers” who keep them updated on political developments in each
constituency.

A close look into democratization trends across Sub-Saharan Africa indicates a need for
patience. Electoral democratic processes and institutions in Zimbabwe such as CSOs and
election monitoring and observations are about a decade old. Meaning, active observation
and advocacy has only been over approximately three main election rounds. And learning
from Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia it is evident all countries might not democratize after
the second or third round of elections (Lindberg, 2006) but require more time. Zambia
from 1964 only became a consolidated democracy around 2000, Ghana became
independent in 1957 but democratized in 1992, Nigeria in 1960 but fully democratized
around 1999. It was however evident among donors interviewed that, even they do not
know how long democratization should take. So future studies on democratization in
Africa might consider focusing on the average length required for any transition before it
requires attention. More consensus on what democracy means and the benefits for
democratization would help strengthening democratization theories.
152

Donors
External actors can influence the politics of a foreign state nevertheless, as the democracy
promotion field grows in actors, scopes and strategies more unity and common grounds
are fundamental to jointly and meaningfully impact foreign politics. Western governments
could take advantage of the widened space, their shared relationships and resources to
make ‘scientific’ or ‘laboratory’ like experiments with aid given the diversity of dependent
variables. More than half of Sub-Saharan Africa continues to face governance problems,
some ‘not free’ and pure authoritarians, some stateless, some ‘partly free,' some hybrid
and some ‘free’ and consolidated democracies. Though prone to ethical dilemmas, similar
and acceptable strategies could be applied to all cases to observe the different ‘reactions’
or effects. Learning from these, strategies could be modified next, and the whole process
could be repeated over some time to find effective strategies. This study proposes this
period as all countries are now independent with basic political structures in place.
Because some countries use democracy assistance as an ‘instrument’ e.g. regime change
while some institutions (neutral or transnational e.g. the UN), their success rates cannot
be assessed in the same breadth. The recipient organization’s attitude or operations
particularly CSOs i.e. the way the funds provided are used, can affect the effectiveness of
democracy assistance. Donors may need to consider combining and channeling aid
through such neutral agencies particularly for state institutions like parliaments and
security forces. Nonetheless, existent overt donor bias towards the assistance of proopposition encourages authoritarians to maintain a monopoly over state resources for
finance and complicates accountability particularly when foreign party assistance is
illegal.

Current donor fatigue can only be solved by internal re-strategizing by both donors and
recipients. A clear performance criterion from donors and its implications (i.e., what
happens if an organization fails to perform over a period of time) is also necessary to
motivate recipients to increase their capacity and effectiveness. This requires careful
monitoring either by donors or external evaluators and auditors. Donors need to desist
from dictating causes and strategies and allow for flexibility to reduce the ‘Jack of all
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trades’ problem. The multiplicity of organisations should be replaced by active, focused
and coordinated network. There is need for patience as the transfer of democratic norms
and values takes time (Lindberg, 2006). UNDP’s continuous ‘neutral’ mediation between
government and Western donors remains necessary. Also, given the development aid vs.
political aid successes, donors might need to consider channeling more aid through
development programs in poor countries.

Yes, there are more democracies today than ever before but caution is required when
evaluating the effectiveness of democracy promotion and attributing credit as the isolation
of causal factors might be dangerous for future applications where the same conditions
might not have the same effect — as in the case of Zimbabwe. Therefore, the ‘one size
fits all’ strategy is not effective as political challenges differ across cases. Donors must be
flexible to modify their ‘set tool boxes’ (Carothers 2004) and prepare for alternative
effects. Furthermore, donor verification of democratic conditions in recipient states is
necessary before committing to democracy assistance. Democracy promotion does and
has promoted democracy to an extent as the concept of ‘good governance’ has received a
lot of attention across Africa. It has given rise to citizen and institutional demands on
governments to positively perform along with pressure for transparency and
accountability. Political systems in Sub-Saharan Africa have begun to mirror Western
ones. Today 48 of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 49 countries allow their citizens to select their
leadership at various levels. Courts have been formalized with the institutionalization of
frameworks under internationally competitive constitutions and citizens although limited,
can express themselves. The Zimbabwean case provides lessons for future initiatives in
modern authoritarian states and an impetus for democracy promotion to develop.

On conditionality, foreign pressure through the imposition of conditionalities does not
work where authoritarian incumbents have alternatives sources of cooperation. In the case
of Zimbabwe, it has given the incumbent an excuse to divert blame for failed policies.
Conditionality also improves incentives for countries to look and act like democracies for
aid. Historical events are a factor especially previous relationships between the imposer
and the recipient when investigating conditionality’s success. Where necessary, donors
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must coordinate to avoid contradictions and duplications. Today, it is limited by the
increase in alternatives given an increase in global powers especially China triumphing
on contrasting governance models and “emerging democracies,” like India, Brazil and
South Africa. However, while China continues to challenge Western dominance over
Africa’s foreign partners, the West remains a valuable donor and partner in economic,
welfare and politics.

Opposition
Zimbabwe’s opposition parties are too weak to defend their victory. Investments are
necessary to enhance their capacities; otherwise authoritarians will continue to claim it.
Opposition parties need to be proactive in identifying and advocating against pre-electoral
violations to avoid election boycotts. Furthermore, investments in political party observers
to gather sufficient evidence are vital for petitions and appeals. Where there are faced with
dominant party systems, public debates are necessary to consientize the electorate and
highlight incumbent failures.
Existing disunity and conflict due to a myriad of splinter groups prolongs the ruling party’s
tenure as the vote is divided. Coordination is necessary for meaningful representation and
regime change.
Issues of intra-party power transfer must be constitutionally addressed to avoid the
creation of more ‘strong men’. Moreover, mismanagement and corruption motivated more
by personal gain also limit the effectiveness and relevance of opposition, therefore, the
revision of norms and practices is necessary.

Civil society
CSOs need to be independent so that they are not affected by aid decline. Because they
had become elite societies, they need to reengage the grassroots for support and
continuously mobilize to remain relevant rather than wait for the next election. CSOs must
also be objective and non-partisan, this is necessary to possibly reduce repression from
authoritarians and illustrate their aim for free and fair political participation.
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Judiciary
Civil servants including EMBs, security sector and judicial or legislative bodies should be
adequately compensated to avoid a reliance on state ‘benefits’ and bribes to increase their
independence. Repressive laws like POSA and AIPPA need repealing for free access to
information, public participation and contestation before the next elections. Only when
judicial powers expand in relation to the executives can we expect absolute rule of law.

Police and military
Security should be depersonalized to monitor and secure interests of all parties.
Restructuring within security forces is imperative to regain public trust in their role as
protectors of all. Constant training for both police and military could also improve their
professionalism separated from preferences. Additionally, violence reinforcing systems
and institutions like security forces, youth militia and war veterans need reform or
purging.

Future scenarios
Zimbabwe’s coercion and repression of pro-democratic institutions and elements can only
be solved by these scenarios: Either authoritarian strongholds are weakened from within
e.g. intra-party splits, state institutions strengthen to defend themselves, or laws and state
institutions become independent of executive influence. Power decentralization from the
executive to institutions is required to restore public confidence. According to Geddes et
al., “When the leader of an autocratic regime loses power, one of three things happens.
Someone from the incumbent leadership group replaces him, and the regime persists. The
incumbent leadership group is replaced by democratically elected leaders. Or the
incumbent leadership group loses control to a different group that replaces it with a new
autocracy.”

A few predictions or scenarios were gathered from the interview on Zimbabwe's future
and most drew closer to the first proposition: that internal splits within the ruling party
between the first lady’s camp and Vice President Mnangagwa’s camp could result in
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Mnangagwa’s military backed camp taking over, although some consider this would be
moving from one autocrat to another. Some however said, the myriad of splinter parties
could form a coalition against the dominant incumbent as the MDC alone against ZanuPF has become too divided to defeat the incumbent as it often unites against opposition.
One opposition MP’s third scenario was that MDC’s president Tsvangirai steps down and
opens his position for an election to illustrate his real commitment to democracy and not
the ‘power hungry dictator’ he is accused of being — since he has not managed to defend
his ‘victory’ against Mugabe since 2000. He said, this would revive hope and prove their
democratic commitment to the electorate. He added that their motto or message needed
revision as the decade long “Chinja Maitiro” (Change your ways) or “Mugabe Must Go”
mottos had become “tired”.
Based on Siegel’s (2007) four stages of state transition, like Lindberg (2006), Zimbabwe
could be in the “10-15 years ‘transition’ phase” and its transition from a purely
authoritarian state to a competitive authoritarian could be a sign of progress. We must
remain optimistic, learning from Nigeria, dictatorial rule to a competitive electoral regime
tends to lead to further democratization and eventually democracy. Following Carothers’
proposition, authoritarians fall in different ways for different reasons, aid may help
improve contestation and participation but if the authoritarian is resolute at manipulating
the people’s will to guarantee his interests, external support cannot do much, neither can
internal transformative groups. International support however keeps the regime
accountable to an extent and sustains hopes for democratization. Current complications of
intra-party divisions and limited resources to maintain patronage networks that previously
supported Zimbabwe’s incumbent maybe an alternative source for change.

But, as argued in this research, there is need for investment in research for effective
electoral democratic practices learning from academic studies conducted elsewhere.
Practitioners need to come together with academics to marry theory and empirical findings
from similar cases. When evaluating democratic progress, it is necessary to look beyond
attributes like the transfer of power alone. Democratization involves varied aspects
necessary for consideration. Following Tilly's approaches to democracy, regarding
157

constitutional laws CSOs need to advocate against state laws limiting their activities. For
the substantive approach, CSOs and citizens must continue to fight for genuine promotion
of civil liberties. Regarding Tilly's procedural approach, there is need for enhancing and
encouraging contestation by encouraging multi-partism, conducting transparent and
objective voting processes including a clean and efficient voter registration exercise with
an acceptable and publicly accessed voter's roll, ensuring the independence of electoral
managing bodies, eventually resulting in some transfer of power whether inter or intra
party.
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